

OUTLINES
OF
LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS

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TRANSLATED FROM THE 4th (REVISED) EDITION, WITH
PREFATORY ESSAY

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PREFATORY ESSAY.

IN all discourse, or verbal expression of thought, there regularly occur, besides terms representing mere objects or groups or classes of objects, terms which, instead, stand for general notions, originating within rather than from without, predicates and relations under which, for the mind, objects stand or by which they are determined—that is to say, the so-called categories of thought. Such terms are, for example, *being*, *quantity*, *essence*, *cause*, *actuality*, *end*, *truth*, with their primitives or derivatives. The general notions for which such terms stand are of very great significance and interest, not only as forming the ground of definite connection, in consciousness, among objects, but also as together constituting a world of realities of themselves.

That these notions have a necessary reality and meaning in experience, and so are a possible matter for a real science, is *practically* evident from the fact that they are indispensable to thinking and discourse as such, to objective or fixed coherence among ideas, to knowledge or science: the very forms of language necessarily imply them, and for this reason, if for no other, they are, since language is but the embodiment and instrument of thought in general, indispensable to thought itself; and the sciences, as the embodiment of ideas of definite and necessary connections

among objects, continually involve them, so that it may with entire truth be said that any science is really and truly a science in proportion to the (indirect) recognition which the categories receive in it. And for the matter of that—it is worthy of being observed in passing—the products of mere fancy could not exist without a certain basis in the categories.

The *theoretical* proof of the necessity, reality and great significance of the categories has to be given by a special science which takes precisely them for its subject-matter. The recognition which the sciences in general give to the categories, is, for the greater part, merely practical and indirect, not theoretical and direct. Even the sciences of discourse—grammar, philology, rhetoric, formal logic—though containing very distinct implications of the categories as something distinguishable from a given material in which, speaking roughly, they are, so to say, immersed, and bringing to clear consciousness the necessity of studying the categories in and for themselves, do not undertake so to study them, to investigate their (logical) origin, necessity, validity, organic relations, and groupings—in short, to “criticise” the categories as such. Still less is this study undertaken by the sciences whose subject-matter is the external world rather than discourse or thought itself. Such study, investigation, criticism, is, let it be repeated, the task of a distinct science, the science, in fact, of science as such, namely, Philosophy, and, in particular, the fundamental part of it, Logic.

Now a complete understanding of the nature of Logic is, of course, not possible at the threshold of the science, but must be gained by the study of it in its entirety. But a certain preliminary notion of it is necessary and may here be laid down. Let, then, Logic be provisionally defined as, *par excellence*, the

criticism of the categories. Criticism may be of two sorts: it may be merely or mostly analytical, restrictive, negative, formal; or it may be synthetical, developmental, positive, real. Criticism of the first-named sort is content to assume its object as given, isolate, scrutinize closely enough merely to detect its limitations without always positively and directly supplying the proper complement for the overcoming of the limitations; and instead of allowing its object to be determined for thought by its natural relations, is apt to judge it according to a standard lying too much outside itself, and hence to be formal rather than real. Of this nature is, to cite an example, in a measure the Kantian criticism of the categories, in spite of the search for synthetic truth by which that criticism was motivated. That criticism was in great part an effort to prevent the (mis)application of the categories beyond a restricted sphere, to keep "human" thought within certain secure bounds. It assumed the categories as logical facts, analysed them, treating as distinct and opposed certain of them which had real meaning and truth only in organic reference to one another, and in consequence reached the essentially negative result that "human thought" is fatally self-contradictory as regards ultimate reality, that there is or may be a realm beyond the reach of thought, an unknowable "thing-in-itself," and that the laws of thought are in relation to it merely regulative. But criticism, to be adequate to its object, must be more than the Kantian criticism or anything else of its kind. The categories must be viewed as in organic relation to one another and to all possible or conceivable matter of thought. The discovery of the limitations of the categories taken either individually or as groups must also be the discovery of what is complementary to them; each category, instead of being assumed as given, must be

known in its origin in a logically preceding one, and its transition into a logically succeeding one, and the categories collectively must be seen as a system of predicates in organic relation to a subject to which they apply and give determination and meaning. The true criticism of the categories is their self-criticism, their spontaneous self-limitation and self-sublation into higher truth, their evolution in a series or system. It is thus the affirmation as well as the negation of the categories; a criticism, indeed, which contains as a factor a certain measure of dogmatism. Such is the general nature of the logical criticism of the categories. From this it is necessary to distinguish strictly the "psychological" criticism which occupies itself with the determination of the temporal order in which, and the circumstances under which, they make their entrance into the individual consciousness as such in its relations with environment. The meaning of a category in itself and in relation to other categories as such is not identical with its meaning in and for the merely individual mind. Logic, then, is the solution of the problem of the evolution of the categories—is itself this evolution. This solution, as having to do solely with activities or objects of pure thought, is itself a work of pure thought, and, naturally, proceeds according to the method of that which is determined from within rather than from without, or is self-determined. Beginning with the lowest, simplest, most abstract form of thought, it proceeds by a gradual development to the highest, most complex, most concrete, thereby discovering or rather evolving the series or system of pure forms of thought or the categories. (See below § 20.)

For the sake of as full as possible a preliminary notion of the nature and importance of the Science of Logic, we may here consider, very briefly, its relation

to the sciences in the more common acceptation of the term. These sciences, whether consciously or not, assume as a fact the general *rationality* of the world of existing things, and their task is the working out or verification of this assumption. Now it is almost a mere truism to say that to the complete realisation of this assumption made by science the conscious understanding of what the rational, as such is, is indispensable. But the knowledge of the rational as such is precisely what Logic is ; therefore the cultivation of the sciences, to be sound and truly successful, must be coupled with that of Logic. It has sometimes been supposed, not unnaturally, perhaps, that the science of thought as such is empty and barren, and should be—in fact, really has been—superseded, for really active intelligence, by a new form of thought, *viz.*, natural science—possessing a rich and valuable content. But the judicious will guard against being too sanguine in belief as to the value of the content of the new form of thought taken merely by itself, or in entire abstraction from that which it is supposed to have superseded. There is more than one sort of emptiness and barrenness ; pure sense-knowledge, or mere experience, is quite as barren and empty as pure thought, or mere speculation, can be. And science as the work of observation, experiment, and formal inference must, to maintain its interest for, and have a real claim upon, the mind of man in its full integrity, become distinctly congruent with and expressive of the essence of pure, self-active thought. The final interpretation and valuation of the results reached in the sciences is not possible within the limits of the natural sciences as such, but must depend upon the co-operation of the science of thought as such. No thoroughly intelligent devotee of science, commonly so-called, thinks of the science of thought as empty and lifeless ; he knows better, and, as his limited oppor-

tunities permit, he borrows and applies its ideal and idealising truths to give the results of his works depth and stability for inner consciousness. To illustrate the truth of the foregoing statements by means of a concrete case, let us take the most interesting and fruitful of the concepts advanced and applied by "science" in the present age, *i.e.*, of "evolution." The very clearest exhibition possible of the nature of evolution is, it would seem, to be found in the process by which (as shown in the present work) thought by an inherent, natural tendency unfolds from a germ which is simplicity itself to the highest degree of complexity or concreteness. Indeed, the concept of an evolving activity, an activity continually repeating itself in successively higher powers, each of which preserves in itself the essential virtue of the one preceding, is an ideal, not an empirical, notion, an object of pure, speculative thought rather than anything that can actually be found (except as "put there") in the external world as such. It would seem, therefore, that natural science, to complete its own work, to secure its own complete evolution, in fact, must take into itself, or, rather, be sublated into, the science of thought; the result being, not indeed the pure science of thought or logic, but rather philosophy in a concreter form. Again—to take another concrete case—natural science, at least as cultivated at the present day, assumes, or tends to assume, that it is true to its ideal, and to the ideal generally, in proportion as it is able to explain the world of external existences in mathematical terms; it, therefore, tries to reduce dynamical or chemical, and even biological truth to mechanical, and thereby to mathematical truth. Now, whatever the convenience there may be in being able to apply mathematical calculation to chemical and biological phenomena, it is, to the student of the categories as such, certain that there is a kind of un-

truth in such application, if it be regarded as ultimate explanation. In pure thought, or in pure science, for such is Logic, the mechanical categories just as certainly are incomplete and relative, and as certainly sublate themselves into chemical and organic categories as their higher truth, as the stone, say, falls to the earth because its absolute centre of gravity is in the earth and not itself. In short, natural science merely as such lacks in comprehension of the relative value in themselves of the categories it finds it convenient to use, and must depend upon the science of the categories as such, or Logic, for the remedy for its defect in this case.

But there is one other consideration that may be here adduced to show the nature and necessity of the logical standpoint, a subjective and formal, because psychological, consideration. It is this: the mind, in the activities of sensible perception, sensuous imagination and conception, feels impelled by a necessity, which, while in these stages of its working, it does not yet understand, to move onward to the stage of thought as such in which, as at home with its essential self, it comfortably rests. In fact, the recognised lower stages are in themselves self-contradictory and incomplete. The world of perception is too much a sphere of mere multiplicity, mere otherness; that of abstract understanding, or understanding which ignores the individual for the sake of a fancied universal, has a unity that is constrained and repulsive to the mind. What is demanded is that sense and abstract understanding be harmonised in a certain concrete unity, that the real and the (so-called) ideal, phenomena and law, object and subject, be seen, or at least distinctly felt, as at bottom one and the same fact. The systematic development of the consideration here briefly set forth forms the necessary *psychological* propædæutic to the study of Logic (see below),

§ 25). From this it is not to be inferred that Logic is not the ultimate form of thought as such, but merely that a certain preparation is necessary for minds inexperienced in logical reflection, a certain elimination, as it were, of psychological functions that would naturally exercise a perturbing influence upon the function of pure thinking.

The work on Logic (in the sense above explained), of which the present is offered as an English translation, is, of the number of existing works of its class, by its conciseness, its relative simplicity of exposition, and the systematic character of its form, peculiarly well adapted for use as an introductory treatise on the subject which it undertakes to cover: and for this reason has been translated. Its author has for upwards of half a century been eminent as a philosophical author and editor as well as university teacher. The present translation has been made from the fourth edition of the original work. For comparison's sake we insert here a few notes of resemblances and differences between this version of the Hegelian Logic and others. In his division of the First Part of Logic Erdmann agrees with Hegel, who is uniform with himself in this respect, in the larger, the lesser, and the propædeutical treatises; but differs from Michelet, whose division is a little peculiar. Michelet divides as follows: Being as such (or indeterminate being), there-being (or determinate being), and being-for-self (the synthesis of the two). For him quantity and mode (or, as he prefers, measure), together with ideality, fall under being-for-self, as its chief moments, while quality is a subordinate moment of there-being. The *general* development, however, which Michelet gives of being, from the beginning to the transition to essence, is substantially the same as that given by Erdmann; it is merely the nodes or crises in the development that are different. The distinctions laid down by

Erdmann as regards quantitative relation, while agreeing with those laid down in Hegel's Larger Logic, are more specific than those given in the Lesser Logic or in Michelet's work. Attention may be directed to Erdmann's use of *mode* as the third category of being, the synthesis of quality and quantity. Hegel, Michelet, and others here use measure instead. For Erdmann, the reader observes, measure is a variety of mode. Erdmann uses the term mode in the popular rather than the philosophical sense; for, by the very powerful example and influence of Spinoza, mode has generally had in philosophical discussion a signification which would make it denote a category of considerably higher order than that it denotes in Erdmann's treatment, namely, a category of essence rather than of being. Michelet so uses it, making it a sub-category to the absolute. Erdmann's treatment of actuality, while essentially the same as Hegel's, as given in the Lesser Logic, diverges from that given in the Larger Logic and that given by Michelet, and, in fact, seems unfinished. In *interaction as such* the moment of plurality outweighs still that of unity; in order to bring actuality to its true conclusion it seems necessary to posit it as totality, which is multiplicity returned into unity. This is done in the concept of the absolute. In pursuance of this idea Michelet (*Logik*, § § 82, 83, 84, 85) gives as the division of actuality the following: (1) Actuality as such (embracing possibility, contingency, and necessity), (2) actuality as necessary relation (embracing substantiality, causality, reciprocity, or interaction), (3) actuality as the absolute (embracing exposition of the absolute, relativity, mode). In the absolute the sphere of mediation rounds itself completely out, and at the same time becomes tangent to that of subjectivity. The absolute is the reverse side of subjectivity. Erdmann's symmetrical division of judgment and of

sylogism, in accordance with the three-foldness of the dialectic method, diverges from these given by Hegel and Michelet, which are as follows: (1) Judgments of quality, of essence, of reflection, of necessity; (2) syllogisms of there-being, [and of quantity, Michelet] of reflection (H.), or essence (M.), of necessity. Rosenkranz also gives a four-fold division of judgments. Instead of the development of objectivity which Erdmann gives, we find in Hegel and Michelet: mechanism, chemism or dynamism, teleology. Rosenkranz and others relegate the categories of objectivity to the philosophy of nature entirely. (See below § 191, obs. 4, § 192, obs. 2, § 197, obs. 1. etc.) (Cf. Hegel, *Encyklopädie*, § 195, obs.; Michelet, *Logik*, § 124.) Instead of the grand divisions of Logic given in the present work, and in Hegel and Michelet, we find in Rosenkranz the doctrine of being (including essence as well as being proper), the doctrine of the concept, the doctrine of ideas. (See Rosenkranz's *Logik*, or his *Meine Reform der Hegelschen Philosophie*.)

An explanation seems called for as to the use throughout of the term *concept* as a translation of *Be-griff*, instead of the term *notion* so long in vogue in the same use. Concept has been chosen for three reasons. First, it is the etymological equivalent of *Be-griff*. Secondly, its use is necessary to consistency in logical terminology; if *judgment* and *sylogism* are necessarily employed in the doctrine of subjectivity, *concept* must be preferred to *notion*. Since the three terms, *concept*, *judgment* and *sylogism*, regularly are found together in psychological as well as logical discussion, as denoting the three successive stages of (abstract) thought and its products, there seems no better reason for discarding *concept* and using *notion* in its stead, than there would be for discarding *judgment* and *sylogism*, one or both, and putting others in their places. Thirdly, the use of *concept*, in an

objective as well as a subjective sense, gives a wholesome shock and challenge to thought, too much inclined to be merely subjective and one-sided, and helps to elevate it to the truly philosophic plane. To the foregoing considerations may be added this, that *notion* is in its ordinary sense rather *too* subjective—more subjective than even *concept*, since it may signify what is merely arbitrarily *fancied*, or surmised, or intended, instead of being definitely represented in any form of *thought* proper, whether concrete or abstract.

Some additions have been made to the original of the present work, in the form of references, included in []. They occur in the *Notes*; it is hoped that they contribute to the usefulness of the volume.

B. C. B.

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OUTLINES OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. THE union of Logic and Metaphysics must, if one consider the long period in which they were treated separately one from the other, be called something new ; while recent works represent it as something antiquated. Our introductory remarks, accordingly, have to examine not merely the objections that are usually made to each of these two disciplines, but also those which are brought against their union.

§ 2. The old (or school) *logic*, which was mostly regarded as *description*⁽¹⁾ of correct thinking or also as a *guide*⁽²⁾ thereto, lost the respect which for two thousand years it had enjoyed, when the discovery was believed to have been made that it was not only

useless, because teaching only what everyone already knew without it, but even *harmful*, because, if its rules (which, of course, are valid only for *finite* thought)⁽³⁾ were followed in the highest spheres of knowledge, the result must be an abstractly intellectual treatment⁽⁴⁾ of philosophy. The universally felt need of a reform of philosophy could not be satisfied by the employment of foreign elements,⁽⁵⁾ but only by the presentation of logic as a *science*, which has not so much to reject as to understand the rules of the old logic, and, while that took account only of finite thought, to consider also free or absolute thought.⁽⁶⁾

(1) The father of logic, Aristotle, proceeded as a "describer of Nature." (2) Hence in the Middle Ages the question whether logic is an art or a science. This question also underlies the Kantian distinction between canon and organon. [See Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason, Method of Transcendentalism," ch. ii.] (3) *Finite* thought is thought of a given objective; such thought is expressed in *propositions*, and from the analysis of the *proposition* Aristotle deduced the primary logical distinctions. (4) The age in which the intellect was so depreciated was therefore inimically disposed also towards logic. (5) Such foreign element is, for example, introduced into logic by its union with psychology. (6) This is the task which Hegel set himself in his reform of logic.

§ 3. *Metaphysics*—merely *per accidens* so called, instead of by the earlier designation, *πρώτη φιλοσοφία*—styled sometimes the theory of the being, or also of

the *essence*, of things (hence also ontology), sometimes the science of that which transcends the sensible, could be accepted as the proper centre of philosophy—indeed, could in general exist—only so long as the *knowability* of the essence of things or of the supersensible was admitted. The Kantian reform of philosophy had therefore as a consequence the fact that the earlier metaphysics appeared as something impossible. Upon what foundations the objections to it rest, and what is the strength of the objections, logic itself has to investigate. (§ 40.) True, these objections have, by the fact that they have become universally prevalent opinions of the age, acquired a great influence, but before they are proved they are to be treated as mere *prejudices* of the age ; and, in *the first instance*, to the *assertion* that metaphysics is impossible, may by way of neutralisation be opposed the *assertion* that it is possible.

§ 4. Finally, the *combination* of *logic and metaphysics*,—since the former has *thought*, the latter *being*, as its object,—appears inadmissible, on account of the opposition of subjective and objective. This opposition will indeed show itself to be false, but only within logic itself. It is, therefore, since, particularly in modern times, it has taken possession of the opinion of all the educated, provisionally to be made harmless by showing how even this opinion does not

treat it as so uncontested an axiom as this opinion itself supposes. This showing is obviously no proof for the contrary view, but merely claims to neutralise one prejudice by another.

§ 5. If, that is, one reflects upon what the *thought* with which logic is supposed to be concerned is, one understands thereby the activity of the mind which has as its product the *universal*. Since, further, the mind in thought acts as universal, the expression "Thought is the activity of the universal," is in its two-fold sense correct. Contemplation, or the thinking consideration of *an object*, therefore, universalises it, *i.e.*, *alters* it. Nevertheless, we believe that by contemplation we gain a knowledge of the *essence* of things—become conscious of fact itself.

Why such an alteration must be made in the object in order to perceive its *essence*, will become yet clearer later, when essence in general is treated. (§ 87, obs. 2.)

§ 6. But, now, since what we gain a knowledge of by thinking can be nothing other than *thought*, *i.e.*, something subjective, and, also, we suppose that by thinking we gain a knowledge of fact—fact in its truth, *i.e.*, something objective—it is contained in our ordinary consciousness that there are determinations of thought which are at one and the same time precisely as well subjective as also objective relations of actuality.⁽¹⁾ These subjective *and* objective thoughts

we call, to distinguish them from merely subjective thoughts or notions, *categories*,⁽²⁾ and understand thereby, not, with Kant, merely so-called root-concepts, but likewise also root-relations, approximating thus the Aristotelian concept of categories. If, now, it is shown that what ontology and metaphysics contained consists, precisely as did the content of the old logic, only in categories, it is thereby also shown that a separation of the two is a violent abstraction which may under certain circumstances be proper,⁽³⁾ but is not conditioned by the nature of the two disciplines. In this manner, then, is the difficulty above stated (§ 4) removed.

(1) Mere reflection upon ideas common to us all, shows, therefore, that that opposition of subjective and objective is not an absolute one. (2) Instead of *category* one may also employ the word *thought* merely as singular. (3) The propriety of a separation of the formally logical from the metaphysical is a pedagogical one for the subject. Similarly, words are presented to the child, separated into letters, in order that the child may learn to read *words as wholes*.

§ 7. Scientific method demands completeness of content. The science of the categories will have, therefore, to lay down all the categories. Their totality may be termed *reason*;⁽¹⁾ they themselves, accordingly, *relations of reason*. (The word *idea*⁽²⁾ designates only the system of rationality.) No name⁽³⁾ is for this science more suitable than that of

logic, since etymologically it has reference⁽⁴⁾ as much to the objective as to the subjective nature of its content, and since it contains nothing whatever besides the laws and forms by which thought is bound.⁽⁵⁾

(1) "In the world there is reason," signifies (objective) coherence. "We think by means of reason," means by means of the categories.⁽²⁾ The word *idea* is, precisely as *reason*, in the first instance merely a name; *what* the idea is is shown in the *entire* logic, hence first at the end of it. (3) For the combination of logic and metaphysics which Schleiermacher attempted, the name *dialectic* was in every respect the most suitable. In Schleiermacher the Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic senses of the word are combined. (4) λόγος similarly as *ratio*. (5) One may, therefore, not say that Hegel has employed the word contrarily to the ordinary usage of language.

§ 8. The peculiar *difficulty* of logic lies in the fact that, since the categories are continually employed, an abstraction is necessary for making them themselves the subject of consideration. In the *unwontedness* of making an object of consideration that which appears to one as the most familiar of things, and directing attention upon the categories themselves instead of upon what, otherwise, one thinks by *means* of the categories, the greater part of what is called the unintelligibility of logic has its ground. This unwontedness creates always the wish that, in using the categories one might, as one habitually does,

think something else (namely, the object), whereas the problem is, precisely, to think *them only*.

§ 9. But precisely in what constitutes its difficulty lies also the *importance*, or the so-called advantage, of logical study. As the scientific criticism of the categories employed in thought, logic teaches how to distinguish⁽¹⁾ the true from the untrue categories, as well as how to discern in what sphere of knowledge certain categories have validity, in what not.⁽²⁾ As embracing *all* categories, it prevents the narrowness of finding in one or some relations of reason, reason itself as a whole. With this material importance is also connected a formal importance. As habituation to the dealing with mere categories, logical study is a discipline for consciousness, and serves as exercise and propædæutic⁽³⁾ for the subject entering upon philosophy. In all these respects, logic is properly the *fundamental philosophy*, or forms the first part of the system of philosophy.

⁽¹⁾ A category may in itself be *untrue*, and in the application of such a category the result of thought *must* be false. ⁽²⁾ One may, for example, apply to the spiritual, categories which are correct in the study of nature; and thus the result is inept. ⁽³⁾ If one regards and employs logic as *mere gymnastic* of thought, one must, of course, disregard the objective (metaphysical) meaning of thought, and view it only in so far as it is produced by the thinking of the subject. (See § 7, obs. 1.) Like all gymnastics, logic as

mere exercise belongs to the school. The school or gymnastical logic is a subject of learning and exercise, not of scientific study.

§ 10. The last expression states, so far as this may be done prior to the treatment of logic, the *relation of logic to the other philosophical disciplines*. (Cf. § 233.) Logic has to do not only with the *forms* of truth, but also with truth itself, with the categories as the “souls of actuality.” But they are the *mere* souls of actuality, and logic leads, therefore, into a “realm of shadows.” Logic is, therefore, not the whole of science, but only its *foundation*.

Our exposition has two rocks to avoid. First, there is that of taking logic in the merely formal sense and making it lifeless abstraction. The fact, on the contrary, is, that logic contains in germ the *entire* truth. Second, is the rock of making it so comfortable for the subject in this realm of shadows that he will no longer have a desire for the life-giving blood of the concreter parts of philosophy. Here the case is that logic presents only the germ of truth.

§ 11. If logic is the *science* (§ 2) of the categories or of thought, that will be true of it which is true of science in general. Since of the latter, that, in the first instance, only is well known which is contained in cultivated opinion, it is necessary to reflect upon it. Of *science* as a *system* of what is known⁽¹⁾ and not a mere aggregate, that must be valid which is true of knowledge in general, *viz.*, that it may not be

satisfied with the perception *that* something is so or otherwise, but has to do with the *necessity* of this relation.⁽²⁾ Our idea of necessity is, therefore, to be analysed, and from it conclusions drawn.

(1) The word *Wissenschaft* is formed analogously with *Landschaft*, *Ritterschaft*, etc., and means, as they do, a body closed within itself. (2) Aristotle's distinction between $\delta\tau\iota$ and $\delta\iota\acute{o}\tau\iota$ correctly brings out the essential character of knowledge. [See A.'s "Posterior Analytics," i. 13 ; ii. 1.]

§ 12. Since in this analysis it appears that necessity may be spoken of only where *two* things (*i.e.*, a ground and thing grounded) are inseparably united or identical,⁽¹⁾ and that herein alone necessity consists, one, in order to know a thing in its necessity, must, since the necessary nevertheless *is*, first seize it in this its fixed determinateness and unity with itself. Contemplation which emphasises this moment is contemplation by the *understanding* ;⁽²⁾ when it is carried out one-sidedly, it results in the mode of view which is termed dogmatism.⁽³⁾

(1) Identity is inseparable combination, not sameness. (2) The element of the understanding is an essential one in philosophical contemplation. Where it is wanting everything floats in nebulous indefiniteness. This is by those forgotten who try to make the understanding out to be something bad. (3) Correctly is it given as the character of dogmatism that, in the interest of definiteness it holds fast to *aut aut*. [See Hegel's "Encyklopädie," § 119.] Since it resolves

everything into its fixed, simple determinations, dogmatism has an abstract character. In the so-called metaphysics of the understanding of the Wolfian school, this moment stands out in its extreme one-sidedness.

§ 13. But, likewise, the necessary contains in itself, *secondly*, distinct determinations (that duality, § 12), since only thereby does it contain the motion which belongs to necessity. The contemplation of the understanding, therefore, does not suffice; for regard must be had to *contradiction* in the object as well as to its resting determinateness. To do this is the problem of *reflection*⁽¹⁾ which, carried out one-sidedly, gives the diametrical opposite of dogmatism, *scepticism*.⁽²⁾

(1) The moment, which reflection emphasises, is by Hegel ["Encyklopädie," § § 79, 81] designated as the dialectical or negatively rational. (2) As dogmatism holds fast to the fact that the object *is* and therefore does not contradict itself, so scepticism maintains that the object *contradicts itself*, and therefore cannot be.

§ 14. But, *thirdly*, the necessary is both at once: it *is*, and contains in itself *contradiction*. Therein is it something *concrete*.⁽¹⁾ The *combining* moment is, therefore, precisely as essential in the account as are the two others. But even this, which in practical matters gives to the healthy human understanding such superiority to all abstractions (*i.e.*, one-sidedness),

may in science be one-sidedly emphasised at the expense of the others; and this happens not merely upon the standpoint of so-called *common sense*, but also upon that of *intellectual intuition*, and, finally, even in Jacobi's *immediate knowledge*, both of which last oppose themselves to the thought of the understanding as well as to reflection.⁽²⁾

(1) The *abstract* is that which contains in itself only one determination; the concrete that which contains several. (2) The age has scarcely passed in which the *philosophy of reflection* was the most common term of reproach.

§ 15. Fully conceived, the necessary is found only where all these moments receive their rights, *i.e.*, in *speculative* thought (*cf.* my "Outlines of Psychology," § 122) or where there is *comprehension*. This occurs when the object is taken *first* as it is, *then* as it *contradicts* itself, *finally* as it is the *concrete* identity of opposites.

If one term virtuosity in fixing, understanding, in analysing, acumen, in combining, ingenuity, then speculative *penetration* will have them all as pre-supposed moments.

§ 16. But if one takes the object so, it is at *first* something other than what it is *afterwards* or *finally*; but what it is afterwards proves, on nearer examination, to be its *proper* being. Comprehension will, therefore, only then occur when in the object to be

comprehended a contradiction is discovered between what it was *first* taken to be and what is its *proper* signification. In this case it is perceived that the object is rightly taken only when conceived afterwards in a way different from that in which it was conceived before. But in this it is said that it must *be* afterwards other than it was *before*. This means that the perception of that contradiction will show that the object must so alter that it *actually* becomes that which it *properly* is. When this occurs, the contradiction is resolved. But since an object's becoming that which it *properly* is, is *development*, it follows from the reflections just made (§ § 12-16) that a thing is *comprehended*, and hence (§ 15) perceived as necessary, only when it is perceived in its development.

§ 17. Though a thing is perceived as necessary only when seized in its development, the converse does not follow. Even temporal genesis is a development; it proceeds from a contradiction like that just indicated;⁽¹⁾ but since the contradiction which mediates the temporal genesis of an object, at least, *may*⁽²⁾ be an *accidental* one, the proper necessity of an object is not with its genesis perceived.⁽³⁾ That necessity is perceived only when in the object itself apart from *external* circumstances there is, perceived, as inseparable from the essence of the object, that

contradiction from which, because it is inseparable, the development which is posited with the concept of the object, *i.e.*, the *eternal* development, follows. ⁽⁴⁾ This *eternal development* is what comprehending perception has to bring to light.

(1) The ripe fruit separates itself from the tree because there is contained a contradiction in the fact that the *ripe*, *i.e.*, the really independent, should be *fruit*, *i.e.*, selfless. (2) External circumstances may produce a contradiction where it has in the object no ground: *e.g.*, wounding a living organism. (3) This is mistaken by those who would replace comprehension by *genetic* thought. The *origin* of States has nothing to do with their notion. Even Aristotle distinguished the historic origin of the State from its true ground. (4) The concept of eternity which Spinoza already rightly conceived has no relationship with time. [See Spinoza's "Ethics," part i., def. viii.; also part ii., prop. 44, cor. 2.] Similarly the mathematician speaks of that which (not temporally understood) *follows* from what has preceded, but means, in so doing, *eternal* sequence.

§ 18. The property of an object to enter into such eternal motion conditioned upon inner contradiction is its *dialectical* nature, and this eternal motion, itself, demanded by its essence, is its *dialectic*. This the dialectic art ⁽¹⁾ or *method* has to imitate and to produce, since, though immanent in the object itself, it nevertheless appears only because self-active thought reproduces ⁽²⁾ it. Since the dialectic method *produces* all that is *contained* in the fact

itself, it is, as regards its *evidence* and *necessity*, superior to the geometrical, with which it is rightly classed.

(¹) Notwithstanding the different judgments which the dialectic method has experienced at the hands of Plato and of Kant, the two are agreed that it is the art of discovering contradictions in objects. (²) More extended discussions on the nature of the dialectic method are to be found in my work, "Body and Soul," 2nd ed., pp. 18-33.

§ 19. Since, in this development, each successive stage of development contains, solved, in itself a contradiction (§ 16) which did not exist in the preceding stage, it contains more determinations than that. As this unity of *more* determinations, it stands related to the earlier stages as the richer or more concrete to the poorer and more abstract. (§ 14, obs. 1.) The more all determinations which are contained in germ in that which is developing itself are posited, the more the object corresponds to its *final* nature. In this it first appears in its truth, for, earlier, it was as it was in truth (*really* § 16) *not*. The dialectical method has therefore to show how the object, through the contradiction lying in itself, rises from the more abstract to the more concrete until it reaches its final nature, in which all contradictions are resolved; or it has to follow the object in its development from its untruth to its truth.

The statement, Each later stage is the truth of the earlier, here finds its justification; which, that is to say, shows what the object is in truth. (*Cf.* also § 220.)

§ 20. If, now, through the dialectic method, science as system is made possible, then will also logic as the science of the categories (§ 6) have to follow the dialectical development of them, and to produce the system of them, beginning with the most abstract and the poorest of them, and discovering the forward-impelling contradiction in them, and so, in methodical fashion, passing to the concreter. In precisely this consists the criticism of them. (§ 9.)

§ 21. But since, in contemplation, the categories which have first to be developed by logic, must already be applied, it may neither be required that one should employ only such categories as are already deduced, nor be expected that each point when treated will be at once perfectly clear. The thoroughness which (often only) appears to underlie such expectation is not to be approved, since, for the reason named, many things *can* receive their proper explanation only in the sequel. That thoroughness which will not go forward until everything is completely understood, is the opposed error to that of immediately drawing *consequences* instead of abiding by the given fact, since what follows can be shown only in the *consequence*.

The latter mistake, of anticipating, is fostered where relations of higher spheres are drawn into logic, and objects—Nature, Spirit, God—are discussed, of which logic *as such* knows nothing. Apart from the fact that thereby the pedagogical purpose (§ 9) of logic is defeated, many misconceptions arise as to the significance of logic itself, which by such anticipations easily acquires the appearance of claiming to be the *whole* of philosophy. (Cf. § 10.)

§ 22. The *beginning* of philosophy in general, and hence also of logic as its first part (§ 9), encounters the difficulty that if philosophy starts with a *proved* proposition, this proposition must be deduced from another, hence will not be a beginning; if, on the contrary, with an *unproved* proposition, philosophical character is destroyed since it can be maintained only when no presuppositions are made.

The presuppositionlessness of philosophy, which was sought already by Plato, Aristotle, and since Descartes more or less by all philosophers, appears, by the dilemma that the beginning of philosophy must either rest upon, or must itself be, a hypothesis, to be proved an impossibility.

§ 23. The assertion that philosophy must make no presupposition, can not have the meaning that *for* it nothing is presupposed, but only that *by* it nothing is presupposed.⁽¹⁾ But in fact, if it supposes, *i.e.*, asserts⁽²⁾ nothing, it also *presupposes* nothing. It will therefore avoid that difficulty (§ 22) by beginning not with an assertion, which of course would be

or would rest upon a mere *assumption*, but with a demand or a *postulate*,⁽³⁾ as regards which the question of proof would be an absurdity.⁽⁴⁾ What it necessarily has it does not *derive* elsewhere, but *puts forth*.

(1) Upon the confusion of these two relations it depends when one says, for example, that since philosophy comes into being only in the development of history, it presupposes history. Certainly history forms its presupposition, since it is presupposed for the origination of philosophy, but *it* as little presupposes history as in geometry the first axiom is that there is a geometer. (2) Where philosophy avoids every *θεσις*, there also can there be no question of a *ὑπόθεσις*. (3) When Fichte ["Introduction to Science of Knowledge;" translated in *Jour. Spec. Philos.*, vol. i.] describes the beginning of philosophy as not a fact but a fact-act, he thereby, as Hegel always recognises, discovers the real philosophical method. His error was in postulating several such fact-acts. (4) Were the beginning of philosophy, therefore, a theoretical proposition, that dilemma (§ 22, obs.) would be valid, because the beginning must then be an axiom or theorem, while now it is a postulate or problem.

§ 24. *What* logic will demand or wherein that postulate will consist, is determined by its entire problem. If, that is to say, it is the science of *thought* (§ 6, obs. 2), it requires no other matter than merely this; it will, therefore, naturally be compelled to begin with the proposal to *produce* only this matter. This means that it proposes that there be merely

thought, and begins with the postulate, *Think!* There is, therefore, "at first present, *merely* the resolve to engage in the activity of thinking." This resolve is presupposed *for logic* without *its* having begun with the definition of thought as its first *thesis*.

§ 25. The difficulty which arises on the *one hand*, by the fact that this postulate appears as a purely arbitrary act of will, because, instead of it, perhaps, another or many others (*e.g.*, that upon which the Science of Knowledge itself rests) might be laid down, and *on the other hand* by the fact that thereby it is not known *how* one has to act in order to realise that postulate, is to be removed in a systematic way by philosophical propædæutic which makes possible *for the subject*⁽¹⁾ *philosophising* the beginning of logic.⁽²⁾ Where such propædæutic has not preceded, it may be suggested against the first-mentioned claim how in our consciousness it is assumed that thought is that function which makes man man, and hence the demand to *think* will have an entirely other justification than any other demand which, perhaps, could be expressed.⁽³⁾ The second difficulty may be met by a practical illustration, as it were, of what that postulate requires. By these two ways may the mere resolve to engage in the activity of thought be produced.

(1) The accusation made against Hegel that his

system has a double beginning is by this means obviated. (2) The best propædæutic appears to be a dialectical development of consciousness which shows that thought is the real goal to which consciousness points. Rightly, therefore, has Gabler treated the phenomenology of consciousness as propædæutic. (3) Herein is contained the reason why it is merely a misconception on the part of Gassendi when he objected against Descartes that *ambulo ergo sum* possesses the same validity as *cogito ergo sum*.

§ 26. Thought was said (§ 5) to be the activity of universalisation. One will therefore engage in the activity of *mere* or *pure* thought when, in thinking, one at the same time abstracts from everything objective which makes thought *applied* thought and does not leave it *pure*. But if one does this, the result will be thought as such, the category completely pure, unmixed, and undetermined, hence the most abstract possible. As this most abstract category is the most untrue (§ 19), the beginning is as beginning the untrue, and its untruth is corrected by, not abiding by it, but *going forward*, i.e., abandoning, *negating* the mere beginning. All beginning is heuristic.

§ 27. If anything definite, objective were thought, there would be in thinking, besides mere thought, also that to which thought would be *applied*, and thinking would therefore be *differentiated* within itself; but now, where there is the activity of *mere*

thinking, thinking is in itself undifferentiated. This undifferentiatedness we call *immediacy*, and immediacy is the first of all things to be treated in logic. Not only the absence of combination and mediation in this thought is indicated by this name, but also the fact that this category is not thought by means of any other to be thought prior to it,⁽¹⁾ rather, however, that it, as the prius of all other categories, is contained in and conditions them. If the difference of thought consists merely in the use of diverse categories, the category of immediacy will be found if one answers the question: What is the least that is contained in thought? or what thought is contained in every thought along with it?

⁽¹⁾ When Aristotle ["Posterior Analytics," i. 2], in speaking of derived and original propositions, designates as *ἀμεσος* that *πρότησις ἧς μὴ ἐστὶν ἄλλη προτέρα*, he quite correctly places immediacy, in the fact that a thing is a *first* (*ἀρχή*), for if it were a *second*, it would be mediated by the first. Because of the double meaning which *πρῶτον* has with him, *πρω* the most universal is termed immediate (for *ἀιτιον*, hence also *ἀρχή*, is *το καθόλου*), *πρω* again the individual, sensible. In fact, the simple and more abstract forms the foundation for the more concrete and composite, or precedes it as the lower, just as the sensible and natural does as regards the super-sensible and spiritual. ⁽²⁾ *Mere* immediacy, as will be shown hereafter, is an abstraction, the untrue with which it is impossible to rest. But for this reason it is merely the beginning. For the rest, immediacy and media-

tion are only *relative determinations*, since one and the same thing may appear in relation to one thing as the more concrete, the mediated, in relation to another as the immediate. *Here* is to be thought immediacy in its purest form, *i.e.*, simple differencelessness.

First Part.

CATEGORIES OF IMMEDIACY.

BEING.

§ 28. IN what the peculiarity of a group of categories consists can be clear always only when it is fully set forth and distinguished from others. If, further, the development of the categories (§ 17) was to be set forth, and only in such development the articulation of what is developing itself originates, a preliminary statement of how the categories *will* group themselves would not only be unintelligible, but would even create the appearance of one's having to do with what is already formed, which may *be divided*, and not with what is organic, which articulates itself. Instead of making such a preliminary statement, therefore, it is better to facilitate the survey of the ground passed over by a recapitulation at the end of each section. Even the general superscriptions are, before such recapitulation, meaningless names.

In oral discussion the designations of the individual

chapters may be omitted, and may be expressed only at the close, but in a printed outline they are not to be dispensed with. In doing this, reference is generally made to the section in which the selection of precisely this or that name is justified. In the matter of nomenclature a threefold principle may be observed; *either* one may designate each group according to the *first* category which occurs in the group, since it contains in itself the germ of all (so Hegel generally), *or* when a development is set forth one may designate the individual groups as periods whose terminal points are given (so Schelling in the "Transcendental Idealism," and Fichte, the younger), *or, finally*, one may seek a name which points out that which is characteristic of the entire group. In the use of this principle, which we shall follow, the name, of course, in most instances appears meaningless before the end of the group.

I.—FIRST CHAPTER.

QUALITY. (See § 54.)

A. ENDLESSNESS (INDETERMINATENESS). (SEE § 54.)

§ 29 (a). IN the first instance, by the resolve to engage in the activity of pure thought, thought (the category) is produced as distinctionless reference to self. For this pure immediacy, which is affected by no distinction, we have no more suitable expression than *being*.⁽¹⁾ Being is, as pure immediacy, the first, *i.e.*, the most abstract, category, and hence with it the beginning is to be made. Because of this abstract character, being is difficult, impossible we may say, of conception or *comprehension*⁽²⁾ (see § 32); the question, *What* being is, as a question concerning the *nearer determinations* of being, is, since being is the most indefinite of all things, unanswerable,⁽³⁾ and only by reflection upon higher categories is the interest underlying it to be satisfied. Being is in the first instance to be explained only by itself, since what it is otherwise or *besides* (see § 30) can first appear hereafter. Only in the infancy of meta-

physics (logic) can the mind abide by this category as the highest.

1) This word will, therefore, be employed throughout to designate what is not further deduced: hence in *feeling*, in which what is to man *is* just so, etc. (2) Conceived or comprehended can be only that in which what one must take together (*con-cipere*) is contained. (3) A *definition* of being would represent it as composite, made up of *genus* and *differentia*, which, however, it should not be. (4) *Being* is essentially different from existence or even actuality. A chimera which does not *exist*, to say nothing of its possessing actuality, *is*—a chimera, that is. *To be* is merely the infinitive of the copula *is*, is merely the *εἶναι* which Aristotle describes as *σύνκεισθαι*. As there is no thought in which thought would not be posited (thought), so there is no expressed thought or proposition which does not contain the category being. (5) When the consciousness of the meaning of a category first dawns upon the mind, it expresses its sense of triumph in this new conquest by making it the predicate of *every* thing, even of the absolute, *i.e.*, it treats it as the absolute category. With being, this happened in the case of the Eleatics, the greatest of whom regarded not only *ὄν* but precisely *εἶναι* as this category. The Eleatic theory has, therefore, a dogmatic character, because being is the favourite category of *dogmatism*. (See § 12.) It is the logic of dogmatism.

§ 30 (*b*). Since being is not at all affected with distinction, there is in it nothing whatever to be distinguished, and it is therefore complete contentlessness and emptiness, which is just as indefinite and as purely to be conceived as being, above. More closely

regarded, therefore, being proves to be *pure negation*.⁽¹⁾ We call this nothing, not being, or perhaps better, not.⁽²⁾ The expression, Being is being and nothing more, contains unwittingly the right relation. As all thought is a positing, so is it, more closely regarded, an *exposition* or *deposition*, *i.e.*, a *negation*.

(1) This transition may in more suggestive form be also expressed as follows: Since being originated for us by our having abstracted from everything objective (§ 26), it therefore *consists* merely in this abstraction and emptiness or contentlessness.⁽²⁾ The expression nothing (*nichts* from *ni-wiht* [*no whit, naught*]) carries with it the inconvenience that in the use of it a negative reference to *something* is thought of; just so the expression *not-being*, because here the reference to being is anticipated, which will, of course, immediately (§ 31) appear so soon as one sees that not can not be thought without being; at first, the term *not* (*ni*) would seem to be the best for completely undetermined negation. This category, which forms the real core of all views that are designated as Nihilism, was, in opposition to the affirmation of being by the Eleatics, employed by the disciples of Heraclitus, even more than by Heraclitus himself. Thereby they became, naturally, the logicians of *scepsis* (see § 13), which Heraclitus was not. They seize in the Heraclitic becoming only the side of *not being*, and thus convert it into mere *not-being*, an abstraction, like being. (See § 32.)

§ 31. Nothing itself, as wholly referenceless, is mere reference to self, hence complete distinctionlessness; which means that when we think *nothing* we really think *being*, and as this was really (or also)

nothing, the converse also obtains. The two are so related that when one is thought, the other, rather, is thought. But this means that we merely denote a single idea by two words. The *distinction* between being and not, which, *for us*, consists in the fact that we came upon the former first and the latter afterwards, is also a distinction in them themselves; "not," that is to say, in order to be thought, must become that *whose* not it is. It is, therefore, pure opposition, while being was pure position. Hence, being is posited as Being (or being); but not, posited as not (or not being), is its contrary, namely being.

If to distinguish nothing from being, one wishes to define it, and begin with the words, nothing *is*, since *being* is not equal to *existence* but is merely participle of the copula *is* (§ 29, obs.), being is predicated of nothing, and thus is completely expressed what the section declares. Likewise, if one will avoid the word *is*, and say, nothing equals nothing, there is attributed to it mere unity with itself, *i.e.*, being. Finally, when one asserts that one *feels* a distinction between being and nothing, this also merely means that the distinction when *reflected upon* vanishes, which is exactly our assertion. For the rest, that proposition appears objectionable merely because one does not abide by it, but draws *consequences* from it. (§ 21.)

§ 32 (c). The result is, therefore, that when we think *being*, *nothing*, instead, is thought, and conversely. (Now may we, therefore, call not or nothing also not-

being.) Neither, therefore, can be thought without the other. Consequently, each can be truly thought only in its unity with the other. *Really*, therefore, we must think their unity, because really each is inseparably combined with the other; the *truth* (§ 19, obs.) of being and of not is the *unity of the two*. We call it (this interchange or this oscillation) *becoming*.⁽¹⁾ This unity is so little *incomprehensible* that rather in it only are being and nothing *comprehended*.⁽²⁾ Becoming is the real truth of the categories hitherto considered;⁽³⁾ as compared with becoming, they are untrue.⁽⁴⁾ The three categories considered correspond essentially to the Kantian categories of quality. In their consideration the three moments (§ § 12-14) of scientific method, like Fichte's Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis, are to be recognised.

⁽¹⁾ Becoming—the *κίνησις* of Aristotle—must here be taken as *pure transition*, with the exclusion of all idea of time. Our language permits this, since it employs the word *becoming* to denote as well the *future* as the *present* (passive). It thus neutralises the notion of time which creeps into this word. Since *alteration* is equivalent to *becoming other*, it is already something much more concrete than mere becoming, which both underlies it, and is, further, change of place and every other alteration. ⁽²⁾ Because of their *abstract* character, being and nothing were not to be conceived. (§ 24.) It is now apparent why: because they are moments of a higher unity, which are kept apart only by a violent abstraction. (In like manner it has until now been impossible to fix

fluor by itself.) Becoming as concreter category is, properly speaking, the first *concept*. With it philosophy distinguishes itself from *dogmatism*, whose principle Wolff enunciated when he said, "*Inter nihilum et aliquid non datur medium*." ("Ontol.," § 60.) *Becoming* is precisely such a *medium*, i.e., the concrete unity of the two. In like manner, philosophy by the recognition of this concept distinguishes itself from all *scepticism*. On account of this concreter character, some have wished to begin logic with the unity of being and not-being, hence with κίνησις, or even with *beginning*. But the beginning cannot be made with that, precisely because the prius is always the most abstract. (§ 19.) ⁽³⁾ That becoming is the real truth of being, is implied in ordinary consciousness. Everything (a city, for example) *becomes* rather than is. When Heraclitus, in opposition to Xenophanes, made *becoming* the predicate of *everything*, he was right. Heraclitus is in his *speculative* depth equally far removed from dogmatism and scepticism. His principle of absolute flux is *concrete*. (See § 14.) ⁽⁴⁾ This untruth of *being* is the reason why thought cannot abide by that but must go further; the untruth of being therein corrects itself.

§ 33. Becoming, as the concrete unity of being and not being, contains *both* in itself. But, of course, no longer as they were *before* their union, but as degraded to mere moments, i.e., as *sublated*.⁽¹⁾ Hence in it being is contained as passing into nothing, i.e., as *ceasing*, and likewise nothing as passing into being, as *originating*.⁽²⁾ The two as constituting a becoming are inseparably joined.⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ *Sublate* taken in the threefold sense of *tollere*,

conservare, elevare: hence *sublate* and *degrade* at one and the same time. (2) Similarly, in combinations of oxygen radical and acid principles *as such* no longer exist, because we have to do with something other than a *mixture*. (3) That what originates also ceases to be, or that what has a *beginning* also comes to an *end*, is no merely empirical observation, but origination and cessation are one (*one becoming*), and every origination is in itself a cessation. Significance of *στέργσις* for all origination, with Aristotle.

§ 34. "Origination and cessation are the same becoming, and at the same time, as these distinct tendencies, reciprocally interpenetrate and are paralysed. The one tendency is cessation: being passes over into nothing, but nothing is just as much the contrary of itself, transition into being, origination. This *origination* is the other tendency: nothing passes over into being, but being just as much sublates itself, and is instead the transition into nothing, is cessation." (Hegel, "Werke," iii., p. 109.) Each of these sublates itself and its other, and becoming, as the unity of such self-sublating terms, sublates itself. The result of such sublation cannot be equivalent to nothing,⁽¹⁾ for this has itself been only a moment in becoming, but the result of the self-sublating becoming, as it were the precipitate of that process, is the *become*.⁽²⁾

(1) This is the claim of the sceptic. (§ 13, obs.) But it is just as false as it would be to claim that when the process between acid and oxide is completed

the result will be the radical or oxygen: rather the result of it is the neutral, the crystal. ⁽²⁾ The preterite of becoming (*werden*) language rightly denotes as that which has become (*geworden*). The become is becoming that has come to a rest (*it is* or *has become*).

B. FINITUDE (DETERMINATENESS). (Cf. § § 42, 44.)

(a) *Something*. (Cf. § 24.)

§ 35. If one analyses the concept of the become one finds contained in it the fact that it *is* [has] become. There is contained in it, therefore, the moment of *being*, but, not of *pure* being, but being as identical with not-being (§ 30); this unity, also, however, no longer as a moment of unresting becoming, which was likewise unresting *cessation* (§ 33), but this unity as having come to rest, become *fixed*,⁽¹⁾ hence has a resting *being* that is coloured with not-being, *i.e.*, *there-*

⁽¹⁾ That until now fluid unity of being and not-being here appears fixed like water in the crystal.
⁽²⁾ *There-being* is being, but with a negation is (*yonder-being*). Instead of it one might say *so-being* or *what-being*. *There-being*, therefore, contains being *in* itself as its moment; hence one may speak of a being in all *there-being*, but not conversely. *There-being* is limited being; hence "the *there-being Dasein* of God" is an improper expression. God is not here or there, because he is (to express the thought quite as spacially) *everywhere*.

§ 36. (β) Secondly, the become contains as a moment in itself *not*; but no longer the abstract referenceless not, but not as identical with being (§ 31), also no longer this unity as unresting origination (§ 33), but as not that has come to rest, or as *being*. This “not” which in *there-being* constitutes the *there*, in *so-being* the *so* we call *quality*, or perhaps better by the scholastic name, *quiddity*,⁽¹⁾ the translation of the Aristotelian τὸ τί ἐστὶ which completely corresponds to this concept. This as the *not* in *there-being* is of course *negation*, but as *being* negation to be called with the same right *reality*.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ By quality or quiddity is not meant a separable *property* which one merely *has*, but that determinateness with the change of which the *quid* itself ceases to be, that determinateness which says *what* an object is. [“Epistolae,” 50, 41; “Ethics,” i., prop. viii., Scholium]. ⁽²⁾ Spinoza is entirely right when he says, “*Omnis determinatio est negatio*.” But he forgets, in so doing, the other side, which is almost as one-sidedly emphasised, when one, for example, calls God, because He is the *omnimode determinatum*, the sum of all *realities*. Reality in *this* sense is essentially different from *existence*, *actuality*, etc., which have no plurals. Later, reality will be taken in another sense. (See § 127.)

§ 37 (γ). But neither of these two moments constitutes fully the become; but this is rather the concrete unity of the two, *i.e.*, *there-being*, which is a *quale* or *quid*, or qualitative, quidditative *there-being*.

Such a thing we call *something*, and now for the first time we fully perceive what really became in the resolution of becoming; the become has now for the first time won its true name, it is *something*. Something, as having behind it the contradiction of becoming, is complete and free from contradiction.

In our consciousness it is implied that when becoming is complete, *something* has become. That *something* is really the best designation for the concrete unity of those two moments is admitted by the fact that we habitually designate as well that *in which* a quality appears, as also the *quality itself* by the word something. In general something is a favourite category of the ordinary consciousness, because it is neither so abstract as the earlier categories, nor so concrete as the succeeding.

§ 38. But if *something* is what *is* become, *i.e.*, is becoming sublated into being, the result of this sublation is, properly speaking, not fully conceived. For since the process from which it results was a unity of being and nothing, in which the two appear as quite equally justified, the result of the process cannot as here be *posited merely as being*, but, to be fully conceived, must be equally *posited as not*, and the real result of becoming we get only by thinking along with something the nothing of something, *i.e.*, *other*. Only so is something thought in its truth; and what was said in the previous section must now be more

nearly defined to the effect that the result of becoming is *something* and *other*.

That (the thought of) something involves *other* as its complement is expressed in the Latin *aliquid*, as in German it is expressed by the fact that by the word *something* a *little* is denoted, *i.e.*, merely a *part* of a *totality*.

(b) *Something and Other.*

§ 39 (a). Something cannot be thought without other. This relativity of the two, therefore, does not, as it were, fall only in us as the thinking and relating subjects; but in the very concept of something is involved the being related to other and having towards it an open side. By this, its being open towards other, it is *for other*, or also *in* or *by other*. *To be for other* is in something the side of its not-being.

By this abstract expression Hegel admirably denotes the selflessness of something. It is the *in alio esse* of Spinoza, which coincided with the *per aliud concipi*. What is *merely* a something is thereby for other, as, for example, things out of which therefore we make what *we* will. They have, accordingly, an "adjectival being" (Weisse). Man, who is more than a something, is for himself; out of him not everything is to be made. (See § 50.)

§ 40 (β). But as something contains the moment of not-being (§ 36), so does it also that of being.

(§ 35.) If it was *for other* because it displayed its not-being towards other, it will in this relation to other have also to be posited under the character of being. The *being* of something, as *opposed to* its being for other, is its *being-in-self*. Something is *in itself* only, because it is (what it is) *not* for other, just as its being-for-other is only the negative of its being-in-self.

The Kantian philosophy in a great measure turns upon this distinction of what something is *in itself* and what it is for consciousness, *i.e.*, *for other*. It is the never-enough-to-be-esteemed merit of this philosophy to have been in earnest with the application of this category. If it is once applied, the result of course is that things as they *are in themselves* or the *in-themselves* of things is not known (*i.e.*, is not *for us*, not for other), a tautology and no *new* discovery. The Kantian objections to the knowability of the in-itself, it has been shown (§ 3), made the possibility of metaphysics doubtful. They rest upon the holding fast of these two categories, and receive their answer so soon as one perceives that we can not abide by these categories as ultimate categories. (§ 41.)

§ 41 (γ). But if the *being-in-self* of something is *merely* the negation of its *being-for-other* and conversely, neither of the two may really be thought without the other, rather each presupposes⁽¹⁾ the other. Hence each taken by itself is only a violent abstraction; in its truth it is taken as inseparable from the other, *i.e.*, is identical with it. To this unity of being-

in-self and being-for other language points in many ways,⁽²⁾ particularly in the expression, "to be at something."⁽³⁾ Since what something is *in itself* is also *for other*, this is *in it*, or it is *posited* as this.⁽⁴⁾

⁽¹⁾ Universally where two things are so related that each is merely the not-being of the other, they are not to be thought without one another, and point to one another as their complements. ⁽²⁾ Such reference consists in the fact that the *being-for-other* of an object, *i.e.*, its external relationship, is denoted by precisely the same word as its *being-in-self*; as when one says, the object has something *in itself*, or there is something only *in it*. ⁽³⁾ At the same time the phrase, *There is something in him*, means the man has an inner worth, signifies something in *himself*; likewise the other expression, *There is nothing in it*, means that a thing lacks the *in itself*, is only an appearance, *i.e.*, being-for-other. ⁽⁴⁾ The expression, *being posited*, taken from the circumstance that an object is not in a place accidentally merely, but is expressly *set* (*gesetzt*—*posited*) there, contains the confirmation, *i.e.*, the fulfilment of the mere being-in-self. The categories of being-in-self and *posited being*, are applied, only under other names, already in § 16, as real being and actual being. In posited being is contained the perfection and the goal (*finis*) of being-in-self.

§ 42. In the union of those two thoughts coincides what had been peculiar to each of the two. It is clear, therefore, that it is necessary to go beyond the two only possible relations in which something stands opposed to other, and hence beyond this opposition. Something, in so far as it is something, or has being

only through the being of another, *i.e.*, of its own *not being*, is definite something, and its *definite being*, or that which makes it definite, is to be more precisely considered. The individual moments which are contained in this concept, which as the most important of the entire group was selected to designate them (see p. 33), have to be developed. They are prescribed in a very intelligible way in language, since this, just as in the case of the word *something*, denotes by one and the same word not only that unity itself, but at the same time the moments contained in it of a further development.

(c) *Determined Being.* (§ 44.)

§ 43 (a). Determined being contains, first, *being-in-self* (*i.e.*, independently of other), but as involved with its opposite, hence as restricted being. Something in which is restricted what it *is* in itself, becomes a determined being only through the tendency which is called *determination* or *what is to be*.

⁽¹⁾ Something is *determined* (*destinatum*) to that which is in it as a thing yet to be *fulfilled* or posited; it therefore requires to be accomplished outwardly, a fact that implies a defect, but at the same time the tendency towards its removal. Determination is the tendency to posit being-in-self. In *determination* appears to us being-in-self, as it were in higher power; hence, according to Fichte, things in themselves are

what (through our doing) they should be. ⁽²⁾ Since what-is-to-be is the proper inner determination of something, something is adequate to its what-is-to-be; hence the correctness of the expression that man can be (is) what he is to be. Of course, also the opposite is correct, since what-is-to-be is *restricted* being, and hence is determination yet to be realised.

§ 44 (β). Determined being as being-in-self, or being that is in itself determined, is what-is-to-be. But since determined being contains *likewise* the moment of being-for-other, something is not determined without other. Hence its being determined depends upon other, *i.e.*, is or *must*⁽¹⁾ be *determined by other*. But since the opposite moment also is contained in it, the determining other becomes the *limiting* thing which experiences resistance or compelling *limitation*.⁽²⁾ Through it the determined is a *finite* thing, since where the limiting other begins, it itself is not, but rather has its *termination*.⁽³⁾ Only by its finitude, or as it is limited, is something a determined something and precisely thereby *something*.⁽⁴⁾ It becomes something, therefore, through the other.⁽⁵⁾

⁽¹⁾ Something is *determined* (*coactum, determinatum*) when it receives its *determinateness* (to be distinguished from determination) from other. The same distinction underlies that between *shall* and *must*. ⁽²⁾ All compulsion, as law, duty, etc., presupposes an opposing tendency, since that which compels is as such a foreign power, *i.e.*, *another* (not one's own) will. ⁽³⁾ *Limit, barrier, termination* are here em-

ployed as synonyms, and in their use all spatial meaning is abstracted from. Something is *finite* in that it is limited by another. Since here the other which appears to present itself *beside* something (§ 38), and is so posited in something itself that this owes its being to that, we have in the concept of finitude the most important concept in this group ; and hence it was employed as superscription. (See p. 33.)⁽⁴⁾ Hence the expression for one who has definite duties of calling, that he (only then) is something. The moment of finitude (*πέρας* was by Pythagoras and Plato rightly emphasised as the higher compared with mere indeterminateness (*ἄπειρον*). *Limit* is that whereby something is this determinate thing (*τὸδε τι*, according to Aristotle) the *haecceitas* of Duns Scotus.⁽⁵⁾ This was above given as concept of determined being. (§ 42.)

§ 45. (γ) But since beginning and termination were according to § 33, the unity of being and not-being, that which makes something determined being (its limit, its barrier, its termination) will be that in which it both *is* and is *not*,⁽¹⁾ and in which the other is not and is. Definite something, therefore, displays in itself the contradiction that it coincides with its limit, and yet does not.⁽²⁾ But this leads still further. Something is something through its limit or within it. But the limit of something is precisely the beginning of the other (§ 44), hence the being of something is *really* the beginning of the other. It, therefore, belongs to its essence that it is only because in its being the other begins. Its contradictory nature is, the

necessity of being other or *alterability*. ⁽³⁾ Something is, as determined, alterable,⁽⁴⁾ and only as alterable is it something.

(1) Hence could "haecceitas," this quiddity of higher power, be called the ultimate reality, and Wolff's *ens realissimum* also *omnimode determinatum*, as well as, by Spinoza, the former was conceived as negation, and all determinateness was excluded from God. (*Cf.* § 36; 2.) ⁽²⁾ Since something by its limit excludes other from itself, it is one with its limit; but since in the limit the other has its beginning, something extends beyond its limit, *i.e.*, is not one with it. ⁽³⁾ This word is here (analogously with mortality) not used for the mere possibility of alteration. Something is alterable because in its concept is involved the being other. (*Aliud, aliud; alterum, alterum; ἕτερον ἕτερον.* The Middle Ages predicated of the *quid, alteritas.*) The being other has *here* entered completely into something, and we have in alterability the fulfilment of finitude. At the same time, also, here is met completely the demand of § 38, according to which the result of becoming should be thought also as *not*. *Here* something is really thought as identical with its not. ⁽⁴⁾ As determined, something is alterable. Where something is determined *to something*, and is *determined* by other, there is posited the necessity that it now *become that*, *i.e.*, alter. Where it shall *and* must, or where its own tendency unites with external compulsion, there it becomes. Alteration is also becoming, but a *determined* becoming, a becoming *other*.

§ 46. But alterability, as it is the real fulfilment of finitude, also forms the transition to a new group

of categories. Something, that is to say (because it must become other, because its determination is to become other), becomes other, *i.e.*, its negative. (§ 33.) But since this other has in the limit of something, just as does something itself, its beginning as well as its termination, it is, in fact, itself something (*something* other or other *something*). Therefore we have in this transition really a passage to other, in which that which is in transition comes into coincidence with itself, becomes or remains identical with itself. Such transition is what we call *Infinity*. If, therefore, we think alteration completely, we think infinitude.

The seeming sophism contained in this section disappears so soon as one reflects that we have *here* to do with the thought-determination *something*, and not with any definite object. As we cannot otherwise express it, so also we cannot otherwise think it than that *something*, when it alters (since alteration was equal to becoming something), becomes *something*, *i.e.*, comes into coincidence with itself.

C. INFINITY.

§ 47. *Infinity* or *Absoluteness* is to be found wherever something becomes in its negation identical with itself,⁽¹⁾ *i.e.*, wherever, by the negation of its negation, it is the affirmative return to itself, or *absolute negativity*.⁽²⁾ In this, the first negation has

not vanished, but is *sublated* (§ 33, obs.), or *ideally* posited.⁽³⁾ The infinite is, therefore, that which does not *exclude* limit and finitude, but which, as the ideality of these, rather *includes* and contains them in itself as sublated moments, *i.e.*, which is its own termination, its own limit.⁽⁴⁾

⁽¹⁾ The word *infinite* is, therefore, not employed by us in the highest spheres only. The circle is an *infinite* line because it returns to itself, limits itself. Hence, in every enjoyment, every satisfaction, because it is a return to self, there is contained also infinitude. ⁽²⁾ The Ego is absolute negativity, because it distinguishes itself from itself (therefore *negates* its unity with itself), but again sublates this distinction (therefore restores its unity with self. *Negatio duplex affirmat*).—Just so God. They are *infinite* because the barrier in them is at the same time *no* barrier. ⁽³⁾ Ideality = sublatedness. The sublated *is*, but as the not-real. ⁽⁴⁾ The expression of Schelling, "The infinite is the unity of the infinite and the finite," finds here its justification. As the Platonic ἀπειρον and πέρασ correspond to *indeterminateness* and limit, so his μικτόν corresponds to the *infinite*.

§ 48. The concept of *infinitude* arose when we thought alteration and observed what *at the termination* resulted therefrom. If now one does not allow this thought to come to a termination, but constantly repeats, something becomes other, other as itself something, becomes again other, etc., *i.e.*, if one constantly *repeats* what has really *vanished*, namely, the opposi-

tion of something and other, the matter reaches no *conclusion*. This *conclusion* we (§ 46) have drawn and indicated by the word *therefore*. If one does not allow thought to arrive at this "therefore" and "conclusion," there arises, in the constant alternation of the two determinations something and other, a progression, to which commonly the predicate *infinite* is given, although only that of endlessness, or false infinitude, properly belongs to it.

Endlessness is *false* infinitude, because it does not correspond to the concept of infinitude. Since, that is to say, it *excludes* termination and finitude, it has in that which is excluded another opposed to itself, which forms its *limit*, its *termination*. As the circle is the image of infinitude, so is the straight line, which is constantly lengthening, that of endlessness. Hence, according to Aristotle ("Phys.," iii., 6, 6), the (false) infinite is that which forever leaves something outside itself. What leaves nothing outside itself is to him the perfect, *i.e.*, truly infinite. Of this he says, τέλειον οὐδὲν μὴ ἔχον τέλος, τὸ δὲ τέλος πέρας. The Grecian expression, ἔντελες, like our *perfect* (*vollendet*), points to an inclusion in itself by the infinite of the finite, and Spinoza's distinction between the *infinitum* (*rationis*) and the *indefinitum* or *infinitum imaginationis* at least approximates the correct concept of infinitude [Spinoza's "Ethics," part ii., prop. 44, cor. 1, 2.]

§ 49. But if the endless progression arises by the fact that one, in the case of the transition of one thought-determination into its opposite, does not

allow the return *into self* to complete itself, but, precluding this result, always *begins* anew and *alternates* the two determinations, there must, *wherever* endless progression shows itself in our thought, be perceived in it the demand to posit the two determinations, through whose alternating appearance the progression arises, as really identical, *i.e.*, think true infinitude, which, if one pleases, may be called also superfinitude, superalterability.

When Aristotle terms every thought which *runs out* into endless progression fallacious, he is in so far correct as it is not possible to *abide* by that. The application of the above-given rule which follows from the very concept of endless progression is, for methodical procedure, of extreme importance. Wherever, that is to say, a concrete identity of opposite determinations must be thought, endless progression must result if one does not allow that identity to be realised. In §§ 31 and 32 this might easily have been shown. Conversely, wherever it appears to be unavoidable, there the demand stated in the section is to be seen therein. However, there may be spheres in which, because such a concrete identity cannot be realised, the endless progression *occurs*. But even then it is not *ultimate*, but there is to be found in it the demand to get beyond and leave behind in thought this entire sphere. Thus, for example, nature does not rise above endless progression in the generic process. The scientific consideration of this process therefore impels thought beyond the sphere of nature. (*Cf.* my work "Body and Soul," 2nd ed., Halle, 1849, p. 61, ff.)

§ 50 (a). Something, therefore, since, while being

other, it became or remained identical with itself, became (§ 46) *restored* unity with self or absolute negativity, and thereby passed into infinitude. Such a something, now, is no longer a mere something, *i.e.*, a there-being something, which required completion through *other* (§ 35), for which and in which it was, and by which it was limited (§ 44), but it will be a self-sufficient, self-dependent, distinct thing, a reference to self, which at the same time, in a *negative, ideal* way, contains the other in itself, so that this merely *appears* ⁽¹⁾ in it. Something as this ideality of the other, we call *being* ⁽²⁾ *in, or for, self* or *one*. ⁽³⁾ If there-being is *limited* being, being-for-self is *infinite being*.

⁽¹⁾ This more figurative expression may state the being-contained of the other in the one as no longer real. ⁽²⁾ Something was only for other (§ 39, obs.), not for itself. *Being-for-self* is here to be understood only as *that* reference to self which is mediated by negative relation to other. In fact, even in the expression there is contained this polemic withdrawal of itself into itself. We have not yet here true subjectivity, to say nothing of the idea of conscious personality, although being-for-self forms the foundation for those determinations, just as becoming does for alteration (§ 32, obs. 1), and later for life. The "substantive being" (*cf.* § 39, obs.), that is, of what is for itself is the foundation as well of substantivity as of subjectivity. Spinozistically expressed: *in se est per se concipitur*. ⁽³⁾ Here one is not to think of the numerical term *one*, but the word is to be under-

stood as in such forms of expression as, If one has his house, and the like. It is more indefinite than *one* (= a person) (because it is merely *incipient* subjectivity), and much more concrete than something (because it is incipient *subjectivity*). And the fact that *one* and *whole* are often synonyms may justify this linguistic usage. The category of the one which is for itself is the ground-category of all atomistic theories. The atomists of antiquity were entirely right in thinking of their atoms as above all change. Leibnitz's monad theory agrees with them in that. It also emphasises the moment of ideality in the monads. These were therefore conceived as representative, *i.e.*, in them all other monads appeared, or, as Leibnitz expresses himself ("Opp. Phil. Ed. Erdmann," p. 184), they are reflected in them as in *miroirs artifs*. This side of the ideal relation, which is contained in the concept of the one which is for itself, the atomists have entirely overlooked. They, therefore, cannot say of every atom, as Leibnitz does of every monad, that it contains (true) *infinitude*.

§ 51 (*b*). One is, therefore, as infinite return to self, for itself. Thus it is passive, negative relation. But towards what? Other does not stand *opposed* to it, but is contained in it as a sublated moment. If, therefore, it is negatively related, it can be so only towards one or the entire totality of ones which now stand opposed to it as the *rest*. Really, therefore, one can only be thought as negatively related to the remaining ones.⁽¹⁾ Being-for-self is to be thought only as the juxtaposition of beings-for-self. It, therefore, presupposes these and *excludes* them from itself.⁽²⁾

In this exclusion *not-being* showed itself raised to infinitude; it is the not (or un-) being of one.

(1) That one cannot be thought without this negative relation to all other ones will readily be admitted as a fact; for us it is no longer an empirical observation. Even the atomists are compelled to admit this distinction; only they do not deduce it from the concept of the atom, but the separating *void* (the pores) exists *along with* it, just as, for the teachers of atomistic theories of the public law of the State, the *bellum contra omnes* does. For Leibnitz, on the contrary, the monad is in a negative relation to the others, not only because it has "no windows" through which they may act upon it, but because the principle of *distinction* dwells in every monad. (2) Hegel employs the term *repulsion* [see Hegel's "Encyklopädie," § 98; "Larger Logic," vol. iii., p. 178]; but apart from the fact that this term, because it denotes a definite manner (the *physical*) of exclusion, is too concrete, one in its use easily thinks of that which is repelled as already existent. The *excluded* one, however, originates as an opposing term only through the exclusion, hence the one *presupposes* the remaining ones.

§ 52 (c). One, therefore, is only in negative relation to the opposing ones, and through this relation. But since each of them is *one*, each consists merely in this negative relation. Since, now, one *negates* the opposing ones, it really negates the negative relation towards the ones. But since it negates the negative relation towards the ones, their relation has, rather, become an affirmative one, and the previous exclusion proves to be a coinciding. We call it *relation*; self-

exclusion is therefore in fact its contrary, namely, *relation*.⁽¹⁾ Where *relation* is posited, *i.e.*, where self-excluding things (§ 51) form one (§ 50), there the two determinations are united, and in the sphere of infinitude the analogue of becoming is presented. ⁽²⁾ *Relation* is becoming-related. The three moments can also, therefore, be designated thus: United Being, Dis-united Being, Becoming of Unity. The last of these may also be designated as becoming for one another in which beings opposed to one another are for themselves.

⁽¹⁾ The fact that exclusion is not, and cannot be, *thought* without relation, no one will dispute who merely reflects that almost involuntarily the word (*i.e.*, the thought) excluding or negative relation gets used. We have, therefore, to discover the necessity of that fact. Hegel uses the term *attraction*, against which, however, there obtains what was said in § 51, obs. 2; and, further, it would perhaps have been more correct to see in the Kantian attraction, which, taken by itself, would contract all things to a mathematical point, a concreter conception of what Hegel had called being-for-self. The necessity of passing forward to the becoming of unity justifies blending attraction and repulsion into a single thought. Hegel himself lays upon these terms no such stress as that he deemed them entirely apposite. ("Werke," iii., p. 202.) [? See p. 193.] Since relation is contained in the concept of the one, the atomists cannot help emphasising this determination also; but, of course, they as little *deduce* it as they do the exclusive relation above; but beside the atoms there is to be

found *chance* or *necessity*, which brings them together. Similarly the atomistic teachers of the public law of the State represent individuals as brought together by external *need* or *force*, or by an equally external *contract*. The pre-established harmony which, according to Leibnitz, places the monad in relation is, since every monad is a mirror of the same universe, at least, not so much brought in from without as many suppose. Also in this regard Leibnitz deserves preference before the atomists. ⁽²⁾ As being-for-self forms the basis for *subjectivity* (see § 152), so does the relation of beings-for-self for what later will be recognised as realisation of subjectivity, *i.e.*, as *system*. (§ 189.) A system can be thought only where we have process, *i.e.*, becoming.

§ 53. The concept of infinitude was absolute negativity. The one that was identical with itself was this, it is true, but because it had not yet carried itself into effect (against other), it was merely *implicit* absolute negativity. (§ 40.) One must, therefore, be for other also ; and since there is no longer any other, it must be absolute negativity for the *remaining* ones ; this it shows itself in *exclusion*. But as being-in-self and being-for-other coincided in *posited being* (§ 41), so also, where the self-excluding ones return again *into one* (§ 52), or exclusion shows itself as *relation*, there is *posited* in relation or in becoming-for-other, and thereby completed (§ 41, obs.), the concept of infinitude ; and the circle of categories embraced under infinitude is fulfilled and *closed*.

Wherever a concept is *posited*, *i.e.*, wherever that is

realised, which it is *in itself* (or wherever it actually has become what it really was (*cf.* § § 16 and 41,)) there is also its development concluded.

§ 54. At the same time, however, an entire group of categories here concludes. How these are articulated together is shown by a recapitulation of the course passed over (*cf.* § 28), which also has to justify the superscription chosen. Since in this group we had to deal first with being, then with merely those determinatenesses of being with whose alteration the determined itself altered, and we have called such determinateness *Quality* (§ 36), the superscription of *quality*, or also *categories of quality*, is given it. Within this group have arisen three divisions, which, according to the different principles of designation (see § 28, obs.) may *either* receive the superscription (Hegel's) *being* there-being, being-for-self, or be designated as the period from being to becoming, from there-being to alterability, from being-for-self to relation, *or finally*, may be called *Endlessness* (Indeterminateness), *Finitude* (Determinateness), *Infinitude* (Self-determination).

The parallelism which, when one enters more deeply into the articulation, appears between the subdivisions and the larger groups is a necessary consequence of methodical progression; but, on the other hand, the great pleasure which one has in this constant repetition is often merely a pleasure in an entirely abstract schematism, which causes that which is in general of greatest concern, *viz.*, the differences,

to be overlooked, and with reason has drawn upon itself contempt and reproach.

§ 55. The qualitative thought-determinations of indeterminateness and determinateness came together, in infinitude, into concrete unity. Since, therefore, in this are contained *all* qualitative categories, but among them *relation*, or *becoming-for-one-another*, was the highest, we have in this category the truth of all the preceding. But even in it, precisely as in becoming, there lies a contradiction. As in becoming, being was contained as cessation, and not-being as origination (see § 33), so here united being, since it had passed into disunited being, as *disunion*, and disunited being for the same reason into united being as *union*. Since the two are opposed, but neither is to be thought without the other, because union (pre) *supposes* disunion and conversely, these two thoughts sublate into the stable precipitate of a being-together-and-along-with-one-another which is neither unitary nor the opposite, in which the peculiarity which above was (§ 54) ascribed to qualitative being has vanished. This non-qualitative being we call quantitative being,⁽¹⁾ and the inner contradiction of the highest, hence of all, qualitative categories, necessitates a passage to those of quality.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ When it is said of the Kantian concept of matter that it implies only quantitative distinctions,

this is from § 52, 1, clear enough.⁽²⁾ That the quantitative determinations *presuppose* the qualitative; hence can be treated only after them, is easily shown empirically. One must have the concept of a *what* before one *numerates* like or similar *what's*. To the contrary the younger Fichte and Braniss. Of course the application of the category *many* at the stage of being-for-self is an anticipation of a quantitative category. (Cf. § 58, obs. 1.)

II.—SECOND CHAPTER.

QUANTITY.

§ 56. IN what the peculiarity of *quantity* consists appears from reflection upon what qualitative determinateness, whose negation and truth⁽¹⁾ it proved to be, had been. As this was one with the determined in such a manner that with its alteration the determined itself altered (§ § 36, 54), so the term *quantity*⁽²⁾ will be employed where something has a determinateness, which, without prejudice to the nature of that whose attribute it is, may be altered, which, therefore, "having become indifferent to being, is a limit that is just as well no limit."⁽³⁾ Such an attribute alone have we first to think. This gives us the concept of *magnitude*.

⁽¹⁾ That quantity is the truth of (mere) quality gives to all attempts to reduce all qualitative attributes (*e.g.*, specific gravity, fluidity) to merely quantitative (*e.g.*, number of atoms), an inner justification. ⁽²⁾ The word *quantity*, like the word *magnitude*, has the inconvenience that by it one may mean as well quantity in general (in the sense of ποσότης, the being a magnitude) as also a quantity

(in the sense of ποσόν τι, quantum, a *magnitude*), which are, however, essentially distinct concepts. In order here to avoid misconception the foreign word *quantity* shall be used in the widest sense, so that by it *all* determinations of magnitude shall be meant, *i.e.*, the quantitative in general, and hence this word has been chosen for the superscription of the entire chapter; the word *magnitude* will be used to denote ποσότης in the sense in which one speaks of the magnitude (size) of a house; finally, quantity in the sense of a ποσόν, or *a* magnitude, will be denoted by the word *quantum*. ⁽³⁾ The (quantitative) limit of a forest may be widened, the forest extend beyond it, and the forest remain a forest; to alter its qualitative limit, its *haecceitas* (1, § 44, obs. 3) means to change it into something else. This is true only within certain limits, because it is only a limited sphere in which quantity is the supreme category. (*Cf.* § 80.)

A. MAGNITUDE.

§ 57 (a). A thing has *magnitude*, or the *being* a magnitude is predicated of it, when there belongs to it an attribute which is also external, immaterial to it.⁽¹⁾ Because of this difference from being-for-self, being a magnitude has the character of being-for-other, and is opposed as relative being to absolute. (See § 47.)⁽²⁾ One was determined in itself; that which possesses magnitude, on the contrary, does so only comparatively. To these negative deductions the positive now are to be added, *viz.*, What is *con-*

tained in the concept of magnitude, and what, therefore, one really has in this category can be known by reflection upon that from which this concept *originated*. The two sides of the contradiction, whose truth quantity proved to be (§ 55) must be found in it, but as sublated moments, and hence *otherwise* ⁽³⁾ than where they formed the unresolved contradiction.

(1) Hence *merely* quantitative determinations have meaning chiefly where external existence is dealt with; but even in the mental sphere we speak of the greatness of a character or a deed, *e.g.*, where the mind enters into external existence. Magnitude is taken as the supreme category when, as, for example, is done by Islam, supreme stress is laid upon the *greatness* of God. (2) Hence distinctions of magnitude and relative distinctions are used as synonymous, (3) As being and not were no longer as such contained in becoming (§ 33), so in every later stage of development the earlier are contained in an essentially altered form.

§ 58 (*b*). In magnitude we shall first have the *disunited* (§ 55) or *self-excluding* (§ 51); but the moment of self-exclusion is *here* no longer opposed to the moment of union or the becoming *one* (§ 50), since it has shown itself to coincide with it. (§ 52.) Therefore, the self-excluding ones will have *also* the character of *sameness*; will, because they are *one*, not be self-excluding. This means that in magnitude are to be *distinguished what are not distinguished*. ⁽¹⁾ On account of this, therefore, magnitude appears

as *many*,⁽²⁾ or *discrete*,⁽³⁾ or there belongs to magnitude the moment of *discretion*.⁽⁴⁾ As in exclusion, so in discretion not-being is repeated.

(1) When one says that two things are *only* quantitatively different, this refers *merely* to the fact that this difference is an *immaterial* one, *i.e.*, is *equivalent* to *no* difference. (2) Of *Many* one can speak only where there is addibility, *i.e.*, homogeneity, the things which are distinguished being also not distinguished. *Many* is, therefore, a purely quantitative determination; the many stand opposed to the *numerically* one (see § 55, obs.); to *one* as we learned to know it, without any *numerical* meaning (see § 50, obs.) are opposed not *many* but the *rest*. (§ 51.) (3) A sum, therefore, is not formed of *disparates* but of *discretes*. (4) This moment of discretion we emphasise when we think of magnitude (*e.g.*, of a kingdom) as originating for us by leaps, by the coming together of *something* and *something*, and again *something* or rather *one*, and again *one*; or explain the greater *length* of a line to ourselves by the addition of *points*. (The *somethings*, the *ones*, the *points* are each what the others are, they are not really different, and yet no one of them is what another is.) Since this is an essential side of magnitude, such a mode of viewing magnitude is not incorrect. In many mathematical demonstrations one cannot avoid using it.

§ 59 (c). But that from which quantity originated contained in itself, *secondly* (§ 55), the moment which was there designated as *Union*, a term which then denoted transition, while here it denotes something completed. (*Cf.* § 35.) Magnitude, therefore, just

as it contained that first moment, will have the character of distinctionlessness, and be simple homogeneity.⁽¹⁾ But that first moment will not thereby be excluded, but will be contained as moment in this homogeneity—as *moment*, hence as both being and not being. This means that magnitude, which, as in itself homogeneous, is *one*, or forms a *unity*, will in an *ideal* manner (§ 47) contain the *many* in itself,⁽²⁾ which as *such* or as *real* will appear only where that simplicity ceases.⁽³⁾ Magnitude is on this side *constant* or a continuum⁽⁴⁾ to magnitude as such belongs *continuity*, since it is a union.

⁽¹⁾ Our consciousness says that the *magnitude* of a kingdom, the *length* of a line, is a simple determination, that the former has not several magnitudes, the latter not several lengths. ⁽²⁾ The *many* are contained in magnitude in an ideal manner, hence as mere possibility. Therefore the length of a line *may* be considered as divided, by dividing the line into lines, each of which has *its* length, or also into *points*. ⁽³⁾ As in the living organism simple chemical substances are contained as *sublated* (combined), and as *such* (free) first appear in decomposition, so *points*, because they are sublated in the line, appear only at its *extremities*, where it is *interrupted*. The line does not *consist* (*besteht*) of points, for then it would contain them as *real*, but *exists* (*entsteht*, formed like *entfliehen*) from them, contains them negatively. ⁽⁴⁾ If one conceives of magnitude as growing *gradually*, or without leaps, one makes prominent the moment of continuity.

That Leibnitz ranges the *lex continui* with the theory of increments is easily explicable. When one speaks of *discrete* and *continuous magnitudes* as different, the plural alone shows that one takes magnitude in the sense of quantum. But continuity and discretion are here taken only as determinations which belong to magnitude *as such* (in the sense of *being* a magnitude not of a magnitude).

§ 60. But what has thus far been developed compels us to go further. Discretion and continuity are determinations of magnitude. It is both many and constant. It is taken as the former when we attribute to an object the predicate much or little, as the latter when the epithet great or small. In both cases magnitude is attributed to it. But those determinations are such that each of them has in the other its *limit*, *i.e.*, its termination and its negation; for as the moment of discretion appears only where continuity *terminates* (§ 59, obs. 3), so can continuity appear only at the expense and by the negation of discretion.⁽¹⁾ Each limits the other, and magnitude, therefore, contains determinations, each of which is the negation of the other.⁽²⁾

(1) When Aristotle ("Phys.," Z 1) says, *ἐί δ' ἐστὶ . . . συνεχὴ μὲν ὡν τὰ ἑσχατὰ ἔν . . . ἐφεξῆς δ' ὧν μηδὲν μεταξὺ συγγes, ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἀδιαίρετων εἶναι τι συνεχές*, he has quite rightly perceived that we, for example, conceive a line (a continuum) arising out of points only by giving the points an extension, *i.e.*, by conceiving their mere discretion as sublated. Hence our division

ceases when we arrive at the indivisible (*continua ἄτομα*). ⁽²⁾ Among the logical puzzles of the ancients, some (*e.g.*, *calvus*, *acervus*, etc.), treating of the growth of magnitude, *now* put forward the moment of discretion, by conceiving *one* grain brought, then another, and so on, *now* pass suddenly from this determination to their *co-existence*, or their *union*. The heap as a co-existence is *a* continuum; as a co-existence of individual kernels, it contains *many*. The very remarkable problem of how entirely definite homogeneous quanta (*e.g.*, side and diagonal of a square) can be incommensurable, would be solved if it were shown why, when the one is thought as discrete, the other *must* be taken only as a continuum.

§ 61. But it is also evident that each of these two determinations is identical with the other; discrete things are *different*, but, at the same time, they are determined as the *same*, their difference is really none. Hence, magnitude in being discrete is really *distinctionless*, *i.e.*, *continuous*. (§ 59.) Hence, since discretion can not be completely conceived except when one thinks continuity, discretion is *really* the *unity of discretion and continuity*. But in like manner magnitude was continuous, only because the many were sublated in it. Hence it *presupposes* these many (*one* point has no *magnitude*, because no continuity); therefore continuity is not to be thought without the many, *i.e.*, without discretion; it, therefore, itself is *unity of continuity and discretion*.

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upon the effort to hold fast one of these determinations without the other, and is, therefore, really already solved by Leibnitz's *sans les simples, il n'y aurait point de composé*.

§ 62. What we have at this point is this: *each* is the concrete unity of *both*, each is, therefore, the *whole* of magnitude, which indeed was both. (§ 60.) But now, the two limit one another. (*Ibid.*) What we really have then is, self-limiting magnitude. But magnitude as limiting itself is *definite* magnitude (*a* magnitude, *a* quantity) or what, as the second term to magnitude, we call *quantum*. This we must think if we are to think magnitude completely.

The *transition* from magnitude to *a* magnitude or to quantum, which the section shows, has no other meaning than that, if magnitude is thought *out*, *a* magnitude is thought. The *empirical* observation that, in order to think *magnitude*, one must think something having magnitude as the substrate of it, although it makes this transition appear as one which we *ordinarily* make, does not show the necessity of it.

B. QUANTUM.

§ 63. As from the transition (§ 62) results as the concept of quantum, that it is definite or limited magnitude,⁽¹⁾ *further*, since it was magnitude that limited *itself*, quantum is the same with its limit, coincides ⁽²⁾ with it, and, *finally*, since magnitude was indifferent limit which the limited also transcended

(§ 56, obs.), quantum, as that which coincides with its limit, will be indifferent to itself, and pass beyond itself. Thereby it will be that which is indifferent to its own alteration, or absolutely variable.⁽³⁾

If in our *idea* of quantum all the developed determinations should be contained, then the choice of the term for this category would be justified. ⁽¹⁾ But that quantum is a (*i.e.*, determined) magnitude is suggested even by language; ⁽²⁾ that a quantum is that which coincides with its limit is continually asserted when it is said that the nature of a magnitude consists in magnitude, or that it becomes quantity by quantity; but that by which a thing becomes a thing was its limit. (*Cf.* § 45.) Finally, ⁽³⁾ the determination of being indifferent to itself is brought out by the mathematical explanation of magnitude, which says that a magnitude is that which may be increased or diminished, *i.e.*, altered without alteration of its nature; any quantum may be transcended, because it is that which is indifferent to itself. Absolute variability is, therefore, what constitutes the nature of quantum.

§ 64 (*a*). Also here must be found, degraded to moments, hence essentially modified, those determinations in quantum from whose contradiction it resulted. (*Cf.* § § 23, 25, 26, and elsewhere.) *First*, must be contained therein what *there* was discretion; that is, quantum will contain in itself the moment of the *many*. But since it was shown that this moment was identical with that opposed to it by which magnitude was a continuous unity (§ 68), the many

as moment of quantum will be many as forming a unity, *i.e.*, *plurality*.⁽¹⁾ This moment of quantum we call annumeration (*anzahl*); it is discretion as *sublated*. But, *secondly*, there must be contained in quantum what previously constituted the continuity of magnitude (§ 59); on this side, quantum will be *unity*, but, because now unity no longer stands *opposed* to the many, but has become identical with it (*cf.* § 64), this, like that, becomes *plural, i.e.*, *unities*.⁽²⁾ The real identity of these two moments is quantum as an *annumeration of unities, i.e.*, *number*.⁽³⁾ Properly, therefore, quantum is number.⁽⁴⁾

(1) Scarcely in the case of any category has language so aptly anticipated thought as in that of quantity. The *many* which are self-exclusive it shows as becoming *plurality* by *uniting* themselves. (2) Similarly, it speaks of *unities*, whereas until now *unity* was in its concept a mere singular. (3) That *number* has as its moments *unities* and *annumeration* may also be sensibly represented by uniting numbers as products or as fractions, the multiplicand in the first case, the denominator in the second, representing unity, while the multiplier in the first case, the numerator in the second, represents annumeration. Whenever one of these moments disappears, number ceases, since 0 or ∞ takes its place. They form the limits of *mere* number. When in the case of a continuously increasing magnitude we go beyond it, there enters into its place something *not merely quantitative*, but *essentially* other—instead of a positive a negative. (4) Number is a category; in this lies the justification of subjecting everything spiritual as well

as natural to calculation. The Pythagoreans regarded it as the highest category. The correct perception that *two* moments (the ἀπειρον and the περαίνοντα) constitute the essence of number, is not wanting among them. *Every* quantum is number. Spatial magnitudes form no exception: a spatial quantum is the number of spatial unities.

§ 65. Since numbers are thought-determinations, operation upon them is *thought*; since they are thought-determinations of externality (§ 57), such operation is external thought or *reckoning*. Reckoning is the production of numbers, or *numbering*.⁽¹⁾ Since, because of the externality of number, numbers are outside one another, and also their moments can separate, there is an opposition in numbers, in that numbers may be produced by composition or by being *reckoned together*, i.e., when separate numbers or their separate moments are united, or by decomposition, or being *taken separately*, as when, on the contrary, one divides what is united.⁽²⁾ The real foundation of the entire system of number is formed by number in its *immediacy*, which, as such, will be first in that system. (§ 27, obs.). If number had as its moments annumeration and unity, the most *immediate*, i.e., the first mode of its unity, will be where with unity (or annumeration), also unity with annumeration (or unity), is *immediately* posited. Number in its immediacy is, therefore, one ($1 \times 1 = 1$).

By the *position* of one, the series of numbers originates.⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ The act of numbering is not λογική, it is true, but yet λογιστική. ⁽²⁾ Like variability, *calculability*, i.e., the ability to be compounded and decomposed, does not find in the nature of number its limit. Hence here even the impossible (imaginary) is permitted. Only the Platonic numbers, which are more than mere numbers, concepts, are ἀσύμβλητοι. ⁽³⁾ *One* is the real principle of numbers, hence even by the Pythagoreans so taken. It is number as not *posited*, in so far number *in itself*. (§ 41, obs.) Hence it comes that *every* number (a) as not *posited* (a°) equals 1. In their *principle* all numbers are the same, namely, *one*.

§ 66. All the various forms of reckoning are based upon certain elementary operations which are the fundamental modes (species) of it, but are themselves, again, posited by the concept of number. The *first* mode of reckoning consists in the operation in which from number, i.e., immediate number, *numbers* are compounded (*summing*), a process which has as its negative correlate *diminishing* or *differencing*. The second mode of reckoning occurs where unity and annumeration, taken separately, are operated upon. Numbers are *produced* ⁽¹⁾ when one number is posited as unity, another as annumeration, one is separated into its moments, the number being sought which was the unity therein or that which was annumeration (quotient), the latter process giving the correlate

of *production*, so-called *division*. While, in the first mode, one had to do with the immediate unity of unity and annumeration, and, in the second, with the separation of both, the third mode of reckoning combines the other two, since one produces numbers from *one* number by positing the same number as unity and annumeration—*potentiation* (i.e., producing squares and higher *powers* ⁽²⁾ or such numbers as are posited as identical with one another, and therefore are mediated by their self-external being) together with its correlate, the *determination of roots*. Herewith is concluded the circle of the elementary operations, which had to be discussed on account of what is to follow.

⁽¹⁾ Hence a *product* is a more intimate and therefore higher unity than a sum, and if arithmetical expressions may at all be employed to denote concrete unities, one may, if necessary, call that into which a chemical combination is decomposed its *factors*, but not its components, i.e., *summands*. ⁽²⁾ The concept, stated in this section, of power makes it clear why many philosophers are fond of using this category. In fact, the nature of the concept is contained in it only in an external manner. (See § 141, obs. 2.)

§ 67 (b). Quantum (or number, see § 64) was magnitude which was identical with its limit. Looking to the limit of it, we shall thereby know how quantum is in the first instance to be conceived. By

the *limit of quantum* or number is to be understood merely that by which this definite quantum is this one number, hence that which *completes* this number. But now the number, one hundred (for example), is completed by no other number than the hundredth, but, since no one of the hundred is not the hundredth, all make a hundred complete. In one hundred, therefore, is contained the limit of the hundred. But now in a hundred (1·100), hundred is precisely the moment of *annumeration*. (§ 64, obs. 3.) In the first instance, therefore, we shall have to take quantum in the aspect which it has through annumeration. Number, quantum, *posited* as annumeration, is *extensive quantum*, a *body or number of somethings*.

With reason does Hegel condemn the confounding (which, for the rest, is explicable by the concept given of *discretion* and *annumeration*) of *discrete* and *extensive* magnitudes, since discretion is a determination of *magnitude in itself*, extension of quantitative *limit*. ("Works," iii., p. 252 [242].) The question whether a person has *much* money has reference merely to the *being* large of his means, they may be large even when diminished; the question *how* large they are, *how* much he has, aims at knowing the *extension* of his possession, which extension really becomes different with every change. *Magnitude* in general is conceivable even without number, whereas an extensive quantum requires number. But number itself is not yet extensive quantum; but in the latter, so-called *denominate* number, it forms the co-efficient (for example, twenty apples.)

Rightly does one here call twenty the annumeration (Anzahl) of apples ; in fact, number (Zahl) is here posited as annumeration, *i.e.*, it is related to that which gives the denomination precisely as the first of its moments to the second. This determination of quantum is the *first* ; hence in the common usage of speech *quantum* is usually taken only so. Maimon's definition is that extensive quantum is plurality as unity. Kant defines similarly. By what is joined to the number—the denomination—number forfeits a part of its variability and calculability. Extensive quantum is increased or diminished by leaps, because in it the moment of *discretion* repeats itself. Of course in higher potency ; hence was fault found above when extensive quantum and discrete magnitude are interchanged.

§ 68 (c). As quantum in general, so is also extensive quantum something *definite*, distinct from all others. But (§ 67) it is determined by annumeration, *i.e.*, the moment of *plurality*. (§ 64.) Without plurality, therefore, extensive quantum would not be this definite thing, *i.e.*, it presupposes plurality. This being understood, *really*, when we think extensive quantum there is *consistently* thought a quantum which is a *simple determination*, which, however, *presupposes plurality*, from which it is distinct, but which, nevertheless, it contains as a *sublated* moment. Even this quantum, although distinct from mere number, will require it as its co-efficient. (See § 67, obs.) But, like the quantum itself, whose co-efficient it is, number here gives not so much an annumeration as, rather, a

simple determination which, of course, contains and hence presupposes an annumeration as sublated moment; *i.e.*, the co-efficient is here an *ordinal number* which gives not the sum but the position. Quantum so conceived is *intensive quantum*, or degree. If in extensive quantum, quantum was as annumeration, it is here posited as unity, so that in extensive and intensive quantum the concept of quantum is completely posited.

The word *degree* we use wherever *one* determination (the twentieth degree of heat is only *one* heat, the twentieth degree of latitude is only one latitude) is *different* from all others (the twentieth degree is *another* heat than the nineteenth); although it is not without it (the twentieth degree is not without the nineteenth), nay, it *contains* them all, as sublated (in the twentieth degree the nineteenth is contained as *having been*, *i.e.*, as sublated). Hence degree, according to Kant and Maimon, is unity thought as plurality. But plurality is taken as *passed through*, *i.e.*, as sublated. For the rest, the analogy between *degree* and *continuity* is so apparent that one can not wonder if some entirely confound them.

§ 69. To be extensive and intensive belongs to quantum by its concept. It is the former when posited as annumeration, the latter when posited as unity. Neither, therefore, is to be thought without the other. That extensive quantum refers to intensive as its truth, has been shown (§ 68); but in similar manner the latter refers back to the former.

Definite degree, that is to say, is *one* simple determination, distinct from all others; but since all other (lower) degrees are contained, sublated, in it, it has in these its annumeration, *i.e.*, its *extension*.⁽¹⁾ Every extensive quantum is, therefore, also intensive, and *vice versa*.⁽²⁾ To put forward only *one* of the two determinations is to involve oneself in insoluble difficulties.⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ Since the twentieth degree contains in itself the nineteenth, eighteenth, etc., *i.e.*, twenty degrees, instead of saying (intensively) the *twentieth degree* we often say (extensively) twenty degrees of heat. ⁽²⁾ The greater the mass (extensive) the greater the pressure (intensive); the greatness (intensive) of the character shows itself as a series (extensive) of deeds; the higher *degree* of heat as also a greater *quantum* of heat (matter); the *higher* tone as a *larger number* of vibrations. Often in the *ordinary reckonings* having to do with intensive magnitudes, one treats them as extensive; as, for example, when one speaks of twenty pounds of *force*, etc. Only in *higher* analysis is the strength (*i.e.*, the degree) of change taken into account without such transformation. ⁽³⁾ The dispute of atomism and dynamism in the natural sciences which mostly, that is, in the application of numbers, turns upon the distinction between extensive and intensive magnitude is, therefore, idle.

§ 70. But as discretion and continuity, though not to be thought without one another (§ 61), were the negation each of the other, so also the two higher powers of them, extensive and intensive quantum, exhibit, besides their inseparability just pointed out,

also a negative relation to one another. The practical human understanding, which supposes that with increasing extension intensity is endangered,⁽¹⁾ is not entirely mistaken; extensive quantum and intensive quantum limit one another, and hence displace one another. But then, since quantum is completely thought only as both, it follows that the more completely it is thought, the more it contradicts itself. Therefore, it forever ceases to be quantum,⁽²⁾ and in the end the result is that, as quantum has proved to be the truth of the category of magnitude, so the former yields place to the still higher category of *quantum which is not quantum*. Whoever operates upon that thinks in a manner which, though doubtful to the *elementary* (§ 66) reckoner, who has operated upon mere quanta, can not seem strange to the logician. The formula just used states, though in the first instance only negatively, the concept of *quantitative relation* as also of the *quantitative infinite*.

⁽¹⁾ The distinction that is usually made between *multum* and *multa* contrasts strangely with the fact that we are nevertheless (see § 69, 2) in the habit of making the latter the measure of the former. ⁽²⁾ With this coheres the fact that already in extensive quantum calculability (§ 65, 2) begins to lose itself. The denomination is in calculation neglected, has meaning only in the application. Denominate numbers cannot be multiplied. In intensive quantum there occurred when one would reckon with that, a reduction to the extensive.

C. QUANTITATIVE RELATION.

§ 71. Every quantitative relation is, *first*, something definite, invariable; as such it is represented by the *exponent*.⁽¹⁾ At same time it appears, *secondly*, as a variable in the *sides* which *compose* it. But both are *one* quantum, and are therefore rightly joined by the sign =, ($\frac{a}{m} = e$). Since thus the exponent (because not variable) is, according to § 62, 3, no longer mere quantum, while the sides are mere quanta, but both are the same, there is, in every quantitative relation, contained the contradiction above developed. (§ 70.) But since *every* unity of opposed determinations can be represented as an endless progression (§ 49), the concept given throws light upon the meaning of the quantitative *infinite*⁽²⁾ as upon its application in reckoning.⁽³⁾

(1) By the exponent of the relation I shall mean merely the unalterable unit, which shows *what* the relation is. (2) By infinitely great (or small) magnitudes are meant such as cannot be transcended, *i.e.*, according to the definition (§ 63, obs. 3) such as are *not quanta*. (3) Every relation, that is to say, may be represented as an infinite series (*e.g.*, $1 + x + x^2 + x^3 - - -$), and the series may be *summed* up in the relation which they represent; finally reckoning may be made with *relations* of magnitudes in the moment of their vanishing, or of the elements (principles) of these magnitudes. Only where re-

lations are concerned is there necessarily reckoning with the infinite.

§ 72 (a). The variable *sides* compose the relation, and, since the exponent says *what* the relation is, they compose *it*. But if the exponent is a number, the two sides will have merely the meaning of being *moments of a number*. Each side is therefore an imperfect quantum, has its completion in the other, and will therefore be also variable *only with the other*. The relation, therefore, appears in the first instance as *the relation* in which one side changes *just as* the other does, *i.e.*, as *direct relation*.

It is the first, hence the most superficial, mode of relation, and in higher spheres gives way to higher modes.

§ 73 (b). But this relation contradicts itself if we pay regard to the *exponent*. This was said to be the *unity* of both as its moments, but it is so neither in the direct arithmetical relation, since there, as *difference*, it shows precisely wherein the two sides do *not* coincide,⁽¹⁾ nor in the direct *geometrical* relation, for there it is a *quotient*, and hence, since a quotient was only unity *or* annumeration, it is merely a *moment* of number, and therefore equal to only *one side*.⁽²⁾ But since it was made up of *both sides* the relation will correspond to its concept only where the exponent contains both sides, whether as *summands* or as *factors*.

In both cases we have *inverse relation*, in the first, *arithmetical*,⁽³⁾ in the second, *geometrical*.⁽⁴⁾ But not only here (when it is *sum* or *product*), rather than in direct relation does the exponent correspond to its concept, but so also does the relation of the sides, since here is *posited* what there merely *was* to be. In the alteration of one side the other should alter in *like manner*. This does not really happen in direct relation, since the second side always appears as the dependent and non-variable.⁽⁵⁾ In inverse relation, on the contrary, the second side alters exactly as does the first, since it makes its change in *opposition* to that of the latter.⁽⁶⁾

(1) If in the relation $y - x = e$, y and x are rectangles of equal bases, which, for comparison's sake, are made to coincide, e is *not* that which is common to both. (2) If $y : x$ is reduced to the simplest form by putting $x = 1$, then $e = y$, *i.e.*, *one side*. (3) Two *radii vectores* from one point of an ellipse are in *inverse arithmetical* relation, because here $y + x = e$. (4) The length of the arm of the balance (y) and the weight (x) are in *inverse geometrical* relation, because $y \cdot x = e$. (5) In fact, if the rectangle x increases, y *remains* that which exceeds it by e , or if in $y : x = e$, y was the double of x , and this increases, y *remains* its double. (6) Hence is inverse relation, as the truth of the direct, higher than it; and in higher spheres, force, etc. (for example), *increase* by use (negation).

§ 74 (c). If in the inverse arithmetical relation the exponent *is*, as the sum of the sides, their unity,

so in the geometrical is it, as their product, a definite quantum in which their identity is posited as that of unity and annumeration. But at the same time the two sides whose unity forms the exponent separate, and indeed, *forever*, for, since neither of the two moments can disappear, so neither can become the exponent; and, since this was the unity of both, neither can become unity with the other.⁽¹⁾ We have, therefore, the status on the one hand, that the exponent is a definite *complete* quantum, *i.e.*, is identical with itself; on the other hand, that, since its moments are forever separate, the exponent does not *come to be* or *is* not. Since, now, the unity of being and not being is *becoming*, the exponent of the relation is really to be taken as *becoming*, as *coming to be*. The relation with such exponents is *variable* or *living* ⁽²⁾ relation, the truth and concrete unity of the direct and the indirect relations. The three together form a series which runs parallel to that of quantum.⁽³⁾ According to the concept given (§ 66) of *power*, it cannot appear strange if the formulæ for variable relations contain powers.⁽⁴⁾ In the living relation the concept of relation is realised because here *both* determinations of the relation, the being constant, the being variable, are posited in the *self-developing* exponent.⁽⁵⁾

(1) An endless approximation is posited: m (say the length of the arm of the balance) may increase, but since n (the weight) can *never entirely* disappear, it can never become the entirely static moment. (2) Hence expressions are here employed which are taken from life, as *members* (of a series), *functions*, *increments*, etc. (3) *Numbers* may stand in direct relation; *multitudes* belong to inverse relation, while *degrees*, as intensities, are sides of the living relation which the continual change of an intensity (curvative, for example) displays. (4) Therefore, we meet the relation of power in the so-called living forces. (5) In development that which changes yet remains identical with itself. If in the equations of the straight line and the parabola, we designate the unchangeable by e , the formulæ $ex=y$, and $ex=y^2$, or still better, $\sqrt{x}=e$, and $\sqrt{x}=\frac{e}{y}$ afford examples in which the distinction of the direct relation is immediately evident, since it appears that in the *exponent* of the latter relation are contained determinations which constitute the relation.

§ 75. Viewing relation in its entirety, we find in it a determination which prepares the transition to a new group of categories. *Relation* is a quantitative category; but, at the same time, was relation declared (§ 70) to be no longer mere quantum, and how far it is not this has now been shown: absolute variability has vanished, for relation is only *as it is*, this definite relation; if the attribute alters, the relation also alters. But it was the essence of *qualitative* attributes that with them that which is determined by them also alters. Really, therefore, we have in rela-

tion an attribute which, though of a quantitative kind, has yet become qualitative also.⁽¹⁾ Such an attribute we call *mode*,⁽²⁾ and to the categories of quality and those of quantity the *categories* of *modality* ⁽³⁾ or of mode form the third group.

⁽¹⁾ This gives the positive determination to the merely negative in § 70. Relations are not merely quantitative, but also at the same time qualitative determinations. Rightly is it said that the exponent states *what sort* of a relation two numbers form. In so far may the exponent be called the qualitative in the relation. Hence it was correctly said of infinite magnitudes, *quantitatively* taken, that they are = 0, but that they had a *qualitative* meaning. Since in the variable relation as the highest relation the qualitative chiefly is active, the calculation of the infinite occurs principally where such relations are concerned. *Degree* was the category in which above all mere quantum was sublated: it has, therefore, more qualitative meaning than has extensive quantum. Just on that account is every distinction of degree already qualitative. Hence, in nature every quality exists in a definite degree, or to have a definite intensity is the manner in which natural qualities are quantitative. The definition of degree, that it is the quantity (better quantum) of a quality is not incorrect. Conversely, the category of degree is always applied where not so much things as rather their qualities are to be quantitatively determined.

⁽²⁾ Since the various meanings of this word will gradually appear as various determinations of one concept, the choice of the name will be justified.

⁽³⁾ The word *modality* is here not taken in the merely subjective sense in which Kant used it; rather in the sense in which it is taken when one, say, terms

the ἀποφάνσεις μετὰ τρόπου of the Aristotelians *modal* judgments.

§ 76. Also here a recapitulation of the completed course (*cf.* § § 28 and 54) lets us see how under the general superscription *Quantity* (§ 56, obs. 2), three distinct groups arose as sub-divisions, which, in parallelism with the qualitative categories, gave us first *indefinite magnitude*, then *definite magnitude*, or *quantum*, and, finally, discovered *quantitative relation*, which last shows magnitude in its *infinitude* and also in its transition beyond the *merely* quantitative sphere.

III.—THIRD CHAPTER.

MODE.

§ 77. By "*Mode*" we mean that attribute which is both quantitative and qualitative, in that by its quantitative being it is qualitative, by its qualitative being it is quantitative. The development of this important concept, which, as the unity of quantity and quality, is their truth, consists in the positing of the individual moments contained in it, whereby its realisation comes to pass. This is accomplished when all determinations contained in it are posited, and it is determined as the unity of them. (§ 41, obs. 5.)

(1) On account of the ambiguity and the great indefiniteness of this term, we take it, similarly as in the preceding chapter we took the word Quantity, as the superscription of the entire chapter, instead of the term *measure* used by Hegel, which is proper for one kind only of mode. (See § 78.) (2) If, therefore, the view was characterised (§ 56, obs. 1) as justifiable which sought to reduce qualitative attributes to quantitative, there *now* appears as *still more* justifiable that view which will explain physical qualities by the different *mode of configuration* of the atoms, from which also the number of them shall

follow. Of course even this mode of view is not the absolutely highest. ⁽³⁾ Also here shall we follow the usage of language in justifying it. The various meanings of the *word* mode are really different determinations of thought.

§ 78 (a). The mode as the unity of quantitative and qualitative attributes appears *first* as the *immediate* unity of them (§ 27 obs.) This cannot be other than what we had in the transition from quantity to mode. It had been shown that in a quantitative attribute (*viz.*, *relation*, in which, therefore, mode already lay dormant) the qualitative came to light. The quantitative, therefore, forms here the real basis, the qualitative appears as the accidental; the former is the *principale*, the latter the *accessorium*. First, therefore, mode will be *magnitude upon which quality* (quiddity) *depends*. The determining or *modifying* is here, therefore, the quantitative. This gives us the notion of *measure*.

The μέτρον ἀρίστον is, therefore, something far higher than the admiration of mere *magnitude*. *Vetus verbum est, Deum omnia pondere, mensura, numero fecisse.*—Leibnitz.

§ 79. By *measure* is to be understood that quantitative attribute which tells *what* the quantitatively determined object is. In all languages this *what* is itself often a merely quantitative determination.⁽¹⁾ In this case measure is either the *unity*⁽²⁾

whose annumeration the measured is, or it is *annumeration*⁽³⁾ which shows how many of a certain unity the measured contains; in short, we are here always concerned with only a quantitative relation, the *discovery* of *whose exponent* is termed *measuring*. That for which such an exponent cannot be found is called the *measureless* or the *unmeasured*:⁽⁴⁾ it coincides with undetermined magnitude. Like degree, *this* form of measure is still quantitative relation.⁽⁵⁾ But since everything whatever may be put into relation, measure itself is indifferent, accidental; it is, accordingly as one understands by it rather the *unity* whose number is to be found in the measure, or the *annumeration* to which that which is to be measured shall belong—a *standard of measure*⁽⁶⁾ or a *rule*⁽⁷⁾ in the concept of which, just because of contingency, it is contained that the exponent of that relation *may* be as well irrational as rational.

(1) So, for example, in an elenchus above-named, *heap* is just as well a merely quantitative determination as are the distinctions quantitative which are assumed between dwarf and giant. Hence in regard to *that elenchus* there is no question as to a change of quality. How with quantity quality really alters we shall speak of immediately. (§ 80.) (2) So, for example, the *ell*, the *foot*, etc., is the *measure* for a length. (3) So, six feet say, are the *measure* for the height of a man. (4) Hence “measureless, limitless,

numberless," are employed as synonyms. ⁽⁵⁾ Hence in many phrases ("In a *measure*," etc.) *measure*, *degree*, *relation* are used as synonyms. ⁽⁶⁾ A so-called natural, *i.e.*, necessary, standard, *i.e.*, a necessary *unity* for comparison is therefore a *contradictio in adjecto*. External fitness may determine the choice of the standard, which (choice) *otherwise* is wholly a matter of indifference. ⁽⁷⁾ The *rule* is merely the greater *annumeration* of cases; in its concept it lies, therefore, that it has exceptions. It is *essentially* distinct from *law*. That the mode may be mere (contingent, external) rule, appears to be suggested in the use of the word *mode* in opposition to *custom*.

§ 80. Because the *what* which the standard of measure determines is not the real quiddity of the object, the concept of measure is in the standard of measure not yet, or not fully, posited. Measure was to be immediate unity of quantitative *and qualitative* attribute (§ 78); it is, therefore, to be taken rather as a quantitative attribute with which the being-*so*, or being-*this*, of the definite object is really combined, so that in another magnitude it would really be *different*. In this case the magnitude will really make the quality; measure will be *quali-fying quantum*. *This* quantum has for this reason no longer the character of indifference. The qualifying quantum will, therefore, no longer be a mere quantum, but what makes the object this definite thing will be a quantum of a qualitative being, *i.e.*, a *degree* of something. (See § 75, 1.)

As an apposite example of a qualifying quantum that temperature is often cited at which alone water is still water (and not vapour or ice). But it is, then, not its amount (*i.e.*, a definite quantum of water) which makes water water, but a quantum of the heat of the water; *i.e.*, a qualitative determinateness must exist in a certain degree or a certain quantity, in order that water may preserve the quiddity of water.

§ 81. Qualifying quantum is more than external standard of measure: it is real measure, for it is already what measure was to be, unity of quantitative and qualitative attribute. This unity is here first *immediate* (§ 78), hence unity as *being*. (§ 29.) But being was identical with not-being or passed into it (§ 30); because of the immediacy of that *coincidence* the quantitative and the qualitative attributes will likewise *separate*, and since here the quantitative had the meaning of the *principale* (§ 78), the qualitative, that of the *accessorium*, the quantitative attribute will, in this separation, show itself as preponderant in the fact that it has a greater breadth. Quiddity will, therefore, be completely joined to the qualifying quantum, but not the latter to the former. Therefore will the quantum retain the nature of mere quantum in so far as it *also* may be altered without the quiddity undergoing alteration.

In the example cited water remains water when it rises from 40° to 50° of heat, though it has taken up a greater quantum of heat. On the contrary, the

quiddity of the water can not change unless the quantum of heat were altered.

§ 82 (α). But if thus the unity of quantitative attribute and qualitative attribute just as much is as it is *not*, and being and not-being had their real truth in cessation and origination (§ 33), this will appear also here. Now will the qualifying quantum be mere indifferent quantum, which may be altered, its unity *having ceased* with a definite quiddity, and *now* again, this unity come forth so that with the alteration of this quantum there immediately, and therefore *suddenly*, comes into being another quiddity. Therefore the qualifying quantum, or the real measure, will lie between limits; and within these limits or within this measure a certain quiddity will be found. If the measure be *exceeded*, another quiddity comes into being.

The phenomena, that in the gradual heating of water there occurs a point where *suddenly* it is converted into vapour, or that gases under continued pressure suddenly become liquid, because the measure, of heating or pressure has been exceeded; phenomena which have their analoga in the mental sphere, are *examples* of the passage of the merely quantitative into qualifying quantum. It is usual to call them incomprehensible. They *are comprehended* when we have seen that such a passage is necessary. Of course they are not thereby *explained*. Explanation has to do with the *πῶς*, comprehension only with the *διότι*. "The greatest enemy of the concept," says Hegel, "is

How." A phenomenon is *understood* or *explained* when it is *genetically* developed (§ 17); *comprehended* through its *dialectical* deduction. So soon as something is seen to be necessary it is comprehended, even though unexplained, and indeed to remain inexplicable. If one cites the elenchi of the ancients as examples of this passage, one forgets that heaps and the like are merely quantitative determinations. (§ 79, obs. 1.)

§ 83 (b). If one reflects upon what is really contained in the concept stated, the qualitative came forward where the termination of quantum was reached. But this obviously means nothing else than that the quantitative is bounded, limited by the qualitative. Therefore, precisely, is the qualitative the *determining*. (§ 44.) If, therefore, we think mode as measure logically through, we are compelled to think not so much a qualifying quantum as rather *quiddity* ⁽¹⁾ *determining* (quantifying) *quantity*. Since it as such is coloured by quantity, quantifying quality will have already in itself the quantitative determination.⁽²⁾ Mode, as precisely quality which is modifying, as consisting in a quality which is not *mere* quality, but, even quantitatively determined, reacts against the quantitative determinateness and modifies it, in way or manner.⁽³⁾ If in measure mode was posited in its quantitative moment, in *way* it is posited in its qualitative.⁽⁴⁾

⁽¹⁾ As an example of this category it may be cited

that water, because it is (by its quiddity) water, takes up a definite quantum of heat as different degree of heat from that of ice, say. The different capacities for heat are in nature what in the spiritual sphere perhaps so manifests itself that the same impression has a *different effect* according to the different condition of that which receives it, because it is its manner so to receive it. ⁽²⁾ In the example cited, the heat capacity of many substances is a definite one only in case of definite temperature, *i.e.*, a definite *quantum* of heat. In the mental sphere the receptivity which strengthens the impression received has its more or less. Herein lies a difference between *quiddity* (§ 36) and *way* or between *what* and *how*. Also here it must be observed that with the development of this category these phenomena are not *explained*, but shown to be *necessary*, *i.e.*, postulated by reason. ⁽³⁾ Since *mode* means both way as well as measure, it was chosen as the general superscription. Expressions such as that, Everything depends upon *manner and way*, The *value* of a gift is increased by the *how* of the giving, etc., show the great importance which is attributed to this category. ⁽⁴⁾ In this sense the sophists take the term measure when in making man the measure of things they make the objective value of all things give way to his subjective condition. The individuality of man is then the modifying element.

§ 84 (c). A further reflection upon the determinations thus far considered leads further. The quantitative mode limits the qualitative, and *vice versa*. But if (§ 45, 2) the limited is one with its limit, those two determinations must be thought as one, and, by the combination of what on the one side and what on

the other the mode had been, its concept realised or completely thought. If, now, in *measure* the first qualitative leading category, being, was joined with first quantitative, magnitude, while in *way*, when quantum must determine whether it belong to something or to other, and the second quantitative leading category was conditioned by the second qualitative determinateness (§ 35, ff.), mode must, where it transcends the opposition of those two, show itself as the unity of that which quality and quantity had always shown in their third position. This had been in quality *absoluteness*, i.e., being-in-and-for-self, but in quantity *relation*. The complete or real mode will, therefore, be that which shows *how* one object is related to itself (not *to* another, but in general, i.e., *absolute*, or how it is related, properly speaking, *with* it).

§ 85. That which expresses this relation may, in default of a better term, be called *Inner Relation*, *Proper Being*, *Inner Nature*, unless one will perhaps say *property*. By it is to be understood that dependence of the determinations of measure upon way, and *vice versa*, which is postulated by reason, which, therefore, wherever it is present, fills the thinker not with admiration but with joy. When definite ways combine only in definite measures, ⁽¹⁾ or, again, certain relations of measure betray themselves

in certain constantly appearing ways, this is with reason referred to the property and inner nature of such combinations, and thus is recognised that they have their own *mode*. Since mode as here conceived combines the two other modal categories, and likewise also the qualitative which contained all other qualitative categories with the quantitative into which all quantitative categories had entered,—all the categories hitherto considered are in it concentrated, and a point is reached which is related to the three chapters treated precisely as those (third) categories had been, respectively, related to each chapter. Here a principal division of the logic is concluded.

(1) Chemical proportions, in which only definite measures of combinations may enter and be represented by equivalents, find their analogues in the spiritual world. (2) Likewise isomorphism. He who does not perceive this to be a logical relation may lapse into astonishment or dream of borrowings when he hears of similarities in Buddhism and Papacy, between Jews and Jesuits, etc. Like relations give like forms, which is precisely their mode.

§ 86. A recapitulation of the course passed over has *here* more than one purpose. First, it has to show how in the chapter which has received the superscription mode (§ § 77-85) the gradual realisation of this concept has been accomplished,

in that the mode is conceived first as quantitative or as *measure* (§ § 78-82), then as qualitative or as *way* (§ 83), finally, as unity of both, and so as complete and real *mode* (§ § 84, 85). Secondly, it must bring to consciousness the fact that here a primary group of categories is concluded. This is evident from the fact that just as in the individual chapters closed circles had shown themselves, so also here a relation of return into self appears, whereby those circles become, as it were, points or epicycles in the periphery of a greater circle. The complex of inseparable or being attributes which the first chapter had treated, quality, had given place to the complex of the indifferent, which (quantity) were treated in the second chapter. Since neither could be thought without the other, the development arrived at determinations in which the indifference is sublated, and which, therefore, are *again* in being,—in which “again” is suggested that mode or the *how*, although distinct from quality or the *what*, is, nevertheless, *also* it in such a manner that it is higher quality, proper or second what. With this second task is naturally combined a third: to fix the superscription which belongs to the finished part. Hegel, in accordance with the principle mentioned in § 28, obs., uses the word *being*, of course in a wider meaning than that which

it had there, where it denoted the first category. Since being had *been* equal to *immediacy*, it is no deviation from him when, instead of being, *immediacy* was placed. *Categories of immediacy* are, however, those thus far considered: *first*, because as the first, presupposing no others, they are employed ⁽¹⁾ by the first thought which presupposes no preparation for it, hence is immediate. Hence this first part of the logic may be characterised as the logic of natural thought ⁽²⁾ or of life, a fact in which the peculiar difficulty precisely of this part is explained. ⁽³⁾ *Secondly*, they were so called because they leave the object to which they are applied, in its immediacy; do not, as do those hereafter to be treated, take it as mediated in itself, so that with the aid of the categories hitherto considered the object is taken *just as it is*, while the later categories, where they are applied, cause the being-just-so as well as being to disappear. ⁽⁴⁾

⁽¹⁾ Naming, numbering, measuring as answers to the questions *quid?* *quantum?* *quomodo?* are the first, hence entirely natural forms of thought. ⁽²⁾ The later categories are those which artistic and scholastic and scientific thought applies. ⁽³⁾ To reflect upon reflective thought is easy for every one, whereas to study undeveloped and unreflected thought is difficult, for the same reason that the simplest occurrences in the organism are investigated later than are the more complex. Because it is not so easy to study exactly

naming and counting as judging and concluding; the former is more seldom done, and when one does it, he must have it said of himself that he busies himself with what does not belong to logic or the theory of thought. As if counting were not a kind of thinking! ⁽⁴⁾ Compare the answers which are received to questions *quid?* and *quantum?* with those which fit *qua de causa?* and *cui bono?* and it will be found that there the answer states *one* thing which the object *is*, while here a relation of two is always stated, and the concern is about such a thing (cause, end, etc.) as the object, not *is*, but *has*. To have is the negation of to be: it therefore serves, in many languages, to form the preterite of it.

§ 87. The passage to a new group of categories is mediated by the perception that in those last considered there begins to disappear the character which all the categories of the First Part had had. That had been the *real how*, the category which we apply when we observe how it stands with the object, or how the object is related to itself in itself. But since a relation is conceivable only between two things, we have in that question really no longer exercised a thought which is a taking of objects just as they are, but is a *dualising* thinking, *i.e.*, what is usually termed reflection. (§ 13.) By this position of duplicity the hitherto simple being separates in two, and it is no accident that for the designation of that category there offer themselves only terms which require a complement. (*Proper* suggests an improper, *inner* an outer.)

For such duplication the name of immediacy is no longer appropriate, and so the last modal category formed the threshold to a group of categories, which, just because immediacy has ceased to be we may characterise as the *categories of mediation*.

Second Part.

CATEGORIES OF MEDIATION.

ESSENCE.

§ 88. As, wherever a hitherto whole suffers diremption, instead of it, two things appear, each as the whole but in opposite ways, thus negating⁽¹⁾ one another, so we are compelled at the point reached, to think, instead of being which is in itself one and whole, two negations of it which are related to one another as kernel and shell. To these thoughts correspond completely the words *essence* and *appearance*, which both negate⁽²⁾ being, but not as not-being, for this they do not both denote but as being proper⁽³⁾ and improper. Essence and appearance are, therefore, diametrically opposed to one another, since the former is thought as that which cannot appear, the latter as the essenceless, but so that the latter accompanies the former, as it were, as a shadow, and appears in it.⁽⁴⁾ With essence and appearance the circle of mediations is entered upon,⁽⁵⁾ and if *necessity* proves to be the

highest of all mediations (§ 130, ff.), it is here already clear why the position of duplicity was necessary to the perception of it. (§ 12.)

(¹) Let one think of yolk or kernel and shell into which that which has split in two has transformed itself for the child who, hitherto, had seen only one (egg or nut). (²) When our language designates *sublated* being as that which *has been*, it takes an apt turn. Aristotle calls essence $\tau\acute{o}\ \tau\epsilon\ \eta\nu\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$; the Middle Age *quod erat esse*. (³) Therefore is essence preferred (§ 86) to being proper, and in the essence of a substance is sought the ground why it combines in itself certain proportions, etc. (⁴) (*Cf.* § 50, 1.) (⁵) If God is conceived as *essence* over against the world as appearance, this is a worthier, because deeper, category than when he is conceived only as *great*.

§ 89. Essence thought in opposition to appearance gives the concept of the *essential*, that which in it only appears being the *unessential*. But since the *essential* is only as *opposed* to *unessential*, the latter is *essential* to it; it as much requires the unessential as the unessential does it. Each, therefore, appears in the other, or there exists between them a reciprocal relation, which we call *reflection*,⁽¹⁾ or *relativity*.⁽²⁾ Like this first mediation, all others also are a reciprocal union one with another. The distinction of this sphere against that of immediacy may, therefore, be defined as follows: we here have to do with pure *determinations of reflection*.⁽³⁾ This sphere is, therefore, that of posited contradiction.⁽⁴⁾ As upon

this fact rests the difficulty of this sphere, so, on the contrary, contradiction here is, as posited, easier to discover than in the First Part.⁽⁵⁾

(1) This term, borrowed from Optics, is usually taken only subjectively as denoting only our action (see § § 13 and 87), later (§ 95, obs. 1) it will appear in how far one is justified in so taking it. It is here taken objectively as reciprocal reference of things to one another. (2) The categories of *relation*, which Kant treats beside these of quantity, quality, and modality are, to say nothing of their subjective meaning, only a part of the categories which are here discussed. (3) In the sphere of being everything was immediate, and hence reciprocal reflection did not make its appearance; one category did not refer immediately to another, but went *over* into it; something *became* other, etc. Here, on the contrary, a reflection is posited. Positive, for example, is not to be thought without negative, cause not with effect, etc. Here always two are posited at once; relativity and, still, reference to self. (4) In the Introduction (§ 13) it is said that to comprehension belongs reflection, which discovers contradiction in the object. If later it is shown that the concept, the real object of comprehension, is the unity of being and essence, there will thereby be thrown a clearer light upon the assertion there discussed, that comprehension has to take the object first as it *is*, then as it *contradicts* itself. (5) The transitions from one determination to another are, therefore, that which is most difficult in the First Part; here, on the contrary, the difficulty lies rather in abstracting from reflection upon other.

§ 90. Since scientific procedure has to do with *necessity*, all the mediations here to be considered are

forms of scientific, hence also of artistic (by culture) *mediated* thought, and precisely as the categories of immediacy, those of mediation are so called for a double reason.⁽¹⁾ (*Cf.* § 86.) As the First Part, as logic of life, criticises the categories of natural thought, so the Second Part criticises the categories of the sciences.⁽²⁾ The basis of them is constituted by the two just named. They appear, therefore, as the leading categories for the thought which makes the transition from life to the sciences. If one denotes the sphere which separates both by the word *school*, it is intelligible why the school has elaborated precisely these categories into (exclusive) laws of thought, in that scholastic dogmatism regarded only *essence*, scholastic scepticism only *appearance*, as a justified category.⁽³⁾ *Conceivability*, which alone interests scholastic thought, is by it limited to the applicability only of these two categories. In this the institution which prepares for the scientific career, which (institution) is *also* called *school*, follows it.⁽⁴⁾

⁽¹⁾ The first, yet unscientific, thinking is satisfied with discovering quality, with counting, with measuring. Quite otherwise does the mind function when it *compares* (*cf.* § 95) or seeks *grounds* (*cf.* § 102) or will discover efficient *forces*. (§ 119.) Then it has to do with mediations. It does not stop at the immediate, but, breaking through this, looks behind it, and *by means* of it finds another. ⁽²⁾ In this criticism they are shown to be untrue; such, however, they are

regarded only from the (philosophical) *absolute* standpoint. The empiricist, for example, who *as such* has not risen to this standpoint, but will remain upon the standpoint of experience, *i.e.*, of *inceptive* thought (*cf.* my "Outlines of Psychology," § 112), cannot avoid using these categories, any more than natural thought can be satisfied with counting, etc. ⁽³⁾ Hence with one that fear of all *appearance* which causes him to demonstrate even that which is most *obvious*, and with the other the tendency to see in everything only appearance, at most, *probability*. Scholastic dogmatism is related to the undeveloped dogmatism of life as the categories which they employ. The like is true of the two forms of scepticism. Appearance is reflected not-being, essence is reflected being. ⁽⁴⁾ It is, therefore, entirely proper when in learned schools the pupils obtain consciousness of the determinations of thought which form the foundation for those by the application of which one is scientifically occupied. This the pupil should not yet be; hence it is not proper to him to gain a judging knowledge of them. If scholastic scepticism had won the victory over dogmatism, there would have been laid down in the gymnasial logic, instead of the familiar three laws, three entirely opposite ones.

§ 91. In the first instance, we have the concept of essence as opposed to essenceless appearance. Now, although (since essence is also what is reflected into appearance) it must, in what *is to follow*, be shown that *mere* essence is an abstraction, since it forces itself into the sphere of the appearance standing opposed to it (*cf.* § 106), yet, because it has first so presented itself, it is to be conceived as such, and

mere essence, or *essence in abstracto*, is first to be considered. All determinations which are present in this consideration will be predicates of essence, while their opposites may be assigned to appearance or be made predicates of appearance. There is required, therefore, only a more precise consideration of the one in order to know (by inversion) what is true of the other.

I.—FIRST CHAPTER.

ESSENCE AS SUCH.

§ 92. ESSENCE is *not* being ; to discover it one must not stop at being.⁽¹⁾ On the other hand, one must not, in trying to discover the essence of a thing, think of something entirely different,⁽²⁾ but only it itself. Hence by essence is to be understood what is *not, yet is*, being, *i.e., reflected being*, reference to self, which, however, is mediated by reference to other, which appears in it. This reflected reference we call *identity*.

⁽¹⁾ Here is explained why, when essence is sought to be discovered, the object is altered (§ 5), *i.e.*, its being is treated as a shell that must be broken through. ⁽²⁾ One must go forward, it is true, but keep by the fact in hand.

A. IDENTITY.

§ 93. Identity contains in itself the two determinations of *being* and *being-turned-into-self*. If one *abstracts* from the latter, one has mere indifference,

abstract distinctionlessness,⁽¹⁾ *i.e.*, mere being. This is often denoted by the word *identity*, although it is merely the abstract form of identity, mere indifference. This *empty* or *abstract* identity⁽²⁾ is, however, only a *moment* in identity. Identity is completely conceived only when it is at the same time conceived as actual *reference*, which as such has for its presupposition exclusion (§ § 51, 52), so that the true or *concrete* identity is the unity of abstract identity and its opposite,⁽³⁾ *i.e.*, *inseparability*.⁽⁴⁾

(1) Hence the word identity is commonly taken as similarity. (2) Because it is the essence of the thought of the understanding to isolate all determinations, and thereby to *fix* them, this abstract identity is also called identity of the understanding. This abstract identity has been made the *leading* category in the so-called first law of thought, in the law of identity or of contradiction. It would therefore be stated, everything is identical, non-identity (contradiction) is mere appearance. The law of identity, $A = A$ (as rule: If one thinks a thing, he thinks *only* it), is *empty*, says *nothing*, because it predicates of A empty identity, pure being. In every judgment one really contravenes this law, because one therein places the subject in relation to a predicate, while this law allows A to be referred *only* to itself. (3) So the proposition (Schelling and Hegel) that identity is unity of identity, and non-identity is entirely correct. (4) This word comes *nearest* to the concept of identity. If hitherto (*e.g.*, § § 12, 84, and elsewhere) the category of identity was *applied*, this word is always used in the now developed sense, and this is one of many examples of how one is

compelled to apply categories before they have been critically examined. (*Cf.* § 21.) How it is with the *identity* of being and not being, quality and quantity, etc., will therefore properly be here for the first time entirely clear.

§ 94. If identity is to be rightly thought, we must think it as unity *or* without sameness, *i.e.*, unity of (abstract) identity and non-identity. If we do this, we really think what is called *difference*⁽¹⁾ the reflected form of what we have designated as other-being.⁽²⁾ If, therefore, essence was to be thought as identical with itself, difference is likewise an essential category; it is, beside identity as the first, the second form of mediation.⁽³⁾ Applied as a law of thought, difference gives us the proposition, Everything is different, which, of course, contradicts the proposition of identity. (See § 93, obs. 2.)

⁽¹⁾ If one says of two objects that they differ in *this* or in *that*, one says thereby that there is something in which they *both* coincide (are identical), but that at the same time they both differ and are distinguished. ⁽²⁾ In what has just been said the distinction is also given between being different and being other. When two things are *different* (or each is *other*) there may be assigned *wherein* they differ; on the contrary, this question has no meaning when we have to do with *something* and *other*; the other is not *in something* but in general the absolutely other; whether it is on that account *other*, remains undetermined. (Or also thus, in difference the different things are each related to *its* other.) ⁽³⁾ Since

identity cannot be (completely) thought without difference, one sees that the accusation brought against philosophy that it is a system of identity is not so terrible as it at first appears.

B. DIFFERENCE.

§ 95 (a). Each of the different is related to itself, and at the same time reflected into its other. If they are taken only in the first determination, they appear as immediately being, and their being reflected into one another then *falls outside* of them.⁽¹⁾ This gives us *immediate* or *external*⁽²⁾ difference, *diversity*.⁽³⁾ Even in this are to be found, particularly determined, the moments of difference: but identity is, as external, *likeness*; non-identity, as equally external *unlikeness*.⁽⁴⁾ *Both* are therein contained, hence only the like and unlike may be described⁽⁵⁾ or be *compared* as diverse.⁽⁶⁾

⁽¹⁾ In the subject comparing, who then *reflects* upon them. Since reflection here falls within the one comparing, it appears as the act of that one. (Cf. § 89, obs. 1.) ⁽²⁾ Although we regard them as diverse, it appears not to touch things themselves, is *external* to them. ⁽³⁾ This category is by Leibnitz converted into a law of thought, although, particularly in the grounding of it, the far higher category of *end* plays a part. This law of thought runs: Everything is diverse; that the opposite is the case is merely an *appearance*. $A = \text{not} - B$, or, stated as a rule, If you think A, exclude B—whereby not *merely* A is thought.

(4) The categories of externality, *i.e.*, the quantitative, play a very important part in comparison. (5) Without a *tertium comparationis* the search for diversity is somewhat idle. (6) Not accidentally does our language denote the termination of a dispute by the word *Vergleich* [= *comparison* taken in the sense of *adjustment of a disagreement*].

§ 96. In the concept of diversity there is contained a contradiction which was indicated even in the name when it was described as *immediate difference* (*i.e.*, relation which excludes relation)—a contradiction which compels us to conceive the merely external difference more inwardly, the immediate difference more essentially. The moments of diversity are likeness and unlikeness. But likeness = identity of the non-identical, while unlikeness is the non-identity of things *compared*, *i.e.*, of ones that have become: each moment is therefore the other also; *i.e.*, each is difference, and, since each side is reflected into the other, we have, as the second form of difference, difference that is reflected into itself, *i.e.*, *essential difference*. Essential difference is *opposition*, in which the reflection no longer falls in the comparing subject, but the things distinguished differ *in themselves*, each of them having in the other *its* other. Essence is *opposition*. *Opposition* is an essential category, and, indeed, higher than mere diversity.

§ 97 (b). As difference, *opposition* contains the

moments of difference in itself. On the one hand, therefore, will be found here *identity*; but, since each side is unity with the other, identity *in spite* of that unity, hence *confirmed*, posited identity. So likewise *non-identity*. Hence opposition is formed; first, by the different *posited* as identical—the *positive*; ⁽¹⁾ second, by the different posited as non-identical—the *negative*. ⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ The word positive is, therefore, often used merely to denote the being posited, *e.g.*, positive religion. Here abstraction is made from the fact that it is posited *difference*. ⁽²⁾ Because opposition is an essential category, it has given content to a law of thought. *Everything is an opposite*, or it must be either + A or - A, *tertium non datur* (or is mere *appearance*), is a proposition which completely contradicts the proposition that it is mere A (*i.e.*, neither + nor -).

§ 98. From the concept given of opposition result, as regards the relation of positive and negative, the following determinations:—Since all things are posited as difference, they are therein *alike*; ⁽¹⁾ but since everything is reflected into the other as *its other*, so everything is inimical to every other, and they cancel one another; ⁽²⁾ but, finally, since the positive is the *posited identical*, ⁽³⁾ the negative the *posited non-identical*, everything has its own specific nature, which belongs not to any other, since the positive appears as that which remains the same,

and is therefore *determinable*, while the negative appears as the changing and *determining*.⁽⁴⁾

In reckoning with opposite magnitudes all these determinations receive their rights:—⁽¹⁾ As *alike* they may be summed, and, for example $+ae$ and $-ae$ together make $2ae$ as the excentricity of the hyperbola. ⁽²⁾ As *cancelling* one another $+8$ and -8 together $= 0$. ⁽³⁾ A second power which were not positive would be a *contradictio in adjecto* because in the second power a number is posited as identical with itself. (Cf. § 66.) ⁽⁴⁾ The positive multiplier, therefore, does not alter the quality of the multiplicand, while the negative *determines* it. The positive appears as the weaker, the negative as the active. So in the difference of sex the woman is the positive, the man the negative moment. (Cf. my "Outlines of Psychology," § 26.)

§ 99. But as diversity points beyond itself, so also does opposition. If, that is to say, we consider its moments, the *positive* is only by reflection into the negative standing opposed to it, hence is positive only because it is *negative* (the negative); the *negative* is opposed to it. The negative is only in so far as it is not mere *absence* but a thing posited, *i.e.*, in so far as it is *positive*. (§ 97, obs. 1.)⁽¹⁾ Each, therefore, is also identical with its contrary. But if each is really also its contrary, each is *really* the entire *opposite*, and since each is directed towards the other, we think, when we think the opposite through, really

the opposite turned against itself, *i.e.*, *contradiction* as the third and highest form of difference.⁽²⁾

(1) Mere privation does not amount to opposition, since opposition has as its *conditio sine qua non* position. Thus, evil is not mere absence of the good but its negation. (2) One needs only to consider the proposition of opposition in the above formula, $A = A$, more precisely to find contained in it $A = \text{not } A$, for by A is to be understood A taken *absoluté*, and the predicate says that there is *nothing* of the kind.

§ 100 (c). Contradiction occurs where something is opposed to itself. As are diversity and opposition, so also is contradiction an essential category and deserves, like them, to be predicated of *everything*.⁽¹⁾ Nevertheless, the fear of contradiction is so great that it is characterised as the inconceivable, whereas a multitude of phenomena are real examples of existing contradiction⁽²⁾ without their being looked upon as impossibilities.

(1) The commonly so-called *proposition of contradiction* does not do this: as the negative form of the proposition of identity it rather makes contradiction the predicate of *nothing*, or explains it as appearance, and must therefore be called the *principium non-contradictionis*. (2) Motion and life are such examples. Before all, belong here the various *phenomena of polarity*. These are not exactly phenomena of *opposition*, as Schweigger rightly observes; but in that the unlike are posited as identical, that each of the polar opposites is in tension, *i.e.*, is defec-

tive without its opposite, etc., *contradiction* appears to us as reality.

§ 101. But of course we cannot stop with contradiction, and, in so far, the above-mentioned fear is well grounded. For what is contained in contradiction? Each side *of the opposition repels itself*. But since each side was the entire opposition (§ 99), and the opposition itself was essence (§ 96), we have the result that essence as contradiction *repels itself from itself*. Thereby essence is as reflection into self, and the duplicity which it was is *posited*, and hence, as may be presumed, *perfected*. In this repulsion, essence will be, first, essence that is identical with itself, but which *repels itself, i.e., ground*, and, secondly, essence which is different from itself and self-repelled—*consequent*. The former repulsion is *position*; ⁽¹⁾ since essence contradicts itself, it, as ground, posits a consequent, contradiction *sublates itself* into the relation of *ground and consequent*. ⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ The expression, *posit* (§ 41), obtains here a closer determination. *Posited* is that which has a mediated, conditioned being. In the example cited in § 41, obs., there is a *ground* for the object's being here. The posited depends upon the positing, therefore, at one time the *being posited* may be described as superior (to being-in-self), at another a thing may be described as *merely posited, i.e. dependent*. ⁽²⁾ When language makes the contradictory fall to *the ground*, it displays a shrewd perception. It has thus far been

presupposed (see § 16), that where contradiction occurs something must *follow* therefrom. Now that presupposition is *proved*, since it has been shown that *contradiction* has its truth in the relation of ground and consequent.

C. GROUND AND CONSEQUENT.

§ 102. The *relation of ground and consequent*, the third form of mediation, besides identity and difference, forms, abstractly stated, the unity of both, since wherein what is identical with itself contradiction occurs, this relation also occurs. In it ground is the movement of identity, hence the *fixed*, while what follows *moves*, and hence contains contradiction. (§ 100, obs. 2.)⁽¹⁾ This relation, like those two, is an *essential* category, and therefore yields the content of a law of thought.⁽²⁾ In it the same thing (essence) is twice posited⁽³⁾ in different determinations, which reflect into one another and are inseparable,⁽⁴⁾ so that it is merely a violent abstraction, which will separate them or maintain only one as *essential*.⁽⁵⁾ Essence is therefore perceived wherever the relation of ground and consequent is perceived. Thereby it is expressed that the two laws of thought thus far considered are inadequate.⁽⁶⁾

⁽¹⁾ Empirical science uses these categories especially; in fact, to seek the *ground* is more than merely to compare. They are treated as leading categories

when (say in a definition of philosophy) knowledge of *essence* and knowledge of *grounds* are used *promiscuë*.⁽²⁾ Particularly in Leibnitz is the proposition of (sufficient) ground treated as such. Baumgarten has rightly rounded out the Leibnitzian proposition into his *principium rationis et ratiocinati*. *Everything has a ground* means, everything is a consequent; everything has a consequent means, *everything is a ground*. This proposition says that groundlessness or consequencelessness is mere *appearance*.⁽³⁾ Ground and consequent are the same essence; hence Jacobi is right in his polemic against the application of this category to the relation of God and the world.⁽⁴⁾ It is, therefore, difficult to define the ground otherwise than through the consequent, or *vice versa*.⁽⁵⁾ Such abstraction is it, for example, when one will justify an action (quite in the masculine manner) only by its grounds, or (quite femininely) only by its *consequences*.⁽⁶⁾ Hence the effort of Herbart, in order to rescue the proposition of identity, to eliminate that of ground. In fact, the latter has as its scheme, $A=B$, that is, if you think something, think (at the same time) other. (Cf. § 93, 2.)

§ 103. If one considers this relation more closely, it appears (*a*) that the consequent is the same with the ground, only that it is it in the way of being posited (§ 101); it is therefore so related to the ground that the ground is, *in itself, implicité*, what *explicité*, or posited, is contained in the consequent. The ground as in itself the consequent is the *germ* or *source* from which the consequent issues.

This determination is correctly stated by the expression: *Omne (animal) ex ovo*.

§ 104 (b). But since the ground *repels* the consequent, it stands *opposed* to it; the repelled and expelled is therefore an *other* than it. The ground, as referring itself to the consequent as its other, distinct from it, is what is called *condition* or *occasion under which* or *through* which the consequent issues.

The theory of *generatio aequivoca*, which, even if it were not confirmed in experience, would therefore not be irrational, will allow the consequent to occur *only* under external conditions. The good reasons, which a sophistical *raisonnement* has ready for everything, are chiefly mere *occasions*.

§ 105 (c). But even hereby the concept of ground is not exhausted. If, that is to say, the consequent is another than the ground, its being is the not-being of the ground. The ground, therefore, in positing the consequent, really posits its own not-being, *i.e., sublates itself*.⁽¹⁾ The ground, as positing the consequent only by its self-sublation (or negation of self), is *foundation* or *presupposition*, compared with which the consequent, because it is the *presupposing*, appears as the higher.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ The concept of ground as foundation, *i.e., as that which grounds only as directed to the ground*, has been admirably discussed by Schelling ("Treatise on Freedom," and particularly, "Memorial to Jacobi"). Only as so understood is the concept of ground rightly understood. ⁽²⁾ Hence, when one seeks consequents,

the *grounds* do not so readily offer themselves, because they are the subservient moment of the consequents. For the rest, all the various determinations of the ground coincide in living development: the egg is equally germ, preserving condition, and finally means of nourishment for the self-developing chick.

§ 106. In its completed development it appears that this relation contradicts itself,⁽¹⁾ and hence (§ 101) sublates itself to the end that something else follow from it: the ground has been the *positing* (§ 101, obs. 1), but it has rather been shown (§ 105) that it is the (pre) *supposed*. Further, the ground had been *the same* with the consequent (§ § 102, 103); but, instead, it has been shown that it is not the same (§ 104). Finally, the ground had been that which was identical with itself; but it has rather been shown that it sublates itself. (§ 105.) As this complete contradiction, the relation of ground and consequent sublates itself; and since this relation had been a determination of essence itself, *so essence itself sublates itself*,⁽²⁾ posits itself as its own *negative*. But now the negative of essence had been degraded to appearance. Since, therefore, we are compelled by the inner contradiction of essence to think it as its own other (as estranged from itself), we are forced to think it as entering into its other (appearance) filling it. Filled *with the essential*, however, appearance is *phenomenon*, and this we have, since it has been

shown that *mere* essence points beyond itself, and hence is a mere abstraction (*cf.* § 91) in the second place to consider.

(1) This contradiction occurs in the description of the ground as that which is presupposed by the consequent. It is its *prius*; hence the latter depends upon it; the ground is *posited by the consequent*, and so, the rather, depends upon it. (2) Difference has so entered into essence that essence is opposed to itself.

§ 107. A recapitulation of this *first chapter* shows that its articulation originated by the fact that essence, or mediation, received various determinations. The mediation was, *first*, identity; it appeared, *secondly*, as difference, and, namely, immediate essential and complete difference; and, *thirdly*, we saw mediation appear as relation of ground and consequent. The parallelism of this articulation with that of the first chapter of the First Part is not difficult to discover; but much less important than to hold fast the discovered essential categories in their peculiarity.

Subjectively expressed, the propositions, Essence is ideality, difference, ground, etc., may be brought within easier reach of ordinary conception. They would thus run: In order to know essence one must distinguish, must discover grounds and consequents, etc.

II.—SECOND CHAPTER.

PHENOMENON.

§ 108. PHENOMENON (*erscheinung*) is appearance (*schein*) filled with essence (hence no longer mere essenceless appearance); and essence clothed with appearance, hence no longer *mere* essence.⁽¹⁾ Essence springs forth into phenomenon; *must* enter into phenomenon.⁽²⁾ If, therefore, appearance stands opposed to it as its other, it is now identical with itself in its other-being. But if this was the concept of being-for-self (§ 50), we have, when we think phenomenon, *essence as being for itself, i.e.,* we have *an* essence. But since being-for-self was thought only in the thought of passive negative relation of *beings-for-self* towards one another. (§ 51.) So is phenomenon of essence to be thought only when a *plurality* of *essences* that are for themselves⁽³⁾ are thought. Phenomenon, which in this sphere forms the analogue to *quantity*, is, because of the analogy, quantitatively determined, as *multiplicity* of essences, or as many *phenomena*.⁽⁴⁾

(1) "What would appearance be where essence is wanting?" (2) "Would essence be where it did not appear?" (Göthe). Phenomenon is an essential category. To conceive everything as phenomenon, means to conceive more deeply than when one merely predicates being of it. The former is done by *empiricism*, a scientific standpoint; the latter by natural thought. The empiricist, therefore, looks down upon dogmatism and scepticism as mere *school-wisdom*. (Cf. § 90.) (3) Essence, as hitherto considered, was a singular, like-being, there-being, etc.; now the concept of *an* essence is given. There is contained a deep meaning in the fact that in German the word *the* essence (*essentia*) and *an* essence (*ens*) are denoted by *one* word (*wesen*), only that word has no plural. (4) Since nature is *phenomenon* (of rationality, § 232) it appears as plurality of appearing essences. Hence occur here categories which the physicist, so soon as he will be empiricist, *must* of necessity apply. In the first instance, his task is to *describe* natural phenomena. For this purpose he naturally applies the categories which offer themselves when one considers what the appearing essence is. *An* essence and *a* phenomenon are, according to ordinary usage of speech, the same thing.

A. PHENOMENA OR EXISTENCE.

§ 109. In the *phenomenal essence*, or in *an essence*, must be contained the moments which were in that from which this concept resulted (cf. § 33, and elsewhere); hence, *firstly*, the *positive moment*, the ground as having become the presupposed. This moment of identity-with-self in the phenomenal essence we call

matter, stuff, or content.⁽¹⁾ Secondly, the *negative* moment which presupposed that first as its foundation, and, as moment of difference, determines it—*form.*⁽²⁾ The two are related as, in the sphere of quantity, unities and annumeration. (The form is the multiplier.) Here is the content rightly always ranged with the essence, the form with the appearance. *Every* essence will, therefore, be unity of content and form, *i.e.*, will *exist*,⁽³⁾ and from the analysis of its concept it is clear that the phenomenal essence is something *existing* or *thing.*⁽⁴⁾ That things are phenomena is therefore a tautology.⁽⁵⁾

⁽¹⁾ The word *matter* is here taken only as the Scholastics, and even Leibnitz still, having in mind the ὕλη of Aristotle, takes *materia prima*. The concept *materia secunda*, matter as opposed to spirit, does not belong to logic, but to the philosophy of nature. The concept of *logical* matter coincides with that of *content*. That the *content* is the underlying, the *determinable*, and in so far the positive (*cf.* § 98), is implied by ordinary consciousness. The Aristotelian determinations that ὕλη is the ἐξ ὧς, *i.e.*, the ground whence the consequent issues; or also that it is the ὑπόθεσις, *i.e.*, the presupposition, are therefore absolutely correct. ⁽²⁾ By *form* is in general to be understood the principle of difference in an essence. Hence *form* was by the Scholastics conceived as the mightier, the determining. It is the executive and determining, hence negative, principle. Form is the concreter aspect of *limit*. If, therefore, content was the moment of ground, form is, Aristotle teaches, that which comes *forth*, and hence is the *presupposing*, and therefore

rationaly the earlier. Hence it is wrong to use the word *formal* in a contemptuous sense. That which has form is, alone, actual existence; only the formal contract *is* a contract. ⁽³⁾ The concept of *existence* has sprung from the relation of ground and consequent; by existence will therefore be understood a being which has *come forth* from the ground (*existere*—properly *se existere* or *existi*) *i.e.*, *grounded* being. (Cf. § 29, obs. 4.) Since to existence unity of content and form belong, it follows that although each can be *thought* (*i.e.*, represented) by itself, each is, nevertheless, when separated from the other, a non-existent abstraction. An absolutely formless content, therefore, does not exist, and to *give* form is always the same as to *take* form, just as to give a content a form means at the same time to take its (other) content. A content, which, though not indifferent to form in general, is yet so towards a definite form, is a *finite* content, a mere *substrate*, which is external to a definite content, is a merely finite form, a hollow form, or mere *condition*, or *shape*. What is more than mere substrate forms *itself*, *i.e.*, has *its* form, which is to it no longer external. This is true of the crystal, still more of the living thing. (See § 215.) The affirmation of Aristotle that every *ὄντις* is of *ὕλη* and *ἔδος ὡς συνθέτη*, and of the Scholastics that every *ens* consists of *materia* and *forma* (substantialis) is, therefore, entirely correct, only the unity of the two is to be conceived not so much as sum as, rather, product. If they excepted God, that is because the category of *thing* is not applicable to God. ⁽⁴⁾ *Thing* is a category which, of course, has a certain similarity with that of *something* (the same similarity which appertains to there-being and existence), but, as more definite, is limited to the world of phenomena. Hence much is characterised as *something*, which could not be called a *thing*.

(5) But in how far one may say *only* phenomena, will appear later. *Here*, where phenomenon is the highest concept, *only* has no meaning.

§ 110. But with the concept of thing we cannot stop, because here the essence which is for itself is not completely conceived. As being-for-self, that is, an essence is *referred* to the *rest* of the essences (§ 54), hence the remaining things appear in the thing, it will have them in itself in an ideal manner. Besides being for self, therefore, the reflection of the remaining things will give itself effect in it. While on that side it is identical with itself, thing,⁽¹⁾ on this side is something *distinguished, related*. These, its *relations*, are manifold determinations, which, since they appear *in* it, must, in the first instance, be conceived as *borne* by it, as having only *in it* their subsistence, *i.e.*, as its properties,⁽²⁾ which it *has*⁽³⁾ as distinguished from it. They form the side of appearance in the thing, while its *being* a thing constitutes the side of essence. Or, otherwise, the properties show us the thing on its *formal* side, while it is by its *content* thing.⁽⁴⁾

Compare upon this and the following sections, my "Outlines of Psychology," § 74, ff. The totally different standpoints which the exposition has to maintain here and there, in that *there* it is shown how consciousness upon various stages of development *applies* various categories, *here* how these form a series, makes it necessary that a symmetry should appear which,

superficially considered, may seem a repetition. That the mere *describer* of nature makes use of the categories of the *perceiving* consciousness, is explicable, since to describe means to exhibit perceptions (*Ibid.*).⁽¹⁾ Hence no *thing* can contradict itself. ⁽²⁾ Properties belong to the thing, only because as it stands in relation with other things. A *single thing* would *only* and *alone* (if such a thing were not in general an *impossibility*, cf. § 108) have no properties. ⁽³⁾ The relation of *having*—this word is, therefore, frequently used to denote the preterite—occurs where immediate oneness does, as in something and its quiddity, not exist. (Cf. § 36, obs. 1.) ⁽⁴⁾ Hence thing is so often characterised as substrate, the properties as conditions.

§ 111. But the manifold attributes which constitute the side of phenomenon of the thing and exist *in* it only as its *own*, are yet, on the other hand, themselves in turn manifold and *determined*, by the fact that they are *limited* in relation to everything else, hence also in relation to the thing (§ 44, obs. 3), *i.e.*, are *distinct* from it. They must, therefore, be thought not merely as in other but as *for themselves*. If we must, therefore, on the one hand, in the case of thing, think the side of difference as that which only occurs *in it* and has its *subsistence* in it, so, on the other side, are these differences to be thought as *independent*, so that rather the thing *consists* of these differences. Viewed from this side, those manifold determinations are not taken as properties, but as self-excluding

independents, as *stuffs* and *matters*. Not only will the physicist, when he has taken electricity, heat, etc., as *properties*, meet phenomena which compel him to take them as *stuffs*, but even in the highest sphere, the description of the divine *properties* leads to the assumption of an exclusive relation of them, a conflict of the properties, which is adjusted by fictions similar to those employed by the physicists who attempt to solve these contradictions by the fiction of absolute impenetrability *and* contemporaneous porosity.

§ 112. But thereby has been shown in the concept of the phenomenal essence a contradiction which as such will be a ground to a consequent (*cf.* § 101, obs. 2), *i.e.*, will impel us *forward*. The phenomenal essence is, on the one hand, *thing*, is reflected into itself, and is this because it is *essence*; on the other hand, since it has issued from itself, there appertains to it a manifoldness of relations, which make up the side of its *appearance*. Each of the two sides has proved to be essential in that (§ 110) the thing underlay the manifold (properties) while (§ 111) the manifold (stuffs) make up the thing. Further, both sides are different, both, finally, are related to one another. We have, therefore, as a comprehensive result, not that the phenomenal essence really *separates into a relation* again of non-appearing

essence and essenceless appearance, both of which exist not, but, since the thought of the existent, or of thing, remains, and, taken together with those, becomes that juxtaposition of the two moments, the *essence* of the *thing* stands over against the thing-like or *existing* appearance, *i.e.*, the *phenomenon* of the thing.

To such a distinction of essence and phenomenon the physicist passes when he no longer merely presents or *describes* his percepts, but when *reflectingly* "Outlines of Psychology," § 79) he seeks something, behind what is perceived, *i.e.*, from a *describer* of nature becomes an investigator, a point to which he is brought even empirically only by the perception of manifold determinations of the *one* thing. An essence without any manifoldness whatever does not stimulate to the knowing of what is in or behind it. Here it has a meaning only when one speaks of *mere* phenomenon as of something unessential.

B. ESSENCE AND PHENOMENON OF THE THING.

§ 113 (a). In the first instance this relation has so presented itself to us that essence, *not* phenomenon, this, *not* that, is. Each is, therefore, in the first instance, to be taken as identical with itself, and their first relation is that of indifferent diversity. *Essence is other than phenomenon.* This category is a justifiable one. Therein lies the justification of the Kantian view of the world. It can here cause no

surprise that *essence* is described as being-in-self. Not only that the *relation* between essence and phenomenon is analogous to that between being-in-self and being-for-other, but phenomenon is actually being-for-other, only in higher potency.

§ 114. But as diversity in general was impelled forward to opposition (§ 96), so also here: phenomenon is *other* than essence or *distinguished* from it: but yet phenomenon is *its* phenomenon, just as phenomenon has in essence *its* essence; therefore, essence is *related* to phenomenon, and logically phenomenon is to be conceived as not only *other* than essence but as *its* other, that is, *its* different. Each is to be conceived as the negative of the other, essence as the *contrary of phenomenon*.

Even the *opposition* of essence and phenomenon, this-side and yon-side, rests upon a justifiable category, which of course is not the highest. In the Schellingian school this opposition often occurs, and by Klein and others is made a principle. Things appear as the contrary of that which they are in themselves. This view, moreover, underlies the fact that Fichte calls the world of phenomena the worst possible. In the æsthetic sphere romanticism occupies the standpoint of the "inverted world" (Hegel, "Phänomenologie des Geistes," pp. 118 and fol.).

§ 115 (b). But if essence is the opposite of phenomenon, and this the contrary of that, each contains the other in itself, and is not to be thought without

it. Each contains the other in itself, and therefore the relation here really is that *one* and *the same* content is taken as essence, and as phenomenon. This means that it will now appear as that which is identical with itself, hence singular, and again as the manifold forming a plurality.⁽¹⁾ This relation we designate as that of law and phenomena, of which the former is represented as the unchanging prototype of manifold phenomena, reflection into self,⁽²⁾ the latter as the manifold, reflection into other.

(1) Since it is *one* content, the law is apprehended from the phenomena, the latter from the former. (2) In the law, therefore, we have the true *essence*. If one inquire still further after the essence of law, one falls *back*, to an already out-grown lower thought-determination. (§ 113.) The law as *the same* content with the phenomena is more than mere *rule*; with its concept, the exception, which was involved in that of the rule (§ 79, obs. 6), is in conflict.

§ 116. But if we look more closely into this relation, we find, on the one hand, essence, but *in its phenomenon*, for it is more than mere rule; on the other hand, phenomena, but as governed by law, *i.e.*, the *phenomenon of essence*, therefore; each is accordingly the unity of both, *i.e.*, *phenomenal* essence. Therefore, that relation brings us necessarily to a relation in which each of the two sides is the same

phenomenal essence. With the phenomenon of essence and the coming into mutual opposition of essence and phenomenon is to be joined *essential* relation as the third member of the triad.

If the empiricist, hence, for example, the empirical physicist, must be content to describe and investigate Nature, he must in the first case abide by things, in the latter by the law, as the ultimate. His vocation, however, is to *explain* Nature. This he will do when he applies still higher categories, and indeed those now to be developed. One first passes to explanation when one has already discovered laws, and, on the other hand, the knowledge of laws *stimulates* to explanation, precisely as the perception of all marks has stimulated to investigation.

C. ESSENTIAL RELATION.

§117. By *essential relation* we understand a relation in which, exactly as in the quantitative, two sides constitute the relation, only with the nearer determination that with each side the other to which it is related is necessarily posited,⁽¹⁾ and that each side is at the same time the entire essence which forms the relation.⁽²⁾ The various forms of this relation form a series in which the lowest is that which least corresponds to its concept, the highest that which corresponds most.

(1) In the quantitative relation I may at pleasure

place *a* in relation with *b*, *c*, etc.; the *whole*, on the contrary, is related necessarily to the parts, the inner to the outer. ⁽²⁾ This appears to be an absurd determination. But it has been shown in the preceding section, and receives its verification in the following.

§ 118 (*a*). Naturally there are again here to be found the moments which occurred in the last section, only modified. Upon the one side will stand the thing with the character which the *law* had, *i.e.*, as *singular*; upon the other, the same thing ⁽¹⁾ with the character which these phenomena had as multifold. In this form the relation meets us as that of the *whole and its parts*.⁽²⁾ Both are the same; for the parts make up the whole, and are equal to it; the whole contains the parts, and is equal to them.⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ This relation is applicable only to phenomenal essence, *i.e.*, to things. If one takes God as a whole, as all, for example, and creatures as his parts, this is a crude mechanical pantheism, which makes of God a thing. Even the living product of Nature has no *parts*, since it is no mere thing; in order to *divide* it (*e.g.*, to anatomise, to analyse it), one must convert it into such, *i.e.*, kill it. ⁽²⁾ When the physicist, in order to explain the law (of chemical affinity), demands (atomistically) that we think the smallest parts of masses, he passes, just as we do, from law and phenomena to the whole and the parts. ⁽³⁾ Here, it is evident, that in this relation there is a real correspondence to the postulate above expressed. (§ 117, obs. 2.)

§ 119. At the same time, also, the contrary obtains. It was said that the whole is equal to the parts. But it is equal to the *sum* or *collective unity* of the parts, But this is not equal to the parts, but is rather the negation of them *as* parts, *i.e.*, equal to the whole. Just so are the *parts* only equal to the *divided* whole, *i.e.*, not to the whole but to the *parts*. We have, therefore, the contradiction—whole equals the parts, rather whole equals whole; so parts equal the whole, rather parts equal the parts. If one alternates these two determinations, one has the *division ad infinitum*,⁽¹⁾ or, more correctly, endless progression of division, which, like every such progression, contains a *problem* ⁽²⁾ *to be solved*.

⁽¹⁾ This progression comes to an end only when I regard, say a line A B, as a whole, hence take its half A C as *part*, then A C as whole, A D as part, which, again, is taken as *whole*, etc. ⁽²⁾ When the mathematician, in order to solve the difficulties which are brought about by the endless division of the path to be traversed in the familiar sophism (Achilles), construes (geometrically) the totality of the path, or (arithmetically) bids to sum the series $1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} \dots$, he recognises this. To think this totality, *i.e.*, this divided thing, which is a *whole*, or *finite* sum of *infinitely* many members, is indeed a *problem*.

§ 120 (*b*). This endless progression means, like every other (§ 49), that we should hold fast both

determinations at the same time: the whole is identical with the parts, *and* is different from them, hence *contradicts itself*. Now the unity of those two determinations, like contradiction, gave as their truth the relation of ground and consequent. (§ 102.) By that endless progression we are therefore compelled to conceive essential relation so that the side which had the character of singularity will be thought as the *ground* of the other side, and that which had the character of plurality as the *consequent* of the other. If we do this, we think an essential relation which corresponds more to the concept of it than does that hitherto considered; ⁽¹⁾ it is the relation of *force* ⁽²⁾ to *its expressions*, in which one and the same content ⁽³⁾ is present twice in the manner described.

⁽¹⁾ In the relation of whole and parts, namely, exactly these particular parts are not, as should have been the case (§ 117, obs. 1), posited with the concept of the whole, since I can divide at pleasure. On the contrary, force has its definite expressions. ⁽²⁾ Since the category of force is really a higher category than that of law, the physicist is *justified* when he does not stop at *law*, but, in order to *explain* it, speaks of the underlying *forces*. Of course it must not be forgotten that, like all explanation, it moves in tautologies. This *dynamic* mode of explanation is, it is true, higher than the atomic, but is closely akin to it, as is shown by the experience of the psychologists who, with their *faculties* of the soul, come very near to a soul that is *divided*. ⁽³⁾ Hence

force is usually explained only from its expression, and *vice versâ*. If we take God as force, the world as expression, this, according to Schleiermacher, is pantheism. One may maintain this in so far as force and expression are *one* nature; on the other side, might such a view be characterised also as a contrast to the previously-mentioned crude pantheism, since here the *difference* between ground and consequent comes forward.

§ 121. But the conclusion is not above (§ 120) fully drawn that every singular was *identical* with the manifold opposed to it, and yet at *the same time different* from it, and must *therefore* be taken as the ground of it. *Likewise* is, however, the other side, to which plurality appertains, *identical* with the singular, and at *the same time different* from it; and it appears to follow that, instead of the relation considered, one is to be thought in which also the plural has the meaning of *ground*, the singular that of *consequent*. The conclusion is correct; in fact, the demand which it contains is already satisfied in the relation of force and its expression. For, since force is force *by means* of the expression and *in it*, it presupposes it; and it is contained in the concept of force to have itself a presupposition, *i.e.*, to be *expression*,⁽¹⁾ as, on the other hand, it is contained in the concept of expression to be *force*.⁽²⁾

(1) One says this when one says that force must

be solicited (set loose). ⁽²⁾ This one says when, in something which one has designated as expression, one recognises again the solicitation to something.

§ 122 (c). Also here one may continually keep apart the two determinations, and, by alternating them, cause to occur an endless progression.⁽¹⁾ The truth is, that if force is expression, and the latter is the former, the two coincide, and we are therefore compelled so to conceive essential relation that, on the one side, there is what was called force, so long as it needed a solicitation, but which now solicits itself to its expression, and is what we call the *inner*;⁽²⁾ on the other side is the expression which, however, no longer has its ground in the inner, but is this itself—the *outer*.⁽³⁾ That relation (§ § 120 and 121) refers us to a higher, the *relation of inner and outer*.⁽⁴⁾

⁽¹⁾ In the endless progression which appears in the fact that A is the expression of B, this again of C, etc.; B is *first* taken as force, then as expression, but each time abstraction is made from the *other* determination. ⁽²⁾ The inner is essence as it manifests *itself of itself*, in the outer. ⁽³⁾ The outer is more intimately joined with essence than is expression; the former is the *constant*, the latter the transient, manifestation of it. A *look*, for example, is an expression of a psychical event, while the *physiognomy* is the expression of a constant psychical condition. ⁽⁴⁾ If, therefore, essence was known where

grounds were known, if it was known where the properties of the thing were known (§ 110), still more is it true that it is known where the inner is known. *Inner* and *outer* are identical; neither is without the other: hence a *mere* inner is an abstraction; the man who is merely inwardly good *passes* only for such. Of the abstract inner it is of course correct to say that it is unknowable. This assertion is a pure tautology. (Cf. § 40, obs.)

§ 123. Recapitulating the course traversed by this chapter, we had, *first*, essence as appearing in phenomenon, immediately one with it, and become phenomenal essence; *secondly*, it appeared that both must be thought as becoming distinguished, and as opposed to one another, a fact which gave the various relations of essence to phenomenon; finally, in essential relation was shown concrete identity evermore realising itself, until at last appeared a relation in which the inner had this determination in itself, to *be* outer. But if, now, the former was the existent as essence, while the latter was the existent as phenomenon, it follows that we must pass on to the thought of an existence which is thought *as* existence, hence as, as it were, potentiated, higher existence. We call it *actuality*, and therefore understand by the *actual* more than the existent. More, because it is what exists *also*, though in a restored,

hence more lasting way, therefore *with a plus*. Actuality as essence that has entirely entered into phenomenon forms to essence as such and phenomenon the third member of the triad.

III.—THIRD CHAPTER.

ACTUALITY.

§ 124. THE *actual* is the concrete unity of essence and phenomenon: more full of form than the first, more full of content than the latter, it has a greater intensity of being than something or thing; it is, as language beautifully suggests, the active; its being is essential, and exceeds mere existence.⁽¹⁾ Compared with actuality, essence and phenomenon are *equal* one to the other,⁽²⁾ i.e., equal as mere moments. As the concept of mode, because it was real unity of quantity and quality, so realised itself that it was posited, first in its quantitative, then in its qualitative, moment, so here there appears a similar realisation, if we reflect upon the moments, which, though they had been in the foregoing, must here occur again in an essentially altered meaning.

⁽¹⁾ Even the impossible may be called *something*, even *disorder* may exist; but the energy of *actuality* does not appertain to it. ⁽²⁾ *Here* is explained how that usage of speech could originate, which, in order to express of a man that he is true-hearted only in an

external manner, says that he *is* not of such a nature ("essence"), but only *has* it.

§ 125 (a). What has in the foregoing shown itself to be the highest, will necessarily be found as *moment* in the actual. ⁽¹⁾ The actual will, therefore, contain the moment which, so long as it excluded phenomenon, was called *essence*, but which here, as that which tends to become phenomenon, gives (real) *possibility*. ⁽²⁾ *Possibility*, or *capacity*, is in the actual the side of identity with self, which, however, has the tendency to enter into difference, it is self-expressing inner, is force ⁽³⁾ pressing towards expression, is matter referring to form, ground ⁽⁴⁾ striving towards consequent, etc.

⁽¹⁾ The connection of this concept with that of essence is brought out by Spinoza and Leibnitz in the use of the word *essentia*. ⁽²⁾ Hence with Aristotle δύναμις, with the Scholastics *potentia*, means both. The seed is the real possibility of the tree, is tree as *inner*. ⁽³⁾ With Aristotle δύναμις = ἔλξη; with the Scholastics *potentia* = *materia*. Even we say that in a person there is *stuff* for a poet or painter, *i.e.*, capacity for being either of these. ⁽⁴⁾ Finally, Aristotle puts also ἔλξη and ὑποκείμενον as equal to one another.

§ 126. If, now, in the concept of possibility *we abstract* from the fact that it is the inner, *uttering itself*, there originates thereby the thought of *abstract*,

so-called logical, possibility. This category is then, of course, not distinct from those earlier considered and left behind, *abstract identity*, being, etc., and is, therefore, defined like them.⁽¹⁾ This possibility, or so-called conceivability, since it is mere relation to self, may be predicated of *everything* so soon as one thinks it only out of all relation to other,⁽²⁾ while true (real) possibility belongs only to that which realises itself.⁽³⁾ Accordingly, as possibility is abstractly or concretely conceived, it is an entirely empty or a very important category.⁽⁴⁾

(1) As distinctionless unity with self *possible est quod non implicat contradictionem*. (2) If one abstracts from the fact that the air is specifically lighter, it is *possible* that a leaden bird might fly, etc. (3) The dispute between the Spinozists and Leibnitzians is, therefore, to be settled by Leibnitz's distinction of *possibilité* and *compossibilité*. (4) Thus it is absurd when the historian asks what *conceivably* would have been possible, when, at the same time, his highest task is to comprehend *real possibility*, the *germ*, of what happens.

§ 127 (b). Possibility is merely a moment. Its completion to full reality is formed by what was hitherto called phenomenon, or *existence*.⁽¹⁾ In concrete unity with the other moment, it is *expression of force*, *actuality* or *energy*.⁽²⁾ It may be called (essential) *reality*.⁽³⁾ It belongs to being-actual and becoming-

actual with the same logical necessity as does real possibility.⁽⁴⁾

⁽¹⁾ *Existentia*, which Descartes and Spinoza, like later philosophers, opposed to *essentia*, is therefore by Leibnitz and Wolff designated as *complementum possibilitatis*. Since *essentia* was the moment of content (§ 125), Kant may rightly say that by existence there is added to a concept no new determination of *content*, a proposition which is *absolutely* correct only as regards pure being. ⁽²⁾ Aristotle's ἐνέργεια, the *actus* of the Scholastics, is not *mere* existence, but manifestation of an inner existence *grounded in itself*, etc. ⁽³⁾ From reality (§ 36, obs. 2) this would be distinguished as *singulare tantum*, or as the common usage of speech distinguishes the *solid* (*Reelle*) from the merely *real* (*Realen*). ⁽⁴⁾ The view that admirable intentions, even when they are not *timely* (i.e., not really possible), may yet be executed, is precisely as *illogical* as the philosophy of sloth and mediocrity, which supposes that what is in time will execute itself, in the absence of *energy* and of *great* individuals, i.e., those who are filled with an *essential* (solid) content.

§ 128. If reality is conceived just as, above (§ 126), possibility was, its difference from *mere* existence disappears, and we have *mere* positedness in the *being posited* by other.⁽¹⁾ This gives the category of *contingency*. It does not exclude necessity, is rather the same with *external necessity*,⁽²⁾ in that the contingent is what merely *follows* or is merely determined.⁽³⁾ This concept of contingency answers the

question whether there *is* anything contingent,⁽⁴⁾ whether and where this category may be applied,⁽⁵⁾ etc.

(1) What posited itself would not be merely *posited*, but, at the same time, *positing*. (2) Spinoza attributes *necessitas respectu causae*, as Wolff did *necessitas hypothetica*, with right to what he designates as *contingens*, and says of it that it *nunquam existere potest necessitate essentiae*. Hence also the determination *cujus essentia non involvit existentiam*. Leibnitz rightly calls *contingentia arbitrii* a *necessité brute*. So can the atomists identify necessity and contingency. (3) If with Aristotle *συνβαίνειν* signifies necessary consequence, *συνβεβηκός* the contingent (so in the Middle Age *contingit* and *accidit*, and then again *contingens* and *accidens*), there underlies the identification the same perception which causes him to identify what is *βίη*, and what *συνβεβηκός*. So we also call the shape of the tree, into which it was *forced*, *contingent*. (4) The question whether the contingent is something *actual* must be answered in the negative; that whether anything contingent *exists* must be answered in the affirmative. The *merely* existing is precisely the contingent, and hence perishable. (5) One is always justified in calling *contingent* what is posited by *external* force, circumstances, etc. In a larger survey of the total connection and inner determinations, much that at first appeared contingent will appear otherwise. To assert that there is (in Nature, for example) nothing contingent, means to mistake the fact that Nature shows us just such *external* there-being, and hence the external violent encroachment upon foreign spheres is here the order of the day. To deny the contingent, as do those who will have philosophy comprehend *everything*, as if there

were nothing unintelligible, is precisely as erroneous as it is to posit it everywhere, as do those who see in lawlessness freedom.

§ 129. But that both logical possibility and contingency are untrue, violent abstractions is shown therein, that on closer consideration each is self-contradictory. *Possibility* was merely ground, hence not *yet posited*; but the ground has shown itself to be foundation *i.e.*, something *presupposed*. In the first respect, therefore, possibility is the essential,⁽¹⁾ in the latter the unessential.⁽²⁾ The same has been shown as regards *contingency*. This occurs where something is posited *only* by other. But, then, since it has the ground opposed to it, it has it *outside* itself, or is *groundless*.⁽³⁾ What, therefore, is *merely* grounded, or posited, is to be thought as entirely *ungrounded*, *i.e.*, as not posited. Thereby, therefore, the two contain the same contradiction, and their difference disappears.⁽⁴⁾ But if we think of what those contradictions point to, not only—negatively—vanished difference, but—positively—the two as one, these results complete *actuality* or *necessity*.⁽⁵⁾ To this, as to their truth, possibility and contingency⁽⁶⁾ are sublated.

⁽¹⁾ Hence it is said that the actual must *above all* be possible. ⁽²⁾ And yet it is said, something is *only* possible, and one regards the possible as so indifferent

that one defines it as that which may equally well *be* and *not be*. ⁽³⁾ What happens without ground is called contingent, so that the word denotes the *contingens* as well as the *casus fortuitus*. ⁽⁴⁾ Therefore, ordinary opinion defines the contingent *precisely* as the possible is above defined, namely, as that which may equally well *be* or *not be*. Even Spinoza, like earlier logicians, takes *possible* and *contingens* as interconvertible concepts. ⁽⁵⁾ Hence the old determination as regards the necessary *cujus essentia involvit existentiam* or the Leibnitzian "what by its possibility has reality." ⁽⁶⁾ The necessary transition from contingency to necessity underlies the *argumentum a contingentia mundi*.

§ 130 (c). Since the *necessary* is the truth of the contingent, the latter is the powerless and subservient. The same is true of possibility, which *yields* to the actuality of the necessary. From them both issues the necessary, as that which we call *fact*,⁽¹⁾ which *presupposes* them, hence is not dependent upon them but rather accomplishes itself at their cost.⁽²⁾ Its forthcoming is *actual occurrence*,⁽³⁾ or becoming of the *truly actual*, the *necessary*.⁽⁴⁾ Necessity is the highest essential category: where the necessity of something is perceived, its true nature is perceived. As essence was the category of dogmatism, phenomenon that of empiricism, so necessity is that of *rational* thought, or of rationalism.⁽⁵⁾

⁽¹⁾ The word *fact* is here taken as when one says, The fact is true but does not concern the person,

What must happen is the (main) fact. ⁽²⁾ The *fact*, say a historical occurrence, realises *itself*, and therefore *makes* for itself circumstances just as do contingently (arbitrarily) acting persons. To attribute everything to circumstances is just as one-sided as to lay everything to the whim of the actors. In the necessity of the fact is contained the pre-established harmony of both. ⁽³⁾ This difference between mere becoming and actual *occurrence* lies (unconsciously) with many in the background, when they distinguish the merely factual and the *historical*. ⁽⁴⁾ Only the necessary is truly actual; hence only the rational is actual. The irrational has only the passing existence of a material to be used. So wrong, which indeed *exists*, but only, by punishment, to be made non-actual. ⁽⁵⁾ Kant's "Physica rationalis," or pure natural science, will lay down propositions which have as compelling evidence as the laws of thought of the school, and are as full of content as the propositions of the empiricists. Not what is only *conceivable* nor what merely *exists*, but what *must* exist, is to be formulated in that.

§ 131. From this is evident what was presupposed in the Introduction (§ 12) as contained in our thinking, namely, that the *necessary* contains in itself opposed determinations. That is to say, since it contains the moment of identity, it is simple immediacy (§ 12); ⁽¹⁾ but likewise there lies in it contradiction (§ 13), since it is in itself *mediation*. ⁽²⁾ It is both: it *is*, *because it is*. As this immediacy ⁽³⁾ which is posited by the sublation of mediation, it is *relation*, and indeed relation in *itself*, i.e., *absolute relation*. ⁽⁴⁾

(1) Hence, It is so, as expression of unalterable necessity. (2) Necessary is that for which a *because* can be given. (3) Purposely is an expression chosen which involves a contradiction. (4) As *relation* has already in other groups proved to be the highest category, so is it here also. Necessity, absolute relation, is the highest form of mediation (*cf.* § 90), as mode was the highest form of being. These *highest* forms of mediation have, instead of all others, been by Kant treated as categories of *relation*. (*Cf.* § 89, obs. 2.)

A. SUBSTANTIALITY.

§ 132. The necessary is *because* it is. There is, therefore, contained in the absolute relation, *first*, the fact (1) as its own ground negating all mere *groundedness*. (2) This it is as that which is identical with itself and excludes from itself every determination. (3) If this is the moment of possibility in the necessary, this side of *essentiality* gives us the concept of *substance*. (4) *Secondly*, this is related to the moment of mere consequent (5) in which falls difference, (6) mere positedness and contingency. (7) This moment of *unessentiality* in the absolute relation gives us the concept of *accidents*, which do not subsist for themselves, but as transient mere affections inhere (8) in substance, not so much *produced* by it as rather going to the ground in it. The first form of the absolute relation is the *relation of substantial-*

ity⁽⁹⁾ or relation of *subsistence* and *inherence* (Kant). (The relation of whole and parts appears here in a higher potency.)⁽¹⁰⁾ Holding fast to the developed concept of occurrence, one may say, no occurrence without substance.⁽¹¹⁾

In Spinoza, who in his system has taken the relation of substantiality as the highest, all essential determinations receive their dues: ⁽¹⁾ substance is to him something necessary, *fact, cujus essentia involvit existentiam*. ⁽²⁾ It is *causa sui*, which is to be taken only in the negative sense. ⁽³⁾ Substance as *absoluta affirmatio existentiae* excludes every determination, is that which alone is because not related to other. ⁽⁴⁾ The concepts *essentia* (see § 125, obs. 1) and *substantia*, because of their kinship, coincide in the Greek word *ὄντῃα*. ⁽⁵⁾ In the double sense which *συμβαίνειν* has with Aristotle is to be recognised the kinship of concepts otherwise so different. ⁽⁶⁾ In the accidents, according to Spinoza, plurality falls. ⁽⁷⁾ Also here the languages are represented, since they identify the concepts of the contingent and the befalling (*accidit, accidens* etc.). ⁽⁸⁾ With Spinoza the accident (mode) is *quod in alio est*, and he says by way of pointing out its *essenceless* nature, *quamvis existant eos ut non existentes concipere possumus*. ⁽⁹⁾ If we take this relation as the highest, and (say) God as substance and the world as accidents, the result is a pantheism which has been correctly denominated acosmism. The essential in such a view is the mere *immanence* of God in things. ⁽¹⁰⁾ When Jacobi makes pantheism rest upon the proposition of the ground which itself merely contains an inference from whole to parts, he could appeal to the fact that Spinoza frequently comes near

thinking of modes as *parts* of substance. ⁽¹¹⁾ This proposition occurs in Kant's rational physics as the First Analogy of Experience.

§ 133. In fact, however, in this, its first form, the absolute relation does not correspond to the concept stated in § 131, because not all the determinations of it are posited. (See § 19.) In it, the necessary (the fact) was said to be related to itself. In the relation of substance only one side, *viz.*, substance, is necessary. The accidents, on the contrary, are *merely* posited, hence are that *cujus essentia non involvit existentiam*; they are nothing *actual*, but, like the waves of the sea, merely changing, static, shapes.

B. CAUSALITY.

§ 134. But, at the same time, because of this defect the relation of substantiality points beyond itself in that in it there is latent already a higher form of the absolute relation. To substance the accidents, posited by it, stand opposed; at the same time, however, they are nothing *actual*, but have their actuality only in substance (in actuality the waves are merely in the water of the sea): what therefore *actually* stands opposed to substance, and what it is actually related to, is only itself. When, therefore, we logically think out the relation of substantiality we are compelled to

think a relation in which the *fact* occurs twice, once as the positing, hence original (primary fact, German *ur-sache*, English) cause;⁽¹⁾ on the other hand, the actual, which is posited from it (effected)—the *effect*.⁽²⁾ The truth (§ 19, obs. 1) of the relation of substance is the *relation of causality*. Without causality there is no occurrence.⁽³⁾

(1) *Causa, cosa* in both meanings. (2) Even speech suggests that the effect is something actual (effective), which mere accident was not. (3) (Cf. Kant's "Second Analogy of Experience.")

§ 135. The *causal relation* in which the same fact appears once as cause and again as effect⁽¹⁾ is a higher form of the absolute relation, just because here in place of the accidents which in substance ceased to be, stands the effect, which, as something actual, *issues from* the cause (there appears in it, in higher potency, the relation of force to expression). The effect is here an essential into which the cause passes; ⁽²⁾ as into something actually standing *over against it*.

(1) The cause of heat is heat, of moisture, moisture, of motion, motion. (2) Hence Spinoza in maintaining the relation of substantiality, speaks against the *causa transiens*, while Jacobi, in order to establish an extra (*praeter*) mundane God, demands that God be conceived as *cause* of the world. This gives what is termed transcendence.

§ 136. But the superiority which one side in the causal relation has as compared with the relation of substantiality, the other, more closely considered, counterbalances. It is true that the effect in the relation to the cause no longer, as there, returns to the cause, but the cause disappears in its passage into the effect.⁽¹⁾ In fact the relation of causality displays precisely the opposite defect from that of the relation of substantiality ; the side of effect is here necessary,⁽²⁾ for it *is*, and is at the same time, *posited* by the cause. The cause therefore *is* only ; it has, therefore, merely the character of contingency,⁽³⁾ of *mere* existence. If, therefore, the relation of substantiality did not correspond to the concept of absolute relation, so does the causal relation just as little correspond, only for the opposite reason.⁽⁴⁾

(1) Heat produces heat by becoming *lost* from the communicating body. (2) Where a thing is known as effect, one knows its necessity—that it must be so. (3) If the cause is, the effect follows : *whether* it is, remains doubtful. (4) A view which conceives the relation of God and the world *only* as causality, would, consistently carried out, become the opposite of acosmism, namely, atheism. No one has taken the transcendence of the divine, *i.e.*, the negation of all immanence, so seriously as the Epicureans.

§ 137. But at the same time in this relation is to be perceived the necessity of going beyond it. The

cause is the positing, the effect the posited. But since the cause is not cause without effect, the cause is properly (as cause) effect of the effect, and presupposes the effect as its own. But just so the effect *presupposes* the cause, is, therefore, in fact, cause of the cause. But if the cause presupposes the effect, and the latter again the former, we think (if we *will* not, through abstraction, be led astray into the endless progression) really a relation in which each side is related as cause and effect to the other as effect and cause, *i.e.*, *interaction*.

The endless progression arises immediately so soon as we apply to a *definite thing* the perceived truth that the cause is in itself effect, and *vice versâ*; and, indeed, when we have first taken A as effect, then abstracting therefrom take it as cause, where it has an effect B., which then again is taken as cause, etc. Since the nature of the endless progression is known (§ 49), it can of course not terrify. Even Aristotle is by the progression of causes and effects impelled to the thought of interaction. (De Gen. et Corr. II., 11.)

C. INTERACTION.

§ 138. Interaction is the truth of mere causality.⁽¹⁾ In it the absolute relation is actually realised. It is related to the relation of substantiality and that of causality as the relation of inner and outer (§ 722) is to the two other forms of essential relation.⁽²⁾

There results, just as above, the proposition, Every happening is interaction. But, at the same time, there is, in this category, given the *highest* mode of mediation, because here is completely posited what above (§ 89) was stated as its essence—*reciprocal* union with one another. Just for that reason is it also the *last*. We stand here at the limit of the sphere of mediations. As to every mediation (§ 89), so also to necessity there belongs a duplicity; *need* is only where one thing experiences compulsion through another. Only in duplicity is there a *must be*, which of course involves a contradiction. (See § 44, obs. 2.) But since in interaction each side is determined as cause and effect, and they therefore coincide, there had appeared, instead of duplicity, unity with self again. We, therefore, have in fact that as actually posited which (§ 131) was given as the concept of the absolute relation, a *being* which coincides with mediated being, the *must be*. In completed ("revealed") necessity, therefore, we have the *must be* identical with *being*. This *inner necessity*, which, therefore, consists in that compulsion has disappeared since the determined and the determining coincide, we call freedom.⁽³⁾ It is the subject of the Third Part of the logic.

(1) Empirically this is expressed as follows: Action and reaction are equal, a proposition which is *fully*

correct only where we have to do with mechanical motion, which is better expressed thus: There *is* no mere causality. (Kant's "Third Analogy of Experience.") Even in the highest sphere it is a deeper view which causes the mystic to say, God is in me so much as is laid to me in Him, as if here one would assume a one-sided causality. For this mystic, then, this opposition of immanence and transcendence no longer exists. ⁽²⁾ If one returns to earlier categories (§ 102, ff), substance is related to cause as source to condition, and interaction exhibits in higher potency negative grounding, or the being presupposed. ⁽³⁾ The justification of this name appears in the course of the discussion.

§ 139. Also here (*cf.* § 86) recapitulation has a double task. *First*, it has to fix the articulation of the *chapter* here concluded, in which, in the analysis of the *actual*, *possibility* and *actuality* or *energy* have been shown to be its moments, the actual itself to be the *necessary*, then the last-named has proved to be absolute relation, which realised itself in subsistence and inherence, in causality and in interaction. The *second* object which is to be accomplished by the recapitulation is that, by a retrospect of the entire path traversed, the now treated *main division* of logic is limited towards the others, its peculiar character given, its articulation fixed. Because, at the beginning of the logic, *only* the resolve was present to think *pure*, *i.e.*, *distinctionless* thought (§ 27), the First Part had to do only with determina-

tions of distinctionlessness or immediacy. The result was, that immediacy was sublated to *relativity*, and this being, which was ruptured within, gave the concept of *essence* and of the appearance standing over against it, with which we entered upon the Second Part of the logic. To this (from *essence as such* to *absolute relation*) will, if it be designated after the *first* of the categories appearing in it, necessarily be given the superscription *Essence* (Hegel); if, after the common character of all, the caption *Mediation*. (Also here as above, § 86, the two determinations, however, nearly coincide, see § 90). In this Part, itself we had first (first chapter) considered *essence in general*, then seen (in the second chapter) how it lost itself in *phenomenon*; finally (in the third chapter), how, having become identical with itself, it gave *actuality*. (The parallelism with the chapters of the First Part is easy to be shown.) In ever-ascending series we arrived finally at a point where the mediation returned again to being, and with this concept of *inner necessity* mediated in itself we enter another sphere, that of *freedom*.

Third Part.

CATEGORIES OF FREEDOM.

CONCEPT.

I.—FIRST CHAPTER.

SUBJECTIVITY. (Cf. § 152.)

§ 140. FREEDOM exists where one thing is, not by means of another, but by means of itself; where, therefore, instead of the highest form of necessity, of being-through one another exists, being through self or of self, to which the other conducts as to its necessary consequence.⁽¹⁾ Freedom as a logical category is not to be restricted to the sphere of spiritual phenomena,⁽²⁾ therefore does not coincide with personality, but with *subjectivity*, since it consists only in the carrying out of a *subject* or a *principle*.⁽³⁾ The transition from the Second Part of the logic to the Third may therefore be termed the transition from *substantiality* to *subjectivity*,⁽⁴⁾ or also from *causality* to

creatorship. As immediate thought thought everything as immediate, and mediated thought took its objects as mediate, so to bring under the categories of freedom means to consider freely. For the most part this occurs in philosophical thinking, for which, therefore, the first categories of freedom are inadequate, and only form the foundation,⁽⁵⁾ in that to it not subjectivity but exerted and completed subjectivity is the highest of things. Thought which has not yet risen thus high, but yet so high that to it happening-of-itself, *i.e.*, what is termed evolution, is the highest category, may be called deductive, deriving, developing, or even genetic. With the logic of *it*, *i.e.*, with a criticism of the categories which *it* applies, has our first chapter to do.

(1) From the premises, A is through B, and B is through A, it necessarily follows that A is through A, therefore is *causa sui* in the positive sense of this term, while substance was so only in the negative sense. (§ 132, 2.) (2) It is, therefore, not a figurative but an entirely exact expression when *free* falling, *free* growth are spoken of, because there is an inner tendency in consequence of which the stone of *itself*, falls, etc. (3) Originally were the three translations, of the Grecian *ὑποκείμενον* and *ὑπόστασις*, *substrate*, *substance*, *subject* not at all distinct. (In the Middle Ages subjective *only*, not predicative.) As everywhere so here, the need of exact denotation causes synonymics to disappear. We use *substrate* (*cf.* § 109, 2) for dead matter *subject* to changes, *substance* (*cf.* § 132)

for that in which manifoldness goes to the ground because it *suffers them* not, *subject* for that which puts forth changes from itself, therefore is related to them at once, positively and negatively. Man is the subject of his actions, but also the plant of its changes. (A limitation will be discussed later, see § 153.) How it could come that the word which *here* denotes only creatorship in distinction from causality could also acquire the entirely opposite meaning of opposition to subjectivity can likewise become clear only later. (See § 202.) Therefore, Kant could characterise freedom as the possibility of absolute beginning. What has initiative power is subject, hence free. ⁽⁴⁾ Hegel rightly prided himself upon this transition. When his school saw therein a proof for the personality of God, this was one of the mistakings of the meaning of logic, and was therefore within the school punished by the fact that D. Strauss, when he denied the personality of God, yet called his God world-*subject* because He put forth things from Himself, as trees do blossoms. Certainly this view is higher than that which sees in God merely the *cause* of the world, and whoever will conceive God as personality must conceive Him also as subject; but the converse does not follow. ⁽⁵⁾ That the school has to prepare not only for the sciences, but also for philosophy, is one of the reasons why the logic to be treated in the gymnasia has taken, besides the categories of the first chapter of the Second Part, also those of the opening chapter of the Third into its province.

§ 141. First, we have to conceive subjectivity in its first, *i.e.*, lowest form, hence as it is at the mere beginning. This mere principle of development pre-conceived to all realisation, we designate, since in German there is only a single word which signifies

at once *inner necessity* and *beginning*, by this word, calling it *concept* (*Begriff*).⁽¹⁾ By this word is, next, also denoted the psychological reflex of this inner necessity; and accordingly *conception* and formation of concepts can be spoken of only where inner necessity is known.⁽²⁾ The concept as inner necessity does not, therefore, stand opposed to actuality;⁽³⁾ it is rather the true actuality, as it is the true essence and being, since in it, as the true *causa sui*, being and must-be⁽⁴⁾ have become united and interlocked into freedom.⁽⁵⁾

⁽¹⁾ In the first meaning the word is taken when one says, It follows from the *concept* of triangle that, etc.; this meaning the Greek word λόγος also has, so that Aristotle can say that a plant's λόγος impels it to grow. The second meaning which occurs especially in the phrase "to be in the *notion*" (*Im Begriffe stehen*), may, at least, in an indirect fashion, be shown in the Greek, since in the example cited, λόγος is the ἀρχή of growing. ⁽²⁾ Hence a universal idea is far from being a concept; to the latter belongs inner ground and inner necessity. ⁽³⁾ A so-called *actual* parabola is none; while in the formula of the same, we have alone a true and actual one. ⁽⁴⁾ He who knows the concept of the plant, its type, knows its nature, and comprehends what nature intended by it. Hence the concept may serve as critical standard of measure. ⁽⁵⁾ In relation to that which is comprehended (*begriffenen*) one stands free, to that which is comprehensible unfree. Hence philosophy dispels astonishment.

A. THE CONCEPT.

§ 142. As the concept—and by the concept we shall henceforth understand its thought-counterpart as well as itself—contains the unity of *being* and *must-be*, the question, What is the concept? with which the question, How do we comprehend? coincides, contains in itself opposite determinations.⁽¹⁾ Therefore could those thoughts in which opposites were combined be called concepts.⁽²⁾ The concept is not, therefore, a contradiction, but rather the resolution of it, and, indeed, of all the contradictions hitherto considered, which had amounted to the opposition of being and must-be. Where, therefore, a freeing, *i.e.*, resolution of a contradiction, occurs, there is the concept, although it is customary just there to speak of incomprehensibility.⁽³⁾ Conversely, where the concept is, hence also where it is in us, there must be present resolved contradiction.⁽⁴⁾ Therefore, the exposition of the concept, *i.e.*, of the categories of this Part of the logic, is not so much an exposition of emerging contradiction or of the *transition* from one thing to another as in being, nor of posited contradiction or *appearance* of things *in one another*, but is the development into self, or the self-development of the in-itself self-contained and self-satisfied concept.⁽⁵⁾ Compared, therefore, with the other Parts, the Third, again, has its peculiar difficulties.⁽⁶⁾

(1) The word concept (from *concupere*) suggests this. Those who assume that there is no contradiction in God deny that He can be comprehended, can be an object of the concept. (2) Hence not being and not-being, but becoming and all succeeding categories. In all these concepts was already the concept as such, so that really we have been continually considering it. (3) Love as free relation, enjoyment as liberation, contain in themselves sublated defect, hence resolved contradiction, and are, therefore, phenomena of the *concept*, of *rationality* (see later, § 212), although they may be an enigma to the *understanding*, which separates everything. (4) Hence the joy and enjoyment when one has comprehended something, and the love towards what is comprehended. (5) Hegel calls it clearness and transparency of the concept—the fact that its development does not alter it. [Hegel, “Werke,” vol. v., p. 12.] The plant is developed in becoming a plant. (6) Differences must be fixed, which prove to be none because every moment of the concept is also the others.

§ 143. Since the development of the concept consists in its becoming what it really *is* (see § 16), we have to reflect upon what it has given itself out to be. Since now it was resolved contradiction it must contain *those* determinations whose opposition is resolved in it. But, naturally, they will now, when they no longer stand in opposition to one another, but have become moments of the concept, have acquired another *meaning*. Thereby also will what outside of *being* has been *essence* now acquire another name. Being, indifference, and distinction-

lessness, as a moment of the concept, is *universality*, and the concept is, in this moment, the *universal concept*, or has extension.

Since the universal is being as distinguished from essence, it is intelligible why Aristotle could call it the immediate. (Cf. § 27, obs.) Likewise is it explicable why the various determinations which the universal will receive (see following sections) must correspond to the three modes of being which were treated in the three chapters of the First Part.

(a) *The Universal Concept.*

§ 144 (1). The concept is the *universal* ⁽¹⁾ since it is mere reference to itself, and excludes all reference to other.⁽²⁾ In this absolute distinctionlessness the universal is the absolutely simple, which excludes every difference and every distinction. If it appears, therefore, on the one hand, as the fixed and imperishable, it is, on the other hand, just thereby without content, and empty.⁽³⁾ The universal, as it is when abstraction is made from every other moment, is the *abstract*.⁽⁴⁾ As this, it is *merely* something fancied.⁽⁵⁾ In the extension of the concept falls all from which it can be abstracted, or whose quality it gives.

⁽¹⁾ The analysis of the concept may also be so conceived that the becoming of the concept in us,

or the "psychological reflex of the concept" is reflected upon; then would first this appear, there is comprehension where the universal is apprehended. (2) In this sense the word *universal* is taken when, for example, one says that one asserts this or that only universally without reference to the individuals. That the universal concept is by Aristotle identified with $\psi\lambda\eta$, is explicable. It, like that, displays the moment of identity. (3) In this sense one takes the word concept when one takes it as equivalent to *universal* idea (see my "Outlines of Psychology," § 100), or when one, with Kant, speaks of concepts without perception, which are *empty*. (4) Hence *universally* and *in abstracto* as synonyms. When the universal or the concept is viewed from this side, the formation of the concept consists in *abstracting* from specific differences. (5) Of this universal is therefore true what in antiquity, Epicurus, and in the Middle Ages, the Nominalists claimed.

§ 145 (2). But it appears here, upon closer inspection, that abstract universality must be conceived otherwise when it supplies the defect of being *merely* imagined. If it exists only so long as abstraction is made from all difference, *i.e.*, everything in particular, it is, nevertheless, really related to the different, and presupposes *everything in particular*. This universality is, therefore, more closely considered, one which *rests* upon all these,⁽¹⁾ *i.e.*, it is universality of reflection, *community*,⁽²⁾ *totality*.⁽³⁾ The extension of the concept is, therefore, formed by the sum of all the things embraced in it. Totality is quantitative universality.

(¹) Similarly as above, this closer determination may be expressed thus: Comprehension takes place where the common is brought to light. (²) Since this is the real truth of abstract universality, therefore by abstraction, precisely, is the common found, and what is true of *no one* in particular (see § 144, obs. 2) *everyone* just on that account rightly refers to himself in particular. (³) Totality is a universality of reflection, because it is related to the particular which is reflected into it. It is the universality which *chiefly* hovers before the imagination when the word *universal* is used, and which alone was allowed validity by those in the Middle Ages who conceived universals as *collectiones*, i.e., the *Conceptualists*.

§ 146 (3). The concept of totality really contains a contradiction,⁽¹⁾ hence complete totality is always a *problem*. This contradiction compels us to go beyond totality. If, that is to say, the universal *presupposes* the different, the latter are, nevertheless, *posited* by it. (Cf. § 106.) Therefore, the universal is to be conceived as that which is valid as against the different, and rules them. It will not have the different in opposition to itself, but, as the free, no longer compulsory, might over them will *express* itself in them, *generate* them.⁽²⁾ The universal so taken is *substantial* (cf. § 140, obs. 2) *universality*, or *conceptive universality*⁽³⁾ (*genus*); it is *true totality*.⁽⁴⁾ Thereby the moment of universality is identical with the other moments of the concept (cf. § 142, obs. 5), and has become the entire concept.⁽⁵⁾ It is not some-

thing merely fancied, but rather real mode (§ 84) and true actuality⁽⁶⁾ and essentiality.⁽⁷⁾ The true extension of the concept is, therefore, the extension of its impelling power.⁽⁸⁾

(1) It says, namely, that the individuals or particulars (*i.e.*, the separate individuals) are taken together (*i.e.*, unseparated). Totality is, therefore, an endless series, as $\sqrt{2}$. (2) In nature this universality *may* occur only as *genus* (*cf.* § 153, obs. 5), which is not mere sum or unity, but real power, not only embracing but producing the different examples under it. In the sphere of the mind the category of genus has no application. (3) In *this* sense is law custom, *universal* will *volonté générale*, and not *volonté de tous*. (4) The genus is not merely a sum to be approximately discovered, but a really completed thing, *completeness*. (5) A thing corresponds to its concept when its substantial universality has acquired reality in it. (6) Herein is the justification of the *Realists* of the Middle Ages, of whom the most significant were those who conceded to the Nominalists and Conceptualists (relative) justification. Where the universality of the concept appears as *genus*, the examples have their proper actuality (immortality; see § 153, obs. 3) in this and *only* in this. (7) So the Platonic ideas represent the real essence of things, and, according to Porphyry, the difference between γένος and διαφορά (see § 148) is this, that the former ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται. Analogously as above, it must be said that one comprehends when one apprehends substantial universality (the *genus*). (8) Hence Schleiermacher is right when he identifies the universal with force; and Aristotle, when he took it as ὕλη (see § 144, 2), was compelled to identify it with δύναμις.

§ 147. Besides the moment, which, taken for itself,

had been *being*, but, as moment of the concept, universality,⁽¹⁾ the concept contains in itself, secondly, that which, taken for itself, had been *essence*, i.e., *difference and contradiction*. (See § 89.) Difference as held apart from the concept as identical with itself (or as universal) is *particularity*, as essential a moment of the concept as is universality. Particularity is not relation of two *entirely* diverse things, but, because the difference falls within the one concept, the disparate (as, in magnitude, it became the *discrete*) (see § 58, obs. 3), here has become *disjunction*. The concept is particularity, disjunction, or has *content*.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ Particularity is not separation; the latter is hindered by the fact that the particulars are, in *the concept* (λογῆ), one, which *embraces* or *comprehends* them under itself ⁽²⁾ since the particular is the negation of the universal, the rule that the extension and the content of the concept stand in inverse ratio has a justification. The expression of that which separates the extension of the concept into particularity is commonly called *division*.

(b) *The Particular Concept.*

§ 148 (1). Particularity appears, first, as the moment of difference, *opposed* to the universal. It is related to it as determining form to content.⁽¹⁾ As this it is not known, except as *posited* by the

universal, or rather as put *into* it.⁽²⁾ Particularity has, therefore, the character of something posited by external reflection it, therefore, does not constitute substance, but forms only the accidental in it. Particularity as brought into the universal concept from without is *logical difference*,⁽³⁾ mere *mark*.⁽⁴⁾ The sum of marks forms the content of the concept.

(¹) (Cf. § 144, 2). Logical *determination* is opposed to *abstraction*. (²) When we speak of a division of a universal sphere, or of *grounds* of division, these fall into a reflection external to the one dividing, similarly as diversity is brought to light by the comparison of a third. (See § 95.) Such division is called artificial, scholastic. In fact, this particularisation belongs to the *first* chapter of the Second Part. It tells what parts are *conceivable*. (³) Porphyry not incorrectly makes *διαφορὰ* and *συμβεβηκός* pass into each other, and says of the former that it *οὐκ ἐν τῇ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ὁποίῳ τί ἐστιν*. (⁴) By this term many expositions of formal logic, in a very superficial manner, denote the most various determinations, already by Aristotle and Porphyry very correctly distinguished. Analogously with what was said above, it must be here said that one comprehends only as one perceives differences and marks.

§ 149 (2). But since particularity is opposed to universality, it has in this its restriction and its other. But thereby as well the universal also is limited and restricted by the particular. The particular has thereby raised itself to *equality* with the universal, or the universal has become degraded to

equality with the *particular*. Thereby we get the relation of two things which as particular are *disjoined*,⁽¹⁾ and hence stand under one universality, which, however, at the same time have the character of universality, and, therefore, embrace under them disjunction. (Cf. § 147.) Such are *species*.⁽²⁾ The species expresses not, like mere difference, only the condition, but the essence, the *nature*; but yet it is opposed to the universal as the positing, and has, therefore, the character of the merely existing, *phenomenal*. Specification is an essential moment of the concept;⁽³⁾ as the concept was the universal, so it is the *species*.⁽⁴⁾ The species which contain the concept form its true content.

(1) Disjunction, as it was here explained, when it was said that the particular opposes itself to the universal, and that thereby the former is itself degraded to a particular, is the most immediate. Rightly, therefore, is this mode of specification pointed out in some so-called *natural* systems in nature. In this particularisation, *phenomenon*, the category of the Empiricists, repeats itself. (See § 108, 1.) (2) The *species* is a difficult determination, since here opposite moments must be held fast at the same time. Hence the uncertainty in this concept to which the Stoics, and, after them, Porphyry, in his investigations upon the γενικώτατον and εἰδικώτατον, have well referred. (3) Hence the name εἶδος, species, also kind (external mode), always signifies something external. (Cf. § 148, 1.) Analogously with the above: Comprehended is only that whose species are

known. ⁽⁴⁾ The concept is the *species* [plural], not *a* species, since it is not a particular but is particularity itself.

§ 150 (3). But if particularity is the other of universality, it is in fact not to be thought without it, hence is identical with it. The species, which the concept was seen to be, do not, therefore, come forth from the universal, but rather are to be thought as *filling* it. If universality was totality (§ 146), the species are rightly thought only when they make up a totality. The concept is not merely the species, but is completion of the species, since it contains the *ground of division*, or has this as its content.⁽¹⁾ In the completion of the species the moment of particularity is actually realised. In truth, therefore, the particularity of the concept consists not in a *difference* brought in from without, nor even in that in universality the species are to be found, or that there are such, but in the fact that the universal puts forth from itself *specific differences*⁽²⁾ by means of which it *separates* into the species⁽³⁾ *constituting* the universal.

⁽¹⁾ Rightly, therefore, are the *διαφοραὶ χωρισταὶ* and *ἀχώριστα* distinguished, and among the latter again, αἱ καθ' αὐτὸ προσοῦσαι, which ἐν τῷ τῆς οὐσίας λογῇ λαμβάνονται καὶ ποιοῦσιν ἄλλο and the κατὰ συμβεβηκός, which ποιοῦσιν ἄλλοῖον. ⁽²⁾ Of the *διαφοραῖς εἰδοποιοῖς* it is therefore said that the γένος δυνάμει μὲν πάσας ἔχει.

(3) The real specific difference is not posited by the one thinking; it is contained in the concept of the universal itself. The universal formula for *all* conic sections ($y^2 = px + \frac{px^2}{a}$) is its complete content because the three possible cases, $\frac{px^2}{a} = 0$, or $+$, or $-$ give the three species of it. It is contained in the concept of the animal that it separates into certain disjunct species. Aristotle saw that the *true* διαίρεσις occurred by the fact that τὸ γένος ταῖς ἀντιδιηρημέναις διαφοραῖς διαίρεται καθάπερ τὸ ζῶον τῷ πέζῳ, καὶ πτηνῷ καὶ ἐνύδρῳ. (Cf. Schleiermacher, "Dialectic," § 278.) Neither the merely conceivable essential nor the phenomenal, but only the actual and self-realising particularisation, gives true disjunction. (Cf. part ii., ch. iii.)

§ 151. If the hitherto considered moments of the concept are merely *being* and *essence* sublated and degraded to moments, an *analysis* of the concept will necessarily be able to reconvert its moments into those determinations (similarly as by the analysis [*i.e.*, destruction] of water, the moments sublated in it can be shown as independent substances). Then it would be *possible* to *begin* the logic with the theory of the concept. Such a course, however, would *presuppose* the concept as ready at hand, and hence not correspond to the demand which must be made of the science. Nevertheless, to go through the course for one's self is, for one who will orientate himself as to the point where he stands, not without advantage.⁽¹⁾ The real result, however, which has issued,

is that the universal does not exclude the particular, but *posits* it; particularity does not exclude universality but constitutes it; only as this actual unity is the concept actual, *determined concept*.⁽²⁾ (§ 41, obs. 5.)

(1) Hegel, who once so presented the logic, was accordingly in the habit of recommending for self-study this course besides the systematic. It would be what the proof is in calculation. (2) The universal was first only the one, the particular the other moment of the concept; complete and realised the concept appears only where it appears as the unity of its moments. Then it is *determined* or has *determined* itself as concept. (See § 41, obs. 5.)

(c) *The Determined Concept.*

§ 152. The *determined* or *concrete* (complete) concept, as the universality which is in particularity identical with itself, is the unity of genus and specific difference, is inner essence as it specificates itself in external phenomenon, without becoming lost therein. Only as this absolute negativity and return-into-self is it the *actual* concept, *i.e.*, concept displaying activity, the actual *subject*, true principle.⁽¹⁾ Since the becoming of the concept in us, or the becoming conscious of it, gives the *definition*,⁽²⁾ the Aristotelian statements upon this are intelligible. If one leaves one of them out of view,⁽³⁾ the other shrinks into a wholly external formula.⁽⁴⁾

(1) Not the concept of *man*, but that of Socrates, is the principle of S.'s development. (2) Hence in the Middle Ages, and even later, the word definition is used precisely as we use the word concept, to denote the inner nature. (3) That it contains the ground of existence. Spinoza lays down this principle: that the *correct definition* of the right-angled triangle gives us the (two) principal propositions regarding it, that the formula of the ellipse helps us to discover an apparatus for constructing it, shows how a definition can be a creator (subject). (4) *Genus* was taken as abstract universality, *differentia specifica* as a mere mark, then it occurred to set up definitions (of course, arbitrary and numerous) by combining the two. As there can be only one concept, from which everything else follows, so there can be only one definition of an object, from which everything else is deduced.

§ 153. If this moment of the concept is fixed, and, in the doing so, abstraction is made from the other two, it appears as a third beside them,⁽¹⁾ and gives what we call the *individual*.⁽²⁾ Individualisation is, therefore, an abstract, *i.e.*, untrue mode of manifestation of the, in itself, *concrete* concept. That the *individual* is an abstraction is shown therein, that, more closely considered, it precisely coincides with the two others which were to be distinguished from it. For if the individual is opposed to the particular, so that it shall be the *immediate*, *i.e.*, unmediated and indifferent, one thinks mere relation to self, *i.e.*, what (§ 144) had been the abstract universal.⁽³⁾ But the individual, thought as that which excludes the uni-

versal from itself and so stands over against it, is the same with the particular.⁽⁴⁾ If, therefore, in any sphere the concept *could* not come forth as actual subject, one would have in this sphere merely *individual beings*, which would have their substance, as their species producing them, outside themselves, and have only the meaning of examples, which are repeatable, while true subjectivity is *singularity*.⁽⁵⁾ The true relation is that each moment of the concept is the unity of the other two.⁽⁶⁾

(1) If one *counts* the moments of the concept, one applies to them an external, and hence improper, category; accordingly as one *will* count differently, one may find triplicity, quadruplicity, fivefoldness, a proof that we have here to do with ἀριθμοὶ ἀσύμβλητοι.

(2) This would perhaps be what Hegel, who uses the word individual in various senses, characterises as immediate individual.

(3) Hence, as the abstract universal was a merely *imagined* universal, a mere individual is only something *supposed*, has *no true* substantial existence; and an abstract universal (red, for example) is *merely* an individual determination in a thing. So it comes that Aristotle characterises now the universal, and again the individual as immediate.

(Cf. § 144, 2.) (4) A *mere* individual, stripped of its universal determination, is, therefore, merely a substanceless fragment, a species, *espèce*. Thus, the slave, as mere species, is called *homo* or *puer*; he is no subject, but only a thing, a mere *predicate* (singular). Hence is the individual as such absolutely *contingent*. It is accident in the genus, just as *mere* particularity gave only the accidental. (5) Nature, whose aim is

to produce a true subject existing for itself, man, cannot do this. Its productions are therefore repetitions of *one* type. This is the highest which it produces, only an *exemplar*, *i.e.*, example, which is not solely and completely author of that which it does, but helper, co-efficient of that whose example it is. Examples are mere *individuals*; hence to them as *substanceless* stands opposed substantial universality as the *subjectless*, non-self-developing, *i.e.*, it is only as *genus*. In this the examples as mere accidents go to the *ground*, and only in this has the example its true and unchangeable actuality (immortality, according to Plato and Aristotle), while it itself is the *substanceless* and perishable. It is otherwise in the sphere of spirit. Here there is neither an unalterable *genus*, nor replaceable, because indifferent (equivalent), *examples*.⁽⁶⁾ The genus *embraces* the species and examples; the species *make up* the genus and contain the examples; in the examples, finally, genus and species have their *existence*. In the sphere of spirit, where the universal by its particularisation closes with itself, man, since his universal nature (reason) acts in him by means of his particular species (nature), is a definite concrete character, and therein precisely by himself. Therefore is he with that which generates him, his substance, identical, is not subject to it. As self-generating, he is his own genus, as he specificates (distinguishes) himself. His existence as subject is existence of the concept as such. Therefore, it is *his* destiny to sublate his *mere individuality*, and to fill himself with a universal content. The more he does this, the more he exists as *individual*. Every true subject has its own definition.

§ 154. Reflection upon this as what the concept *has* proved to be (*cf.* § 143), has led to the fore-

going analysis of the concept (§ § 143-152), which has not so much considered how it *develops* itself as, rather, shown what that is *in itself* which has yet to develop itself. But if the concept is considered only as it is *in itself* (i.e., as related to itself), this consideration can concern only the nature of the concept *in general*. But hereby is said that this consideration of the concept has not yet been exhaustive; for if its development consists in that it *makes* itself that which it is, and a thing is known in its truth only when it is known in its *development*, the concept must be posited also in the other moments contained in it. But that it posits itself in the moment of particularity is really contained already in the result arrived at. The determined concept is *subject*, as such it is for itself; but as being for itself it is *exclusive*, posits difference. (§ 51.)⁽¹⁾ But, since no other being stands opposed to the concept, the exclusion, and the position of difference, can fall only in the concept itself. In fact, therefore, there lies concealed in the determinate concept a *relation* in which the concept appears as dirempt. This diremption is therefore the further development, a fulfilment which shows what the concept really is; it is the *judgment*.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ Hence the (determined) concept of the ellipse, for example, is *different* from that of the parabola,

while there are no different necessities of both. If, above, the transition from substantiality to subjectivity was mentioned (see § 140), here it may be remarked that while substance is by its concept sole, distinctionless, subject, on the contrary, is differentiated substantiality. In nature, where there are no real subjects, examples are merely repetitions of one type. Where they are not this, the case is regarded as an irrationality, and we say the example is *abortive*, while in the sphere of spirit originality is not regarded as a mishap. ⁽²⁾ In so far as judgment is a higher form of the concept, it is here clear how we can speak of mere concept as distinguished from the judgment, as later from the syllogism. The determinate judgment met us in the definition just as in the formula of the curve; the former is, therefore, always called a *judgment*, the latter an *equation*, i.e., different things posited as one likewise. In general, subjectivity is to be thought only as it posited as active. If one does this, one has at once subject and predicate, substantive and verb, i.e., judgment.

B. JUDGMENT.

§ 155. In the *judgment* the concept appears as self-excluding duality.⁽¹⁾ In this diremption its moments separate. True, since they are *its* moments and in it identical, their unity has not disappeared, but because it is not yet *posited* (as that to which the realisation of the judgment has to conduct) it has the character of immediacy, and appears as *copula* ⁽²⁾ introduced *from without*. This is the reason why the judgment, which, like the concept,

is a *category*, is commonly regarded as a product only of our reflection. *Judgment* is likewise an objective relation, and *our* judging, if it is a *true* one, consists merely in our following the self-diremption of the concept as objective.⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ Hence we may here, as already above (§ 155, obs. 1), speak of several *concepts*, and of a combination of two, which was until now not possible any more than there are two or more actualities or necessities. ⁽²⁾ By copula we mean (subjectively and objectively) the bond by which the terms related in the judgment are joined to one another. ⁽³⁾ Hence we say of a man who judges incorrectly that he has *no judgment*.

§ 156. In the subject (§ 153) diremption made its appearance. But since the other moments of the concept stand over against it as exclusive, it has acquired the meaning of the *individual*: as *subject*, it was first to show itself in the realisation of the judgment, in which realisation it fulfills its destiny as subject. Until then it has only the *position* of subject, and appears as the *merely grammatical subject*.⁽¹⁾ Opposed to it stands the *universal*, or also the *particular*, in either case that which *comprehends* it.⁽²⁾ Because, however, of their external relation to one another, the latter appears not so much that to which the individual must subsume itself, as, rather, that to which it *is*, by the copula, *subsumed*. It has, there-

fore, even yet only the *determination* of its universal nature, *passes for that*, and is *predicate* to that (grammatical) subject.⁽³⁾ Wherever, therefore, an individual is subsumed under a universal determination, a judgment occurs.⁽⁴⁾ Since each moment is *really* the unity of the two others, and hence is the entire concept, the realisation of the judgment, which gives the different forms of the judgment,⁽⁵⁾ consists in that every moment shows itself to be this unity *i.e.*, that *every* concept of the judgment becomes *the concept*. In the first instance the relation exists that a mere individual is subsumed under an abstract universal in an immediate way—*judgment of immediacy*.

(1) Also the so-called *logical* subject. It is, therefore, not accidental that Aristotle uses the same words by which he denotes the real substrate and subject, in order to denote the grammatical subject: ὑποκείμενον is to him both. (2) The universal formula for the judgment is therefore: the individual is (or is not) universal (I—U) since even the particular has, as opposed to the universal, the value of the universal. (3) If, according to Aristotle, τὸ ζῶον κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὡς καθ' ὑποκείμενον, this predication appears to be merely the work of the one judging; but the copula *is* shows that the predicate is no longer attributed to the subject by us but is *its*. (4) Every product of nature expresses or exhibits a *judgment*, since it is subject to its universal standing over against it. Therein consists its judgment and doom (Gericht). (5) Most expositions of the old, *i.e.*, abstract logic,

start from the unreal abstraction of a contentless form, and therefore place the difference of the various judgments in the *mere* form. Since we have seen that a mere form does not exist, the various forms of the judgment will be to us also in content different judgments. According to the old way, no difference whatever is to be made between the positive and the assertoric judgment, and the categorical judgment is different from them *only* when one has regard to the content. In Aristotle such empty distinctions do not occur. Since here form and content are not considered apart, it is an inadmissible demand if it be required to show the passage of one form of judgment into the *others* in one and the same content, and to show (say) how the judgment, "The rose is red," passes through the forms of the positive, negative, indefinite, singular judgments, etc. In the case of every other form there *must*, if the example shall be fit, be chosen another example. Upon the nomenclature a remark: If, to designate the various forms of judgment, the same names should be employed that are employed by formal logic, this will occur only because that name appears as the most *suitable*. The main thing is not the name but what is perceived as the peculiarity of each form of judgment.

(a) *The Judgment of Immediacy.*

§ 157 (1). The immediate judgment is *positive judgment*, since the individual as subject is subsumed,⁽¹⁾ or subsumes itself,⁽²⁾ under a predicate, without there being a necessity for the subsumption, posited by the nature of the subject or the predicate. This judgment has as *contingent* no *truth*,⁽³⁾ although it

may be correct where a contingent content is concerned.⁽⁴⁾ The universal formula of the judgment (I – U) is also its. Only, since the union of subject with predicate is here an external one, and the *abstract* universal, is merely an individual determination (§ 153, obs. 3), the predicate can receive the meaning of a merely external attribute or mere mark (§ 148), which *inheres* in the subject along with other marks.⁽⁵⁾

(1) The *propositions*: "The sky is blue," "This house is yellow, etc.," and the *act* whereby I occupy a thing, are positive judgments. (2) If I give myself up to a determination, let it pass for right, yield to everyone without being obliged by my duty, my pleasure is the copula in this judgment. (3) The *positive* acquires here the meaning of the accidental, hence the usage of speech opposes it to the rational and necessary. The sky may also acquire another predicate, I may be unaccommodating to others, the subsumption is *merely* positive, *i.e.*, contingent. (4) Even if it have its *correctness* that I have by occupation become the possessor, there is yet no (eternal) truth (of reason) therein. (5) The relation of inherence may, therefore, just as well be expressed by the formula U – I: in this case the *subjectivity* of that of which the mark is predicated is mere *thinghood* (*cf.* § 110, obs. 4), *i.e.*, the grammatical subject is the *substrate*, and the predicate expresses a certain *condition* of it.

§ 158 (2). But it appears in the case of the contingent judgment as well as in contingency itself (§ 129,

obs. 1), that in it lies its opposite, since the subsumption which it expresses may *just as well not* occur. If, namely, I predicate the universal of the individual, there nevertheless belongs to the individual only a *part* of the sphere which the universal includes; there can, therefore, be predicated of the individual ⁽¹⁾ only a *particular species* of the universal, or the (entire) universal can *not* be predicated of it. The truth of the positive judgment is, therefore, the judgment in which an individual is withdrawn (I not—U), or withdraws itself from subsumption under a universal in that it is subsumed under a *particular* determination (I—P), *i.e.*, the *negative judgment*.⁽²⁾

(1) Of the sky only sky-blue, of this house *not* all yellow but only a *particular* yellow. Both expressions mean the same: hence the formula for the negative judgment, I—P, *i.e.*, This is an *exception*.

(2) In civil wrong I negate *merely the subsumption* of my affair under a universal rule, and will represent my conduct as an exception (as a particular). It is therefore a negative judgment. Just so, it is a negative judgment when I renounce a right. Such a judgment would the proposition, Cajus is not learned, be.

§ 159 (3). And in the negative judgment precisely the same relation is repeated. Since, namely, the predicate (the particular) embraces more than the individual, this again contains more than merely

that particular determination, the relation between subject and predicate is so to be conceived that every reference of the individual to the universal becomes by the complete negation of the latter impossible ($I - \text{non } U$),⁽¹⁾ or the individual is related only to itself ($I - I$).⁽²⁾ The result is, therefore, the *indefinite* (infinite) or *identical* judgment, in which the predicate, which in the two other forms of judgment had had the meaning of universal and particular, appears as their unity. Hence it is in a higher sense than is usually said, unity of the positive and the negative judgment.⁽³⁾ In this judgment the judgment sublates itself. That is to say, since it is a judgment which is no longer a judgment,⁽⁴⁾ it contradicts itself and is in so far a meaningless judgment.⁽⁵⁾

(1) The proposition: The mind is not-square, This line is not-sweet; crime in which I do not negate the subsumption of my act under the right, but the right itself by my will. (2) The proposition: The mind is the mind; the obstinacy which says that my will is my will. (3) In general the real difference between the negative and the so-called infinite judgment, to which Salomon Maimon has directed attention, is too much neglected. (4) The proposition: The mind is not square, or, The mind is the mind, says (judges) *nothing*, is entirely empty. (5) Just as absurd is, say, crime, *i.e.*, a *deed* which is *no deed*, obstinacy, *i.e.*, a will which wills nothing. In spite of their absurdity these judgments have (unfortunately!) reality.

§ 160. But what is contained in the fact that the *highest* form of the immediate judgment contradicts itself, is that we have to go beyond it. In fact, this really occurs, for when the predicate in the various forms of this judgment has passed through the different moments of the concept, it has thereby become true universality of the concept, and the truth of the immediate judgment will be a judgment in which the subject is subsumed (or subsumes itself) to a predicate which constitutes the true substance and real essence of the subject, *i.e.*, its true concept, (§ 152), even though this, as opposed to the *mere* individual, get the meaning only of the genus. (§ 153, obs. 5.) We call this judgment the *essential judgment*.

(b) *The Essential Judgment.*

§ 161. The *essential judgment* occurs where an individual subsumes itself or is subsumed under an essential (substantial) universal determination. As the truth of the immediate judgment, it is higher than that.⁽¹⁾ If in the immediate judgment the series of its forms was produced by the alteration of the *predicate*, here it is otherwise: the predicate is the totality of the concept, needs therefore no further development, while the subject is merely an indi-

vidual, and has consequently to develop itself and become equal to that.⁽²⁾ The various stages by which this judgment has to realise itself give the various forms of the essential judgment, in which the foundation is formed by the fact that the subject has an essential universality as its predicate.

(1) Hence *more judgment* is attributed to the man who says, Tin is a conductor of electricity, Man is free, than to one who says, Tin is white, or, The man is blonde. ⁽²⁾ That is, to fill itself out to the complete concept. (*Cf.* § 156.) If, therefore, one will designate the various forms by the earlier analogous formulæ, the predicate will have to be designated as unalterable (p).

§ 162 (1). The essential judgment has itself still the character of immediacy where a *mere* individual in an immediate way is subsumed, or subsumes itself, under an essential determination.⁽¹⁾ There then appears an essential relation as a mere *individual case*.⁽²⁾ We call this relation *singular* (essential) *judgment*.⁽³⁾ It is as contingent as the positive. Its formula would be I—p.

(1) These propositions: This (tin) is an electrical conductor, Cajus acts justly, is mortal; despotism in the Orient, in which an *individual* is *free*, not because of his merit, but immediately by natural character *alone*. ⁽²⁾ It is a contradiction that what is in itself *true* should have merely the meaning of something whereby it accidentally has its *correctness*. ⁽³⁾ Ac-

cording to the formal logic, a judgment of immediacy may be a singular judgment. Because of the other meaning here, the word *essential* is added. The death of an animal shows it to be subject to its *genus*, etc.

§ 163 (2). But the contradiction which is contained in this judgment carries us beyond it. If, that is to say, the individual shall be a universal, it is at the same time determined as *both*, i.e., as unity of the (subjected) individual and the essential universal (predicated of it). If such a unity gives the concept of a *particular* essential nature, i.e., the concept of the *species* (see § 149, 2), the truth of the singular essential judgment will be a judgment in which the subject is a particular *species* of a genus, of which the rational nature of the latter is predicated.¹ Since therein is *implicité* contained that other species are excluded by this subsumption, this *particular* (essential) judgment (or the judgment of plurality) is equally affirmative and negative.⁽²⁾ Its formula would be $P - p$.

¹ The propositions: Some men are rational, Some metals show capacity to conduct electricity; ancient freedom, which consisted in the fact that some (the Greeks) were free. ⁽²⁾ The freedom of the Greeks only, involved the non-freedom of the Barbarians. The negative judgment and the particular judgments show relationship with the category of possibility. (Cf. § 162. 1.)

§ 164 (3). This defect is remedied in a higher form of the essential judgment: this form, when we reflect upon the two foregoing, emerges as their unity. If, that is to say, in the singular judgment the subject was conceived as the individual, in the particular as the particular, it will, since both judgments should be equally true, have to be taken as the unity of the two determinations, *i.e.*, as the universal embracing the individuals and particulars. The *universal* (essential) *judgment*, or the judgment of totality, is found where the the totality of all individuals and particulars are subsumed to an essential universality. Its schema would be U—p.

The proposition: All wolves are vertebrates: the complete equality of all classes of men before the law.

§ 165. But we cannot stop even with judgment of totality. Totality comprehends *together* the individuals and particulars; but as individuals and particulars, they exclude *togetherness*; the concept of totality, therefore, involves a contradiction, and totality is, since it can never completely *be*, an end still to be realised. A universal judgment, therefore, is true only for the nonce, and has the value merely of judgment which obtains of the greatest number, *i.e.*, the value of a particular judgment;⁽¹⁾ hence,

like that, points beyond itself, so that we can as little rest with it as with the indefinite judgment to which it corresponds. To what we have to pass from it, has been shown in the various forms of the essential judgment. In this, namely, as did the predicate in the immediate judgment, the subject has passed through the various moments of the concept, and thereby has become the entire concept.⁽²⁾ (Cf. § 165.) Both subject and predicate, therefore, since their determination is accomplished, have not to alter further; but it is merely required that the copula also be fulfilled to the concept. This successive development of the judgment into the syllogism (§ 170) gives the various forms of the *conceptual judgment*.

(1) That all wolves are vertebrates is true in the *first instance* only of all those which are known.

(2) Tacitly there is assumed as the basis of those universal judgments the judgment that it is involved in the concept of the wolf to be a vertebrate, of man to be respected by the law.

(c) *The Conceptual Judgment.*

§ 166 (1). The judgment of the concept occurs where the subject has a determination that constitutes its innermost essence, by which is determined its relation to the predicate attributed to it. Subsumption under this predicate appears *first* as a mere

immediate copula: it is not yet shown that this predicate belongs to it from inner necessity, or *must* be subsumed under it. This gives the *immediate judgment of the concept*.⁽¹⁾ It corresponds to the positive and the singular judgment, because the subsumption is only a fact.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ Only of one who names beauty as the purpose of the work of art, or faithfulness to duty as that of man, is it said that he has *real judgment*. ⁽²⁾ Such a judgment is *expressed* in the proposition: man (no longer *a* man) is a rational essence; it is *contained* in innocence, in which in an immediate way man corresponds to custom, *i.e.*, destination. The immediate judgment of the concept corresponds to what Hegel calls the categorical and assertorical judgments. If we employ once more the earlier analogous formulæ, an unalterable letter will here have to be taken for the subject also, and we should have s—p.

§ 167 (2). In the immediate judgment of the concept there is contained a contradiction, which even the name suggests. It consists in that, although the subsumption under the predicate is posited and conditioned by the *essence* of it, it has here only the character of *being* and immediacy. The contradiction is resolved, since the copula loses the character of immediacy and becomes true necessity, *i.e.*, a *relation*. (See § 131.) If in place of mere *is* an essential relatedness enters, we have the *essential judgment of the concept*.⁽¹⁾ It occurs where the subsumption of

the subject under the predicate has acquired the character of necessity, and may be called the judgment of necessity or *compulsion*.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ With Hegel, the hypothetical judgment. ⁽²⁾ In the proposition, the criminal *must* be punished (or, if a man is a criminal he is punished); further, in the external legality of man we meet this judgment in its subjective and objective meaning.

§ 168. Since, however, the subsumption has lost the character of immediacy, the opposite defect is present. That is to say, *being* is wanting to it, it has got the meaning of a mere must be, *i.e.*, of a problem (*πρόβλημα*), and this judgment is therefore *problematic*.⁽¹⁾ Just on that account there is repeated here, in higher potency, the negative judgment as well as the particular. What is problematic obtains always only of some. Since the subsumption is *compulsion*, *i.e.*, external necessity, it is mere contingency (§ 126). As mere problem this judgment contains an unresolved contradiction.⁽²⁾ This, however, is resolved by the copula's being posited *again* as immediacy, *i.e.*, as immediacy produced by the sublation of mere mediation. (*Cf.* § 131.) This gives us the grounded or completed judgment of the concept.

⁽¹⁾ Rightly, therefore, did Hegel, earlier, identify the hypothetical judgment with the problematic. Although it is necessary that the criminal be pun-

ished, it is yet problematical whether it always happens; and when it happens, it remains, since that necessity is an external one, an accident. ⁽²⁾ This contradiction is contained in the concept of every problem, every *should-be*, which as such cannot be realised. (Cf. § 44, 2.) The law, therefore, can only condemn, its judgment *compels* and punishes.

§ 169 (3). The complete judgment of the concept, or *judgment of freedom*, is to be found where the subject, by means of its possible independence, is by its essential ⁽¹⁾ predicate nevertheless subsumed under it. (§ 166.) It contains, therefore, the two forms of the conceptional judgment ⁽²⁾ which have, hitherto, been considered, and is their truth. The subsumption, that is to say, is neither a new being, nor even a mere *must-be*, but is both, hence free and, therefore, conceptual subsumption. ⁽³⁾ The judgment of freedom has a universal character, for what *should* be forms no exception.

⁽¹⁾ In so far as in such a judgment as: The wolf is either a mollusc, or articulate, or vertebrate, it is at least represented as *possible* that the subject is subsumed under another as its appropriate predicate, we may with Hegel call this judgment the *disjunctive*. ⁽²⁾ It has, therefore, the character of inner necessity, and is, therefore, *apodictic*. ⁽³⁾ As an example of this judgment in so far as it has real meaning, may be cited even willed rationality, in which man, though he can be irrational, is rational. This relation may easily be reduced to a disjunctive judgment.

§ 170. The various forms of the conceptual judgment have shown how the *copula* realises freedom, *i.e.*, the concept, just as the series of immediate judgments had exhibited this realisation of the *predicate*, the essential judgment that of the *subject*. Thereby, however, the *goal* of the judgment is reached (§ 157) and hence also the *termination* of its development. For since, as was postulated, the concepts have become concept, we are compelled to think the concept which, through the concept, is identical with itself, *i.e.*, the *syllogism*.⁽¹⁾ This, as the return of the self-particularising concept (§ 154) is the truth of the judgment, whose highest form is, therefore, *really* the syllogism.⁽²⁾ (Cf. § 16, § 41, obs. 4.) In this, self-exclusion yields to self-inclusion.

⁽¹⁾ In the example last cited the subsumption of man under rationality is itself rationality, *i.e.*, concept. ⁽²⁾ The difficulty of distinguishing the highest form of the judgment from the syllogism has in this relation its ground. The student involuntarily passes from one to the other because what is thought of is itself this passage. Only in a higher sense must it be said of the judgment of freedom, as of identical and universal judgment, that it is no (longer) judgment.

C. THE SYLLOGISM.

§ 171. Also the *syllogism* is generally regarded as merely a product of our thought; but as *category* it is

just as well a real relation, and the syllogism which we make is merely a psychological reflex, or an inner repetition, of the syllogism which is contained in the fact itself.⁽¹⁾ As the return of the concept from the judgment to itself, the syllogism is the unity of the concept and the judgment (hence is latent in the judgment of the concept), and its truth.⁽²⁾ The syllogism is the concept which is mediated with itself; its development can, therefore, consist only in that it *posits* itself as this self-mediation. The various stages of realisation of it are shown, each again, by various forms, the *figures of the syllogism*; ⁽³⁾ these form a series of stages in that they successively approach more nearly the final determination of the syllogism. Since the syllogism has shown itself to be the truth and foundation of the judgment, a parallelism between the various syllogisms and judgments cannot cause surprise.

(1) Where this is not the case, one says rightly that there is no *syllogism*. (2) Such propositions as everything, God, etc., is a *syllogism*, have therefore a justification in these. (Cf. § 29, obs. 5.) (3) Precisely the same is true here as what was said (§ 156, obs. 5) regarding the various forms of the judgment. But the more the theory of syllogisms has kept, in the formal logic, the form which the most careful observer of the reflex of the syllogism in us, Aristotle, has given it, the more we shall know ourselves in agreement with it, the more its terms may also be

employed here. Since the abstract logic abstracts from the content, so it ignores the *difference* between the *stages*, and rests in the most abstract. Hence in the ordinary usage of speech the figures of the syllogism denote only the forms of the *immediate* syllogism, and the syllogism of analogy, for example, is not commonly called a particular *figure*.

§ 172. The syllogism will therefore appear *first* as not yet realised. The concept has, therefore, not yet become identical with itself; therefore, the syllogism appears as a plurality of concepts, like the judgment (*Cf.* § 155.)⁽¹⁾ But mere judgment it can not be, for the mere copula has become mediating concept. (§ 170.) Therefore, the syllogism will first appear as a mediation of two concepts by means of a concept, in which mediation the two *extremes* as much as the *terminus medius* have the meaning of mere *moments* of the concept,⁽¹⁾ each of which is by itself taken as concept. As this not yet mediated syllogism the syllogism is *immediate syllogism*.⁽²⁾

(1) As in the quantitative relation, because *one* quantum was made of *two*, these had the meaning only of moments of the quantum (§ 72), so here the *concepts* which make up the syllogism, which is, however, only the self-mediating concept. (2) This expression contains the contradiction which lies in the fact itself; the syllogism is not yet (completed) syllogism, but only begins to be it. Otherwise expressed: syllogism is conceptual mediation. The first

sylogisms to be considered exhibit only *superficial*, forced, and hence, not conceptual mediations.

(a) *The Immediate Syllogism.*

§ 173 (1). In the *immediate syllogism* the various concepts are, by a concept distinct from them, so mediated that each gets the meaning of a mere moment of the concept. If these, now, were taken by themselves, the universal, the particular, and individual, the immediate syllogism, the fulfilment of the immediate judgment, will have in the first place to be so conceived that in it an individual is by a particular subsumed under a universal.⁽¹⁾ This *first figure* of the immediate syllogism (the foundation of the positive judgment) may therefore be denoted by the formula I—P—U. Since the three concepts are valid each by itself, the mediation will have the character of externality. Therefore both the subsumption of the particular under the universal, and that of the individual under the particular, appear as an immediate and external subsumption, *i.e.*, as *judgment*. The premisses of the syllogism (the immediate in it) are therefore (or may be represented as) judgments.⁽²⁾ In this case, in the first figure the particular will be combined with the individual as its predicate and with the universal as its subject.⁽³⁾

(1) Aristotle, who in his exposition always seizes the real relation of the concepts combined, therefore defines the first figure as that in which the *terminus minor* is contained in the *medius*, and this in the *major*. [See Prior, "Analytics," i., 4.] The proposition, This house is yellow because painted with ochre; the purchase in which I get possession by means of a particular stipulation, or every contract, in which, for the sake of a particular interest, I subject myself to a particular determination as to a rule, may serve as examples of this syllogistic figure. (Cf. § 157, obs. 1, 2.) (2) The modern expositions of formal logic always put forward this form as the assented form. (3) The regular form of this syllogism is then $P - U$, $I - P$, $\therefore I - U$.

§ 174. This syllogism is as regards its content just as contingent as the judgment which it proves. (See § 157.) There could *equally well* be subsumed under the universal another particular, and the individual combined by the same particularity with another universal.⁽¹⁾ From this defect of content there follows also its defective form. Only one part of the syllogism, namely, is here, which the syllogism should be, mediated, the conclusion, or the reference of the two extremes.⁽²⁾ On the contrary, the reference of each extreme to the mean is an immediate *presupposition* or an *assumption*, in short a contingent judgment.⁽³⁾

(1) In that example *another* interest might lead me to this same contract, or the *same* interest to *another*

contract (2) The contract is concluded, my obligation compulsory ; or in every syllogism the conclusion is by its *ergo* no longer a *mere* judgment. (3) It is accidental that I have this particular interest, etc.

§ 175 (2). This defect demands a remedy, namely, that from the syllogism everything shall be removed which contradicts its nature. This now would *not* occur if its premisses were by this same figure made conclusions ; the *regressus in infinitum* which would thereby arise would not take away this defective form, but rather *repeat* it. This figure points to its own sublation, and to *another* figure of the syllogism. That is to say, if in the first premiss the universal is identical with the particular, in the conclusion with the individual, then *really* that which joins the particular with the individual, or in which the two coincide, is the *universal*. But if this be *posited* as that which it really is, there results a syllogistic figure in which precisely the universal forms the mean concept. This *second figure* of the *syllogism*,⁽¹⁾ the demonstration of the negative judgment, whose formula will be $I - U - P$,⁽²⁾ must, if one takes the premisses as judgments, in both (as already done in the first) assign to the universal the place of predicate. It occurs when any individual whatever obtains through the universal a *particular* predicate.⁽³⁾

(1) Also Aristotle ["Prior Analytics," i., 5] calls this figure of the syllogism in which the concept of greatest comprehension forms the *terminus medius*, the *second*, but without giving a reason why it is so declared. This reason lies in the fact that it has the second form of the judgment for its conclusion.

(2) The regular form is then: $P-U, I-U \therefore I-P$.

(3) Examples of this figure are so to be chosen that the connection with the judgment is always clearly apparent. Therefore (*cf.* § 158) the *proposition*, Cajus is not learned because he was not industrious; The *relation* in which from universal respects I renounce a particular right, or in which, supported upon universal use, I represent my affair as an exception, etc.

§ 176 (3). This figure of the syllogism stands higher than the first, because it presupposes it. (1) But even it, since it still contains an immediated premiss, points to another as its truth, one which is contained in it as it is in the first. Since, that is to say, in the second premiss, the identity of the universal with the individual, but, likewise, in the conclusion, that of the individual with the particular, is expressed, it is *really* involved in this second figure that the universal and the particular coincide in the individual, and that, therefore, the individual mediates them both. This being *posited*, there results a figure in which a particular is by means of an individual placed in relation with universality. ($P-I-U$). (2) This *third figure of the syllogism* in

which the *terminus medius* appears as joined with both extremes as its subject,⁽³⁾ has no unmediated premiss. It is, therefore, the truth of the two former, which it presupposes.⁽⁴⁾ As, however, the indefinite judgment, although the truth of the two other forms, was, nevertheless, *empty* (see § 159, 3), so this figure, in spite of the above-mentioned superiority, is entirely nugatory,⁽⁵⁾ and can gain a content only by a subreption.⁽⁶⁾

(1) Precisely this is the reason why formal logic gives the preference to the first figure; but the foundation or presupposition occupies a lower position than the presupposition. (See § 105.) (2) In the *proposition*, There are finite beings who are learned, because Cajus is both, we have an example of this syllogism; also where (in transgression) a particular interest, because it is my pleasure, is made law. (3) The regular form here would be I—U, I—P ∴ P—U. (4) The first forms the presupposition of its major premiss, the second of its minor premiss. (5) From the fact that Cajus is learned, and that he is a finite being, follows, exactly taken, only that *a* finite being (*i.e.*, Cajus) is learned, and rightfully one infers from the major premiss only the major premiss itself, *i.e.*, one repeats, but one concludes or infers nothing. (6) This subreption makes us say: Some finite being is learned. It is a gratuity when one allows validity to this further step, which really contains the anticipation of a higher syllogism. (§ 182.)

§ 177. Not only, however, does the syllogism of immediacy show itself defective in the fact that its

highest form is really no syllogism, but a repetition (a *bis idem*, as is the identical judgment); a like result emerges when the three figures are more exactly considered. Between all the three figures of the syllogism there exists the relation that what in one has (in the premisses) the character of immediacy, appears in the others as something mediated (as conclusion). They, therefore, form *a circle*, and *all three figures* conduct to the negation of true inference, to the *circulus in ratiocinando*. But this is merely the negative result. The positive is that what they each have shown must be combined, and that, therefore, the syllogism in whose various figures each moment has taken the position of the mean will now have for its *terminus medius* a determination which is not a mere moment of the concept, which (moment) joins in an external and accidental way the two extremes, but forms *an essential mediation* of them. The syllogism has become *essential syllogism*.

(b) *The Essential Syllogism.*

§ 178. Since the *terminus medius* in the essential syllogism is a determination which is *essential* to the *terminus minor*, and not a mere accidental predicate of it, the *terminus major* also, to which the same is to be subordinated, cannot, as in the immediate syllogism,

stand to it in an external relation, but will likewise be an essential universality. The essential syllogism, the fulfilment of the essential judgment (*cf.* § 173), occurs where something is by means of a determination essential to it subsumed, or subsumes itself, under its universal nature.

§ 179 (1). The mean, since it stands *over against* the individual, will have the significance of the *universal* (§ 153, obs. 5); but since the individual can be subject to the universal only by being subsumed under it, it stands *over against* the universal, and has the value of a *particular*. Both facts taken together, there results a syllogism in which the mean is formed by the *species* (§ 149, obs. 2), embracing all individuals, by which (the species) the individual is subsumed under its essential universality. We call this syllogism, whose mean is formed by particularity widened into universality, so that the individual, as being its species, is subsumed under the universal, the *syllogism of totality*.⁽¹⁾ It corresponds to the first figure among the immediate syllogisms⁽²⁾ and proves the singular essential judgment.⁽³⁾

(1) If one calls *this* (tin) an electrical conductor because *all* metals are so, or if Cajus acts rightly because it is universal *custom*, we have this figure as proposition or as real relation. In the first example the species is all metals; in the second, all who act form the middle term. (2) Here the *species* is the

mediating, which means that the *terminus medius* is the particular. The syllogisms, which are commonly cited as examples of the first figure, are, as a rule, examples of this syllogism. ⁽³⁾ Its schema would be: I—P—p. (See § 162.)

§ 180 (2). In the syllogism of totality a universal is predicated of the individual because it pertains to *all* individuals of this species. In spite of the superiority which this syllogism has in comparison with the immediate syllogism of the first figure, it at last proves, nevertheless, to be a delusion. For since a thing can be predicated of *all* individuals only when it is true *of this* individual also, the major premiss really *presupposes* the conclusion, and the circle which the three figures of the immediate syllogism present has made its appearance also in this syllogism. But if the conclusion of this syllogism *really* forms the premisses, the major premiss *really* the conclusion, there lies concealed in the syllogism of totality a syllogism in which precisely the individual forms the middle term, which, therefore, if one compares it with the immediate syllogism, follows the schema of the third figure. But by the concept of the essential syllogism (§ 178), the middle term can not be a mere individual, therefore only individuals as forming a totality, *i.e.*, *all* individuals posited *as* individuals, are the mean. (In so far, again, may one say of this syllogism, it follows the

second figure of the immediate syllogism.) This syllogism of posited totality which the one above considered really presupposes, in which, therefore, the middle term is formed by universality individualised in a series, may be termed the *syllogism of completeness*. It occurs where, by means of all the individuals of a species, the species is subsumed under an essential universality. Its formula will be $P - i, i, i, i - - - - p$ (2).

That *all* metals are electrical conductors is true only on the presupposition that tin also is. That a mode of action is the custom of *all*, presupposes that it is of Cajus also. The psychological reflex of this syllogism is what is familiarly known by the name *Syllogism of Induction*: in this the mean is formed by all individuals of a species (gold, silver, iron, etc.) whereby this itself (metal) is joined to a determination essential to it (capacity of conduction.) Hegel, therefore, uses for this syllogism the name Syllogism of Induction: it is the syllogism of experience. As real relation, this syllogism occurs when a corporation, through the condition of right and activity of *all* its members, realises the universal end of the State.

§ 181 (3). This syllogism has a double defect. First, the *terminus medius*, because the totality of the individuals never is realised, is a never-concluded series, an endless progression which merely says that the individuals *should* form a totality. The *validity* of this syllogism is therefore problematic (*cf.* § 168),

and since totality merely says that for the nonce the series is to be regarded as complete, this syllogism really proves only the particular essential judgment (§ 133). *Secondly*, the subsumption of the minor premiss under the major (the assumption) is permissible only under the presupposition of the correctness of the conclusion which, therefore, forms for that the presupposition.⁽¹⁾ As the syllogism just considered, so also this, by the circle which it contains, points beyond itself. This reference is carried out when the problem contained in the syllogism last considered, *i.e.*, when as middle term is taken individuality which not only *should* form a universality (i, i, i, i,) but *is* universality, *i.e.*, individuality, which at the *same time* is *universality*, and when, further, what there was immediated assumption, here becomes conclusion. Because the middle term has this *concrete* character, this syllogism (*cf.* § 180) may be referred to the second as well as the third figure. Though Hegel calls this syllogism, in which the individual as universal forms the middle term, the Syllogism of Analogy,⁽²⁾ this name is really proper only for the psychological reflex of this syllogism, which just as well appears as real relation,⁽³⁾ and hence may be better called the *Syllogism of Combination*.⁽⁴⁾ That is to say, it occurs wherever the middle term is formed by an individual which,

however, is valued according to its universal nature, or by a universal, but only as it immediately exists as an individual. Since here there belong to the middle term *two* determinations, this syllogism is invalid when the middle term in the one premiss is taken only in one determination, in the other, in the other determination. Then would occur a *quaternio terminorum*.⁽⁵⁾

(1) In that example there is the tacit presupposition that to be electrical conductors is essential to gold, silver, etc., in so far as *they are metals*, and not in so far (say) as they are coloured, *i.e.*, that to the metal this predicate is essential. (2) A syllogism of analogy would be, if one said, Gold combines metalleity and capacity for electrical conduction; now tin, lead, zinc, etc., are (like) gold; therefore, etc. Here gold is taken only in its universal nature; hence, instead of saying "like gold," one says "a *species* of gold." (3) We meet this syllogism where, for example, an individual claim becomes legal through the will of the monarch. The monarch gives here the privilege because he is more than individual ego, because he is a universal, a *we*. (4) With reason are we in the habit of calling inference by analogy a combining. (5) Analogy would be superficial and invalid if one said that, since metals are like gold, they are nineteen times as heavy as water, or that the moon is inhabited, as is the earth, since the earth is not inhabited as a mere independent heavenly body; but merely in this latter respect is it taken when one subsumes the moon under the concept earth. Likewise would it be a *quaternio terminorum* if, in the example cited, *tel est notre plaisir* and *tel est mon plaisir* were confounded.

§ 182. But even in this syllogism there has not disappeared the circle by which the two other forms of the essential syllogism were fatally vitiated.⁽¹⁾ This syllogism, that is, precisely as did the others, presupposes its conclusion, since without this presupposition the minor premiss would be incorrect. If, therefore, all forms of the essential syllogism are superior to those of the immediate syllogism in that the former admit of an advance, while in the case of the latter nothing *results*, since they move in a constant circle,⁽²⁾ the former on the contrary labour under the defect which, instead of *petitio principii*, should rather be called *petitio conclusi*.⁽³⁾ But the consideration of these forms shows still another result. Since successively the major premiss (§ 180), the assumption (§ 181), and the minor premiss (§ 182) have been shown to be *mediated* (by the conclusion), it is involved therein that everything *unmediated* must be removed from the syllogism. Unmediated were, however, even in the highest form of this syllogism, the two determinations which were joined only by *also* or at *the same time*. The true mediation will consist in that, instead of such mere combination, which gives the syllogisms considered the character of contingency,⁽⁴⁾ the middle term is formed by the self-producing genus, *i.e.*, by the true universality of the concept. The result is that the

essential syllogism realises its concept (see § 178), and thereby has completed itself, and has passed into the *conceptual syllogism*.

(¹) The metals are like gold, only in so far as they are electrical conductors, not in so far as they are nineteen times as heavy as water. "This is the will of the monarch," can I say only on the presupposition that we have to do with something which he can justify, *i.e.*, what is lawful, not with (say) a matter of taste. (²) Hence Bacon of Verulam (Introduction to "Instauratio Magna") finds fault with the syllogism on the ground that it gives no new knowledge, and praises, instead of it, induction and analogy. (³) The correctness of induction and analogy depend upon whether the *presaging* of the conclusion is correct. Hence it is *contingent*, depends upon the genius of the investigator, whether his inductions and analogies bring him to what is correct or not. (⁴) This contingency has its chief ground in that the individual (see § 153, obs. 4) as such was the contingent. It is a matter of good fortune when the individual will of *this* monarch coincides with the will of *the* monarch (who does not die). The *quaternio terminorum* is possible, because here two things are *combined*; one is not mediated through the other.

(c) *The Conceptual Syllogism.*

§ 183. In the *conceptual syllogism* the defect of the *immediate* syllogism, in which the *terminus medius*, as well as the subsumption of one extreme under

the other, had the character of contingency, has disappeared; since now its own nature, the *genus* (§ 146), forms the middle term, the syllogism has acquired the character of necessity. Just so was the *essential* syllogism defective; namely, in that the middle term *was* to develop itself to true universality, it displayed a never-realised postulate, which had as consequence either the endless progression (§ 181), or the circle in the syllogism (§ § 180 and 182), in which what could not be arrived at⁽¹⁾ was *presupposed*. This defect the conceptual syllogism will not have, since in it true universality forms the middle term, *i.e.*, the concept which synthetically combines in itself being and *must be* into *inner* necessity. (§ 138.) The conceptual syllogism is, therefore, the explication and proof of the conceptual judgment.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ Since what that postulate demanded is not *realised* (*efficere*), therefore those syllogisms are not completely *demonstrative* (*efficere*). ⁽²⁾ (*Cf.* § 178.) Its formula will be $s - m - p$.

§ 184 (1). How the conceptual syllogism is in the first instance to be conceived appears from the foregoing. There it was shown that the subject by its nature subsumed itself to an essential determination. The subsumption will therefore be *conceptual* (rational), hence not the absolutely contingent one of an *in-*

dividual. But here the conceptual syllogism itself, like everything in its beginning, will have in the *beginning* the character of immediacy. This *immediate conceptual* syllogism is, by Hegel, called the categorical.⁽¹⁾ The immediate conceptual syllogism is the fulfilment of the immediate conceptual judgment (§ 160), and therefore has this for its premisses. But herein consists its defect. Although the *terminus minor* has in the *medius* its essential predicate, nevertheless the subsumption is, because it only *is*, only *conceivable* or *possible*.⁽²⁾ (See § 126.) But therein it is contained that the contrary, as well, may be. (§ 129, 4.) The same is true of the relation of the *medius* to the *major*,⁽³⁾ and both premisses have, therefore, the character of mere possibility.

(1) Such a syllogism is *expressed* in the proposition: The (not *a*) wolf is, as mammal, a vertebrate. It occurs as *real relation* in marriage, in which man, by means of the sexual relation, is mediated with custom. (2) It is *possible* that man may lend ear to the voice of the sexual impulse; where he does so, he follows his nature; but it is equally possible that he should not do so. That *terminus medius* is not the only one by which a man subsumes himself under ethicality; in another this *terminus medius* is something else. Marriage has not an absolute, but only a conditioned, subjective (see § 191, obs. 1) necessity. (3) It is just as *possible* that the sexual impulse conduct to ethicality, but the contrary is just as *conceivable*.

§ 185 (2). The defect in the syllogism just characterised is, like every defect, a contradiction, and must as such be resolved. This takes place precisely as in the case of the judgment. What is essential predicate is posited as such when it enters into, not a merely *being*, but an *essential*, combination with the subject, *i.e.*, where the *minor must* be subsumed under the *medius*, and the latter to the *major*. There will, therefore, result, as the truth of the syllogism just considered, one which demonstrates the judgment of compulsion, in that it has judgments of compulsion for its premisses. Like that, it also will have the character of necessity, and may therefore be called the *Syllogism of Necessity* or of *Compulsion*.

An example of this syllogism would be, The criminal must confess, but the one confessing must be punished. Since this proposition may equally well be expressed, If the criminal confesses, he must be punished now, etc., it is justifiable when Hegel, who called the preceding syllogism the categorical syllogism, designates this as the hypothetical. As real relation we meet it where the Hindu, since he *must* belong to a caste, is *compelled* to carry out the end of the State. It is easy to express this relation in a proposition analogous to the above.

§ 186 (3). But, more exactly considered, the syllogism of compulsion, as diametrical opposite of the immediate conceptual (categorical) syllogism, displays

an opposite defect. The subsumption here is a *must-be*. But to the *must-be* is wanting *being*, and the necessity of this syllogism is merely external necessity, *i.e.*, *contingency*.⁽¹⁾ What the syllogism contains remains, therefore, always a problem, and it is *problematical*, as is the judgment founded upon it. As possibility and contingency were only abstractions, which postulated their unity (§ 129), so here an analogous thing occurs. If it lay in the concept of the conceptual syllogism that the subsumption *be* (§ 184), and, likewise, that it *must be* (§ 183), it is in truth to be conceived as a syllogism in which subsumption has the character of *freedom*. (*Cf.* § 142.) This occurs in a higher form of the syllogism; in this the last remnant of immediacy and contingency (analogously as above in the judgment, § 169) will disappear, since the *terminus minor* subsumes itself under the *medius*, and the *major* by means of its independence of them. This *syllogism of freedom*⁽²⁾ will have removed the conditionedness, which yet clings to the syllogism of necessity, and will be *unconditioned* and *absolute*.⁽³⁾ As its premisses it will have the judgment whose fulfilment it is, the judgment of freedom.

(1) Because the criminal *must* confess (the defenders of torture urge), therefore his confession is *contingent* (as the adherents of the English jury

assert). ⁽²⁾ The proposition, The criminal *will* confess, and be punished, may also be expressed thus: He may deny, lie, exculpate himself or confess, but he does neither of those three, therefore, etc. Hegel therefore calls this syllogism the disjunctive. (Cf. § 185, obs.) As real relation we meet this syllogism when a man, excluded from the labouring class, or the military profession, connects himself with the State through the learned class in his calling. ⁽³⁾ Freedom (cf. § 142) is absoluteness, unconditionedness.

§ 187. In this syllogism of freedom, or the *absolute syllogism*, all immediacy has disappeared. The seat of immediacy was always the premisses, but these are now *grounded* (completed) judgments of the concept (§ § 168, 169), hence mediated; the conclusion is already so. It is thereby the concept which had dirempted in the judgment (§ 154), and was posited in the moment of particularity (*ibid.*), actually returned to itself; and if the concept was as return into self subject (§ 152), so is now the *subjectivity* of the concept, which was continually realising itself, *completed*. The development of the concept which had begun by the diremption into the judgment, has now, since the concept is posited in all its moments, reached its *conclusion*.

The entire investigation into the various syllogisms has merely the meaning of answering the question, What is *mediation of the concept*? i.e., what mediation is conceptual and what development is, according to

that, *complete*? Since, now, it appears that *that* development is not yet so in which there occurs a relation such as that in the immediate syllogism, etc., but only *that* which occurs in the syllogism of freedom, which really is what the syllogism should be, unity of concept and judgment, *i.e.*, concept again restored.

§ 188. A recapitulation of this chapter, to which the superscription *Subjectivity*⁽¹⁾ (see § 99) was given because therein the concept has realised its nature to be subjective, shows that the concept was *first* considered only *in itself*, as *abstract, mere* concept (§ § 142-154), and then as dirempted in the *judgment*, or *relation* of concept (§ § 157-170), in which the individual moments of the concept fell asunder and their unity only *should* be posited, and *finally*, was shown how the concept issued from the sphere of contradiction and in the *syllogism* or *mediation of the concept* (§ § 171-187) has rounded itself out to that which was its proper destination, to concrete subjectivity.⁽²⁾ Since the subjectivity of *quality* in the First Part corresponded to essence in the Second, so concept, judgment, and syllogism correspond to indeterminateness, determinateness, and self-determination, just as, on the other hand, they run parallel with identity, difference, and the issuing from a ground.⁽³⁾ Deductive thought which consisted in the application of these categories (see above, § 140)

occupies itself, therefore, in defining, subsuming, and combining.

(1) According to the various principles of designation (see § 28, obs.), this chapter may be also headed: The Concept, or also, From the Concept to the Syllogism. (2) Where *really* concrete subjectivity is, there is on that account *syillogism*. *Ego* is a syllogism, since the ego closes with itself; likewise *God*. But even where subjectivity appears only confusedly, it displays the same thing. The plant shows itself subject only in that it develops itself, has *made* itself subject only where its development has reached a *conclusion*, i.e., the *seed*; only, here the seed from which and that to which the development proceeds are distinct. (3) Herein lies the reason why Aristotle ["Posterior Analytics," ii. 2] identifies the *terminus medius* with the *ground*, and why with us *concluding* and *inferring consequences* are *synonyms*.

§ 189. But the attained *completion* of *subjectivity* is, as cannot be otherwise, also its *termination*. Reflection, that is to say, upon what has come to light in the theory of the syllogism, shows that *first* (in the figures of the immediate syllogism) every moment of the concept gets the meaning of the *terminus medius*, hence is the *mediating*; *secondly* (in the various species of the immediate syllogism), the *terminus medius* has developed into complete universality of the concept; finally, in the *third* place (as the conceptual syllogism), since immediacy always disappeared, everything has now the character of the

mediated. The result is, therefore, that the syllogism has proved to be a circle, returning into itself, of mediations or a syllogism of syllogisms.⁽¹⁾ Since here it has ceased to be the case that mediation is external to the things mediated, the mediation immanent in them is *constant*, and such a syllogism of syllogisms is necessarily a *process*. The concept has *realised* itself, *i.e.*, the determinations lying in it have unfolded themselves into a *system* which, in relation to the concept and the judgment regarded as the thesis and the antithesis, forms the *synthesis*.⁽²⁾ System is realised concept or *content*. But if we consider this attained reality of the concept, it is, because returned to itself, unity with itself, hence *being*, *i.e.*, immediacy; but, at the same time, as having issued from mediation, and hence as containing this moment in itself.⁽³⁾ The concept in this its mediated reality is *true* fact, or has *objectivity*. Objectivity, therefore, is the truth of the merely subjective concept⁽⁴⁾ and its fulfilment.⁽⁵⁾

(1) Such a syllogism of syllogisms is everything in which concrete subjectivity displays itself. In the family, for example, there is a trinity of syllogisms, since father, mother, child, are each the *terminus medius*. (2) *System* and *synthesis* are kindred concepts. The question as to the possibility of syntheses (Kant, Fichte) is the cardinal question of logic. A true system which were not a process is not conceivable. In it there occurs a mediation with self.

(3) Hence the expression of Hegel: immediacy through the sublation of mediation, or *again* acquired immediacy. Hence we have here *true* necessity. (Cf. § 131.) (4) We called the inner nature of the plant the *subject* of its development. (§ 152, obs. 5.) As this *subject* it exists already in the *seed*. But, so, it is still in its *untruth*. The true is, that the development became *objective* also. Later it will appear how in a certain way the contrary is just as correct. Similarly had relation shaped itself in the treatment of quality and of quantity and elsewhere. It may even here, still more later, be pointed out in how far one may speak of *mere* subjectivity, since until now subjectivity was the highest. As opposed to objectivity, the subject appears as the *immediate*, *i.e.*, lower. (5) The knowledge that objectivity forms the necessary completion, and fulfilment of the mere concept forms the *logical* basis for the ontological proof for the being of God, the real value of which, however, depends upon still another. It is clear even *here*, and will hereafter be still clearer (§ 207), that the distinction of subjective and objective (*cf.* § 4) is not insurmountable and absolute. Against the claim that there is no passage from the subjective to the objective, it is rather to be remarked that only that is a *subjective* (and not mere substrate) which shows itself to be such a passage. He in whom the idea of God is *subjectively*, *i.e.*, vitally, and not as a dead possession, will experience that God is active in him, and therefore has *actuality*, objectivity.

II.—SECOND CHAPTER.

OBJECTIVITY.

§ 190. By *objectivity* is to be understood neither mere being nor there-being, nor existence, nor, finally, mere actuality: all these determinations are poorer than it.⁽¹⁾ Objectivity is conceptual reality, or *reality only of the concept*. Objectivity exhibits in higher potency the nature of quantity and of phenomenon. The question, therefore, whether to the concept objectivity *appertains*, is peculiar, since *only* the concept can have objectivity.⁽²⁾ Philosophical linguistic usage since Kant justifies the taking of this word in this sense.⁽³⁾ Another sense in which it is usual to take this word will later show itself likewise to be justified. In the *first instance*, we have nothing to do with the opposition to the subjective upon which the latter usage of speech rests, but only to take objectivity as the explication and realisation of subjectivity.⁽⁴⁾

(1) By uneducated thought these words are generally used as synonyms: being was entirely undeter-

mined unity with self (§ 29), there-being was being modified by not-being (§ 35), existence a grounded being (§ 109), actuality phenomenon of the essential (§ 124); objectivity, finally, reality of the in-and-for-itself rational. ⁽²⁾ Of course, existence that may be grasped with the hands does not appertain to the concept, because it is to it too unworthy. Even the empiricist does not keep to this existence, but seeks the supersensible *law* as the really true; philosophy does this still more; it, like religion, demands elevation beyond the sensible. It was therefore barbarous when Kant, in his polemic against the ontological proof (of God's existence) cited the hundred dollars, which are not even to any rich man *an object*, much less to philosophy. Just as barbarous was it to demand that the true content, right, truth, etc., should exist *outside thought* (i.e., be without thought). ⁽³⁾ Kant opposes to one another maxims and laws: the latter are (according to him) *objective* principles. They are so because in them *reason* is realised. ⁽⁴⁾ Laws are objective, although they exist *only* in the will of subjects. In the entire Middle Ages, and then afterwards up to Kant, the word object was so little opposed to being in thought that rather *only* that which is thought, taken, of course, as the merely conceived, should have *objective* reality.

§ 191. Objectivity is, therefore, merely the concept itself, as again immediate. ⁽¹⁾ Now, in the realisation of the concept it has been shown that it is *system*, syllogism of syllogisms. (§ 189.) Objectivity is, therefore, only as totality, as system. But a totality with the character of immediacy is a *world*, ⁽²⁾ objectivity therefore a world of objects, and the

nearer determinations of objectivity which will come to light, or the *objective categories*,⁽³⁾ which are now to be developed, will give the various relations to which that world is subject.⁽⁴⁾ We have, therefore, first to consider the relations in which things stand as objects of a world. That these relations can display only *processes*, lies in the nature of the case. (§ 189.) An inactive world were no *world*.

(1) Before it had returned to this immediacy, it was *merely* subjective; hence even the highest syllogisms had a merely *subjective* necessity. (Cf. § 184, obs. 2.) (2) A *world* is more than a mere aggregate, it is a system, hence κόσμος; *world* is a category which can as well be applied to the spiritual as to the natural; one speaks of a *world* of thought, etc. Kant often employs the expression *realm*, e.g., "realm of ends," etc. The manifestation of essence appeared in a *plurality of things* (§ § 108, 109), the objectivity of the concept (*Begriff*) in a *world of objects*, or in a totality (*Inbegriff*) of them. (3) The categories of phenomenon (or existence) are especially applied where one will *describe* or *explain* nature (cf. § § 108, and 115, obs.); the objective categories have to do with it in so far as it is a *totality*. By their application we show the *systematic* connection of them, for whether a phenomenon is to be explained mechanically or chemically concerns the *systematics* of science. (4) That they find their application *alone* or even only *especially* in the sphere of *nature* is an illusion, which is, it is true, explicable by the concept of nature, but is, nevertheless, an illusion.

A. RELATION OF OBJECTS.

§ 192. Since objectivity has the character of immediacy, all its moments are immediate, hence not *posited* (cf. § 41), but if so, then *independent*. (§ 101, obs. 1.) But, on the contrary, they form a totality, only because they are one. They will therefore form a relation where, though independent, they *nevertheless* are related to one another, and are precisely therein *not independent*, or are *objects* to one another.⁽¹⁾ These *contradictory determinations* give us, as the *first*, and hence lowest, relation of objectivity, *interconnection* or *mechanical relation*. Mechanism⁽²⁾ is an objective category, and every world is ruled by it, or is in so far a *machine*.

(1) Herein lies the reason why the word object has, now a disparaging, now a respectful meaning. Things become objects only when they come together into a totality. That on which nothing depends is no object. (2) Since mechanism is a logical category, one correctly speaks of it even in the sphere of the mind. There is a mechanical memory; there are mechanical arrangements in the State, just as much as, where various sensible objects form an aggregate, there are mechanical combinations of them.

(a) Mechanism.

§ 193 (1). Since the related objects are independent, their relation appears external to them and

forced, and, in spite of their relation, they are externally conditioned towards one another, and cannot be thought as one, but only as *composite*.⁽¹⁾ Their relation to one another is, therefore, merely a superficial *operation* or so-called *impression*.⁽²⁾ That which receives the operation is therein not *free* but mechanically *determined*.⁽³⁾ This determination is possible, because it lies in the concept of the object, although independent, nevertheless, to be *related*, and hence, both to operate forcewise and to be susceptible of such operation, *i.e.*, to *suffer*. Since it lies so in the concept of the object to determine and to be determined,⁽⁴⁾ determinism, *i.e.*, the view which allows validity only to mechanical operation as an objective relation, leads to endless progression.⁽⁵⁾

(1) If one assume that, for example, body and soul are related to one another as objects, their unity can consist only in that an external force (God's will or a pre-established harmony) has *brought them together*. Combination is a favourite category of the understanding, which has not risen to higher categories; combination or composition arises by mere addition. (2) In the sensible world this is pressure, impact; in the spiritual, that which is done from threats or fear is *mechanically* done. (3) Because here the object is determined by another, compulsion is here posited, and the determinist denies freedom, *i.e.*, self-determination. This would give what is not given here, a *perpetuum mobile*. (4) That the two determinations are inseparable, is expressed by the proposition, *Every action calls forth a reaction*, and the two

are exactly (*i.e.*, quantitatively and qualitatively) equal, like impact and resistance. ⁽⁵⁾ The mechanical determinism of Descartes seeks to avoid this endless progression by supposing motion to act in a circle and to remain constantly the same.

§ 194 (2). In endless progression the contradiction contained in mechanical determination is only fixed, not overcome. It consists in that the object at one and the same time shall both be for itself, and be passive, *i.e.*, be for other. If the two determinations are, as is postulated by that progression (§ 49), actually posited as identical, this gives as the truth of it that the being of the object is to be dependent. The object, therefore, postulates something in relation to which it is dependent; but this will, therefore, be *over against* it, *i.e.*, outside it, and it will posit itself, on the contrary, as dependent, and will therefore fall outside itself.⁽²⁾ This *eccentricity* of the object makes it subject to a relation which we describe as *mechanical tendency*.⁽³⁾

(1) In Nature the object in relation to which another posits itself as dependent is called its *centre of gravity*, or its *centre*; even in the spiritual sphere one having a desire appears dependent as regards another thing, the object of his desire, wherein he has his centre of gravity. ⁽²⁾ Since it lies in the concept of the object to be *outside itself*, therefore every object gravitates toward *every* thing external to it. ⁽³⁾ A sensible manifestation of this tendency is *falling*; in the spiritual the conditions of passion

and the like are rightly described as a being-beside-one's-self, a losing of one's self, and the like.

§ 195 (3). But even in mechanical tendency the contradiction is not resolved, for, strictly taken, not *both*, but rather only one of the two determinations comes to its rights, namely, the one *opposed* to that which had shown itself in mechanical determinedness. That is to say, the object was essentially independent, there where it posited itself; its *suffering* came to it from without, and it was therefore *contingent*, or, what means the same, it exerted force.⁽¹⁾ Here, on the contrary, where it itself tends to become dependent, its separation from its object (centre) is the rather brought about only by *force*, hence (§ 126) *contingently*.⁽²⁾ But in this separation consists the independence. The true union, and hence the perfection, of the mechanical process or of mechanism will be given in a relation in which the two, centrality and eccentricity, are actually united. Where the object just as much *is* centre as it at the same time *seeks* a centre, then we have *free* or *absolute mechanism*,⁽³⁾ a relation which, since it represents actually a system and not a mere series, corresponds more to the concept of objectivity (*cf.* § 191) than do the mechanical determination and the mechanical tendency, which two it synthetically combines.⁽⁴⁾

(1) That positing of self only as independent appears in Nature as *inertia*, in the spiritual world as *indolence*. (2) The stone *tends* towards the centre of the earth, *i.e.*, not to remain a body but to become a mathematical point. If it went to the centre, it would be a point; there are *other* bodies in the way which prevent its doing so. It, therefore, suffers *violence* from them. (3) In nature we find such a mechanism in the solar system, in the circulation of the blood, etc.; the State has a side by virtue of which it has rightly been characterised as a *machine* in the management of taxation where the individuals, their needs, and the government form a system; each of these moments both is itself a centre, and has its centre in the other. (4) Herein is contained a reason why the view recommends itself, which will explain the absolute mechanism from the concurrence of *fall* and (§ 194) *impact*. (§ 193, obs. 2.)

§ 196. In the free mechanism are contained the two determinations, that the object both maintains its independence towards other, and also, on the contrary, posits itself as dependent. But now, however, that other is itself *object*; the same will, therefore, be true of it, and there results as the truth of free mechanism (hence also of mechanism in general, since in free mechanism all other forms of it were contained) a relation of two objects directed towards one another, each of which posits the other *first* as *dependent*, or will be posited by it as dependent, *secondly*, maintains itself, however, as *independent*, and, therefore, will posit the other as dependent. This being

directed towards one another, is no longer *external*, mechanical, but dynamic or *chemical relation*. The (every) world is, therefore, a system of chemical relations.

When it is demanded that it be *empirically* shown how out of a mechanical relation a dynamical *arises*, there is a confusion of temporal becoming with conceptual succession of stages. For that matter, it might here be answered to that demand, that even *empirically* it appears that the, in the first instance, *mechanical* relation of the central body to the planets manifests itself also *dynamically*, as light, by which, finally, *chemical* processes are brought about.

(b) *Chemism (Dynamism)*.

§ 197. The *chemical relation* makes its appearance when each of the mutually related objects is the *contradiction*, which is described as the *tension* of the sides towards one another.⁽¹⁾ Each by itself contradicts itself because it is incomplete, and *integrates* itself only by the absorption of the other. Therefore it is a violent abstraction to *isolate* ⁽²⁾ them while in mechanism precisely force brought them together. The tension is not a tension towards object in general, but towards objects antagonistically in tension : their relation is, therefore, called affinity, and also *elective* affinity in so far as this tension is an *inner nisus*, and in so far *similar* to arbitrary choice. Because here

the reciprocal tendency is an inclination, chemism is negation of mechanism.⁽³⁾

(1) This relation appears both in Nature (in the relation of acids and bases) and in the spiritual sphere, in the relation of the sexes, in the relation of nations in tension towards one another, etc. The word *chemical* is, therefore, here taken in a wider sense than usual. (2) The more objects are in chemical *tension*, the more are artificial means necessary to keep them asunder. (3) The attempt to reduce all chemical phenomena to mechanical relations mistakes this. (*Cf.*, however, § 200.)

§ 198. The postulated concurrence of two objects is therefore a *process*, in which they *equilibrate* themselves, and their *difference* and *tension* cease.⁽¹⁾ Since therein each of them is as much absorbed by the other as it absorbs it, the product is one produced by actual interpenetration—a *neutral*, in which each of the two is degraded to a moment. But since the chemical relation exists only so long as that one-sidedness, it is lost in the result of the chemical process. The product of it is no longer an object in tension, but one at rest in itself, which no longer must be integrated, but exist independently for itself.⁽²⁾

(1) If one puts, instead of chemical interpenetration, mechanical juxtaposition, one will fix the *difference* precisely in the extinction of which the chemical

process consists. Chemical combination is actual intussusception, and originates, therefore, not by addition, but is rather to be described as a union of *factors*, in which an actual multiplication, increase, is effected. *Concordia res parvæ crescunt.* ⁽²⁾ If the sexual relation be taken *only* on its chemical side, the child is the neutral. In conversation, in war, etc., chemically one-sided things are *neutralised* in that they enter into one another. Action and reaction are here no more, as in mechanical operation, the same, although proportional to one another. Oxygen is hydrogenised, hydrogen, oxygenised. In nature the crystal is the *caput mortuum* of the chemical process.

§ 199. If, however, the result of the chemical process is an object which is *not* chemically conditioned, but has the character of independence, so that it no more requires another for its completion, it is related to other, all other objects, *indifferently* as to things *indifferent*, i.e., its relation is external, mechanical. (§ 192.) In the *end*, therefore, chemism leads to mechanism, with the same necessity with which the latter led to it. If, however, at the *end* of chemism, mechanism appears, just as, at the end of mechanism, chemism appears, this merely means that they mutually limit one the other, and there issues as the *third relation* among objects the reciprocal determination of mechanism and chemism.

(c) *Reciprocal Determination of Mechanism and Chemism.*

§ 200. In this reciprocal determination the mechanical will show itself in so far the more powerful as the dynamical and chemical properties of the object are modified thereby,⁽¹⁾ and *vice versa* the modification in a chemical regard has as consequence a modification in a mechanical regard.⁽²⁾ Neither is more inexplicable, neither is more *natural*, as it is termed, than the other. This reciprocal determination of two relations makes intelligible the attempts to reduce each of them to the other.⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ In the natural sphere the chemical property changes with the (mechanically) finely divided condition; in the spiritual, inclination or disinclination changes with the pressure of circumstances or of force. ⁽²⁾ Thus the metal becomes friable by oxydation, etc. ⁽³⁾ To the attempts to reduce chemical affinity to mechanical attraction stands as correlate the attempt to explain the phenomena of gravitation by the assumption of chemical affinity between solar and terrestrial bodies. In the spiritual sphere some expect everything of force, others everything from impelling inner inclinations.

§ 201. But what is really contained in this reciprocal reference is this, that each of those relations refers to the other as to its truth; both, therefore, to a relation as their truth in which they are both sublated and

degraded to moments. How is this relation to be conceived? Mechanism was posited contradiction (§ 192); in chemism (§ 197) each of the related sides was a contradiction, since its being consisted in its allowing itself to be absorbed, hence *not* to be. Now objectivity should be a relation in which both these conditions are fulfilled at the same time. Objectivity will, therefore, so enter into difference with itself that at the same time each of the sides appearing in this differentiation is reflected in the other, and outside its unity with the other contradicts itself. But if, since objectivity is only the realised concept (§ § 189, 190), and the only moments in it which can enter into difference are the concept and its reality, there will, therefore, result as the truth of the relations hitherto considered between subject and object, a relation between the concept and its reality, *i.e.*, between *subjectivity* and *objectivity*.

From this it is clear (*cf.* the following section) in how far one is justified in opposing subjectivity to objectivity. Of course it will hereafter appear how this opposition is overcome. (§ 211.) In both relations there is here repeated what had shown itself, in a lower potency, in connection with essence and phenomenon.

B. THE SUBJECTIVE AS OPPOSED TO THE OBJECTIVE.

§ 202. All the developed determinations receive

their dues in the *relation of end*. First, in this there lies a dualism,⁽¹⁾ since what is *merely* subjective,⁽²⁾ or mere concept, stands opposed to a *mere* objective, and operates (*in so far* mechanically) upon it as upon its other. Secondly, the end is not a concept which could *remain* in its mere subjectivity, but refers to objectivity as its necessary compliment, as, on the other hand, objectivity, because it is properly *its* reality (§ 190),⁽³⁾ must receive it into itself as its necessary fulfilment. Objectivity can, on account of this (*as it were* chemical) relation, not withstand the end entering into it, but shows itself to be the *matter* to be determined by it.⁽⁴⁾ The relation of end is, *finally*, the truth of mechanism and chemism, and shows itself as this in that it degrades them to subservient moments, and they, powerless against the end, must serve it; ⁽⁵⁾ *against* the end, for this relation is the *truth* of those hitherto considered only in that it is at the same time their *negation*.⁽⁶⁾ If one combines the mechanical and the chemical mode of view under the term *physical*, the *teleological* stands above that.

(1) Anaxagoras, whose chief merit is rightly said to be that he introduced into philosophy the concept of end, is therefore necessarily a dualist. Before him there is only a mechanical or chemical view of the world; the former among the Atomists, the latter in Empedocles. (2) The end is *subject* of the change

which occurs in its realisation. This *subjectivity* of it acquires here the character of being *mere* subjectivity, because objectivity is still wanting to it. (Cf. § 189, obs. 3). As this *merely* subjective, the end is found where it is a *lack* (e.g., instinct of a plant or of an animal) or even a merely willed end, i.e., an end existing in an understanding. Here is explained how the words *subjective*, *subjectivity*, etc., could have the sense which Baumgarten first, and, since Kant, every one has joined with them. (Cf. § 152, obs. 5). ⁽³⁾ Just for this reason, on the other hand, *objectivity* here gets the meaning of *mere* objectivity, i.e., the quality of standing over *against* the end to be realised, or the concept. (See § 190.) ⁽⁴⁾ The difficulty contained in the question how a subjective end can make its way into objectivity, has caused many to take refuge in the assumption of a divine assistance or a predetermined harmony, and the like. It is to be obviated only by the perception that objectivity is the *subservient* moment of the concept, that which is (pre) *supposed* by it. ⁽⁵⁾ If one places the *causa finalis* on a par with the *causa efficiens*, and does not regard that as the truth of this, it must of course appear as something conceptless, i.e., as a *miracle*, that the end contravenes the (mechanically and chemically) working causes. The end realises itself in that it over-rides the laws of *mere* mechanism, i.e., *uses* them. Kant's identification of end and contingency emphasises as *tertium comparationis* the fact that both are *non-necessity* (the one of course not yet necessity, the other no longer so). Since the end is a higher concept than that of ground or of cause, it is a higher view which regards God as *end of the world* than that which merely conceives him as *cause* of the world. ⁽⁶⁾ In those two the determining lies *before*, in this it lies *behind*, the determined, or there the *ground* is the determining, here on the contrary the *consequent*.

If the tacit presupposition is made that there *can be* only those two, then the *impossibility* is that of easily *proving* (i.e., claiming), that what only *follows* can determine.

§ 203 (a). In the first instance, therefore, the end as merely subjective stands opposed to objectivity. In this dualism each moment has in the other its limit. Since the end has in objectivity its limit, it is *finite*; since it has not yet realised itself in objectivity it is only *inner*; since it is something entirely other than objectivity, it is for this only *external* end.⁽¹⁾ Over against it stands objectivity, which, since it *excludes* from itself or has over against itself the concept, gets the meaning of *conceptless mass*.⁽²⁾ The complement to the fact that the end is *merely* subjective, mere impulse is formed by the fact that to mass all subjectivity is wanting. As logical, this relation occurs everywhere, hence even in Nature.⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ These various designations are, according as one places himself upon the side of the end or upon that of objectivity, equally correct. ⁽²⁾ In the dualism of Anaxagoras, therefore, there stands opposed to the *vous* as the possessor of all ends, *things* in their mindless, massy finely-divided condition. ⁽³⁾ If, for example, from a mass which has not in itself this instinct, a nest is built; or also in all parasitic phenomena.

§ 204 (b). The contradiction ⁽¹⁾ which is contained

in the fact that the concept is not yet objectivity, although objectivity pertains to it, and that objectivity, although the concept's reality excludes it from itself, is resolved by the fact that the end realises itself. This occurs quite immediately; because it is more competent than the mass, it relates itself to it as mere (crude) force, and mass is related to it as unresisting *stuff* or as *material*, in or by which the end is realised.⁽²⁾ This realisation of itself in the stuff is a ridding itself of its *finitude* and the accomplishment of itself as against the mass.

(1) There is scarcely a concept in which it would be so easy to show contradictions as in the concept of end, *i.e.*, of the *inactive active*, of the *following ground*, etc. (2) Such *immediate* realisation of the end meets us in phenomena, where there is found over against the end an unresisting (soft) material which at once yields to it. Clay yields to the artist, but not so marble: the animal finds at hand what it seeks. The *voûs* of Anaxagoras find no difficulty where it carries its end into the mass.

§ 205 (c). In this form, however, the relation of end does not correspond to its concept. According to this latter, that which stands over against the end should actually be *its* objectivity, and have the meaning of its *basis* (see § 202); here, however, it appears as something *found*, already at hand by it, and just on that account can the end which is limited by that

external never be master of it. It remains external to the mass, as the mass to it, and, therefore, never loses its finitude. (2) If the relation of end is to correspond to its concept, the object will no longer merely yield to the end, and thereby necessarily offer first a (passive) *resistance*; (3) but in order really to be penetrated by the end, it must actually be negatively posited (*i.e.*, degraded to mere basis.) (§ 105.) This gives us the concept of *means*, *i.e.*, of an object determined by the end, *operating* (mechanically, chemically) upon other objects, and in this operation being negatively posited (used up). (4) This *mediated* realisation of the end, which displays itself no longer as crude *force* (see § 204) but as *cunning*, presupposes the immediate, and therefore stands higher than that. (5)

(1) The end, therefore, does not force its way *into* the material but merely produces changes in it from without. (2) They are *finite* ends which are thus realised in the mass. (3) The more the mass yields the more it gives way to the end, and the less the end presses into it. The end therefore remains external to it, and is only an external form (a concept, the relationship of which with the end Aristotle rightly insists upon) brought to the substrate. Since the *voûs* of Anaxagoras brings its ends to the mass, it is merely forming, shaping end, not animating nor creative. (4) The end realised itself not merely *in* the means, but through them, since it permeates them. (5) In man the immediate realisation of ends, just as in the animal the mediated, is reduced to a

minimum; he must *learn* that which the animal can do of itself, and by making *tools* always acts with *cunning*. In this cunning he gets rid of his barbarousness.

§ 206. But if one considers more precisely what lies in the concept of *means*, one finds in it an *object*, which, however, is determined, perhaps willed, by the *end*. The *finitude*, therefore, of subjectivity and objectivity has here been removed, since that which is an object is at the same time subjective also. The *means*, which, therefore, stand higher than the mass and higher than mere finite end, compel us to conceive a relation, in which no longer does the subjective end stand over against objectivity, but, rather, objectivity has come into accord with the end. This gives purposiveness or realised finite end.

The plow is something higher and more honourable than the desire of enjoyment which causes it to plough. Just so also is it more than the land.

C. FINALITY (OR PURPOSIVENESS).

§ 207. Where something is made *according to an end*, there it is practically denied that there is no transition from the subjective to the objective.⁽¹⁾ The hitherto merely inward end is here present in externality, and hence *realised*. (§ 123.) In this

realised end is, therefore, permanently combined what in the means was only transiently⁽²⁾ united; therefore it stands higher than the means,⁽³⁾ and, therefore, also than the merely wished or sought end. Therefore *enlightened*⁽⁴⁾ thought is an advance upon teleological contemplation,⁽⁵⁾ and may pride itself, as opposed to that, upon its realism.⁽⁶⁾

(1) This may be shown even as to Kant's celebrated "hundred dollars." (2) So long as it *serves*. If it is not used, it is a mere *object*, and sees in a tool which it cannot use mere iron. (3) This is the truth in the maxims, The end sanctifies the means, Whoever wills the end wills the means also, etc. They make the end the *principale*. (4) Even in the practical, enlightenment (industry) consists in that, in the place of mere (raw) material, something purposively formed is posited. (5) This asked *cui bono*? The former shows what one gets by a thing, or what it is good for: The transition from Anaxagoras to the Sophists is, therefore, an advance. (6) By "real interests" is, as a rule, to be understood only advantage.

§ 208. But not accidentally does the word *purposive* or *useful* signify that which (as means) serves an end. Since, that is to say, the end according to which the material was formed was one *external* to it, *i.e.*, finite, so also the union of the two can be only a mechanical and forced one; but then it is a contingent one (§ 128), and as such transitory, as that given in the means had been. But just therefore is

also every realised end, upon nearer consideration, a means to a new end to be attained.⁽¹⁾ And finitude is not really removed from the end, if the end is brought to the material from without and combined with it by a sort of juxtaposition, as it were; and one must not wonder if, in spite of their realisation, ends of that sort are called *merely subjective* or even *finite*.⁽²⁾

(1) The realised house is means to comfortable living, this to undisturbed labour, etc. (2) On a higher standpoint (see below § 211 ff.) the teleological mode of view which places the end outside the real and beyond it, appears immature and childish, and the enlightened, according to which things have value only as transformed (the cork-tree only as stoppers), narrow and silly.

§ 209. But not only is the (and hence every) attained finite end really means, but also the (and hence every) means is not distinct from the attained end, and therefore itself an end.⁽¹⁾ For if, in order to bring the subjective end into objectivity and to combine the two, a means was necessary, so also for the transient union was a means necessary. The concepts of the means and the realised end are, therefore, not to be separated, must be thought as unity. By alternating application of them to one and the same object, is, therefore, of course produced a *progressus* and a *regressus, in infinitum*.⁽²⁾ (See § 48.)

If we sum up what has been shown, we think *end* which is *means* and is not wanting in reality, just because it is *self-realising end*. This gives that which we call *self-end* or *ideal*.⁽³⁾ To it as to actual unity of subjectivity and objectivity finite purposiveness refer as to its truth.⁽⁴⁾

(1) The means to the building of the house must be procured by all kinds of means, for which still again means must be employed, etc. (2) Such a series is given in the preceding. (§ sub. 1, and in what is remarked sub. 1.) (3) As the Sophists point beyond Anaxagoras, so Socrates goes beyond the Sophists, in that, in place of the finite end, he puts self-end, and therefore, in the place of the useful, the good. (4) The teleological argument for the existence of God, which passes from the existence of the merely purposive to the concept of a self-end, has its *logical truth* in this transition.

§ 210. A retrospect of the chapter closed (§ § 190, 209), which has considered the categories of *objectivity*, which in this sphere corresponds to phenomenon, just as concept does to essence, shows how, *first*, the *relation among objects* comes to be as objective relation. In this relation among objects objectivity appears in its immediacy; the various forms which the relation of objects could assume were *mechanism*, *chemism*, and *reciprocal determination* of the two. They correspond to what in the Second Part the complex of things had exhibited. Then, *secondly*, objec-

tivity entered into difference and mediation, which gave us the *relation of the subjective and the objective*, in which the relation of essence and phenomenon is repeated. *Finally*, in the realised end we saw *subjective end become objective* (as there the inner expressed itself), which referred as to the self-end, or to the *idea* as the final true relation. It does not need to be emphasised how exactly the transition from this chapter corresponds to that from the Second Chapter in the Second Part of the logic to the Third.

III.—THIRD CHAPTER.

IDEA.

§ 211. By *idea* we mean *self-end*. As such, the idea is at once accomplished being and end to be realised,⁽¹⁾ and must be thought as immanent *process* of self-mediation.⁽²⁾ While in the realisation of the end the subjective and the objective still stand over against one another, the idea is, as their unity, subject-object.⁽³⁾ Where, therefore, philosophy places itself upon the standpoint of the idea, or is idealism, the opposition of subject and object does not for it exist.⁽⁴⁾ The idea as this unity is *reason*⁽⁵⁾ in the sense of rationality, so that to *self-conscious* reason there is here no reference. To the idea as this unity the *concept* appears opposed as a subordinate moment.⁽⁶⁾ Since the idea contains in itself the *highest opposition*, resolved, it is, on the one hand, easy to point out contradictions in it,⁽⁷⁾ and, on the other, the idea is exalted above all objects, so that it contains in itself ground and consequent, cause and effect, etc., as their unity. The various determinations which

the consideration of self-end brings to light may be called *ideal categories*.⁽⁸⁾ They correspond to what in the First Part was treated under the superscription *mode*; in the Second, under *actuality*.

(1) Of these two determinations, the idea in Plato's sense emphasises the first, the idea in the Kantian sense the second. The former is, therefore, lifeless, the latter merely regulative. The idea is neither. (2) The idea realises itself, is not completed, dead being. Therefore it is *system*. (3) In the idea, therefore, the concept which had got lost in objectivity returns to itself. (4) Philosophy as idealism furnishes the proof for the possibility of the union of Logic and Metaphysics (see § 4). (5) Schelling therefore defines reason (what he calls reason means here idea) as the unity of the subjective and the objective. When he places this definition at the beginning, and then proceeds, as it were, analytically, there applies to his procedure what was said in § 151. (6) Hence one may speak of *mere* concept in so far as one means thereby the concept as not yet by itself posited as identical with objectivity. As distinguished from it, the idea is the *truly* actual. (7) In that, that is to say, the idea is *analysed*, i.e., abstractly considered. (8) For the same reason for which the categories of objectivity, although *logical* categories, nevertheless appear to find their application chiefly in the natural sphere, the ideal categories, particularly the higher, have theirs principally in the sphere of spirit. Spirit is the idea as *knowing* itself, reason as self-conscious (*cf.* my "Outlines of Psychology, § 92).

§ 212. The idea is unity of concept and objectivity. This it must be even in the beginning, i.e., as it must

first be conceived. If now that which is at the beginning is in general the immediate, the idea is first to be taken in the way of immediacy, and since immediacy was *being*, the idea is first to be considered as being or as immediate.

A. THE IMMEDIACY OF THE IDEA.

§ 213. The *immediacy* or being of the idea we call *life*.⁽¹⁾ Even as being, the idea cannot contradict its destiny of being self-mediation, infinite returning to self; its being will, therefore, be an *infinite being*, i.e. (§ 50), *being-for-self*. But if being-for-self shows itself only in beings-for-self, so also will life appear in a plurality, and, since this is a conceptual plurality, in a totality of *living things*.⁽²⁾ In each of these is the *idea*, i.e., self-end.⁽³⁾

(1) This word is here taken as *logical* category, and, therefore, in as wide a sense as it is taken in when one speaks of living community, etc. This category forms the abstract basis both of vitality in nature and of other spiritual relations. To apply it means to consider everything *organically*. In the highest sphere *beauty* is the immediate existence (life) of the absolute spiritual content. (2) Hence, in popular usage *life* often denotes a complex of living beings. (3) Only what is manifestation of self-end has life. Self-end idea has been rightly recognised by Kant as the real nature of life. His "Critique of Judgment" contains more (true) idealism than all the rest of his

works. It is particularly the immediate idea with which he therein occupies himself, hence the reflections upon life and upon beauty.

§ 214. In every living thing, therefore, there will be a no longer *external* end (§ 203), but an immanent end, which does not realise itself *against* a foreign material to which it does violence (§ 204), or at the cost of a means to be used up (§ 205); but this end will realise itself in such means as have value in the realisation of that itself as end. If we call that end the vital *principle*, or *soul*,⁽¹⁾ the means, organs or *members*, and their totality *body*,⁽²⁾ the living will be a unity of body and soul,⁽³⁾ and life be merely where there exists such a unity. Since the manifold (the *members*) are not an aggregate which is held together by an external force, but the end as the ideality⁽⁴⁾ of the many posits them as unity,⁽⁵⁾ all mechanical and chemical action are degraded to a moment, and appear *as such* only where life is imperilled or extinct.⁽⁷⁾

(1) This word is here taken as Aristotle takes it, *i.e.*, as immanent end. (2) Even in the spiritual and the highest spheres this category finds its application. The Church is the *body* of the Lord. *Organs* are not parts, not even mere means; an organic view of the State does not regard it as an aggregate. The *organism* is more than a mere machine, *i.e.*, than a *mechanism*, therefore a *system* in the highest sense. If these concepts are taken as the *highest*, God would be con-

ceived as the *soul* of the world, which, again, is more than to conceive Him as its *end*. (See § 202, obs. 5.)⁽³⁾ Since *life* equals *idea*, Hegel ["Werke" v., p. 243; "Encyklopädie," § 216] may with right describe the *idea* as unity of body and soul. ⁽⁴⁾ The soul continually *negates* in the interchange of material the manifoldness of the organs, and leads one into the other the more the stronger it is. Animals live their lives more quickly than trees. ⁽⁵⁾ According to the concept laid down, the *separation* of body and soul is a *non-sens*. ⁽⁶⁾ How the merely chemical mode of view is not applicable to living being appears in an empirical way in the fact that organic matter, even chemically regarded, is a composition different from the inorganic. ⁽⁷⁾ In disease, in decomposition, these are *merely* chemical processes: digestion is not, because it is something still more than that.

§ 215 (a). Since the living is manifestation of the *idea*, it cannot be processless rest, but its nature is, to *result*. This its activity as process appears, in the first instance, as directed towards itself, so that the living produces itself: as the *productive product* it shows itself in that it realises itself (as end) in itself (as material). This self-production and self-formation gives us the process of *organisation*. Without *organisation* there is no life. To it belongs both its activity as a *manifold* and ⁽¹⁾ the positing of this activity *by itself*.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ That in this process of organisation *precisely* the soul, *i.e.*, the *principle* or *subject* of life, is taken as the formative, lies in the nature of this relation. In

general it is a likeness of the relation which, apart from the example of Aristotle, in the Middle Ages caused the soul to be conceived as the *form* of the body, and the body as its *matter*. The soul is not finite, but immanent, hence *absolute form*. The body is not mere *substrate*, but the only possible mode of actuality. This relation Aristotle ["De Anima," i., 3, § 23] always affirmed in his polemic against the transmigration of souls. (Cf., however, § 109, obs. 3.)⁽²⁾ The elements are, therefore, not living, because there is in them no manifoldness; crystals are not, because there is no manifoldness coming from within.

§ 216 (b). But herewith is the activity of the living not closed. That is to say, since it is the concept as having objectivity, so it stands in objectivity as a part of a world (§ 191); it will, therefore, be subject to all the relations in which objects stand to one another (§ 192), to all the ways in which they act upon one another. But if every mere *object* could be *determined* by the other, this is not possible here, since the being *objective* (objectivity) is its own moment, and therefore has no justification against it. Therefore, operation of objects upon the living as such⁽¹⁾ will be for this only the occasion of degrading it to a moment: the object can only *stimulate* ⁽²⁾ the living: the living, on the contrary, will, as it were, infect the merely objective with vitality, by *assimilating* ⁽³⁾ it. The process of assimilation is neither mechanical composition nor chemical neutral-

isation, though it has both as its presuppositions; without *assimilation* there is no life.⁽⁴⁾

(1) When a living thing is pushed, lifted, etc., it does not enter into the account *as* living. (2) Only the living can, and every living thing must, be *stimulated*, i.e., in its *reaction* is not equal to the (stimulating) action, but is specifically different therefrom. (3) This infectional process (Oken, Hegel) of the assimilating object Aristotle has in mind when he shows that everything nourishes itself by what *is* and *is not* like itself. Assimilation is, therefore, no mere chemical process. In this a third thing is produced, the neutral. In the former, on the contrary, the product is only *one* of the two, namely, the assimilating—a difference that is absolute. (4) Not even in the spiritual sphere. Learning is assimilation: without it the mind ossifies and dies.

§ 217 (c). But the closer consideration of the process just explained compels us to think another: The result, namely, is that, on *the one hand*, in such process the living *satisfies* itself. This satisfaction lies merely in the fact that it has produced itself anew,⁽¹⁾ has enhanced its self-feeling. *On the other hand*, in the process of satisfaction the object is infected by it, and becomes of *its essence*. Both sides taken together give us the concept of a process in which the living produces itself by assimilating an object stimulating it, which represents to it only its own essence, by which, therefore, it is equally *assimilated*.⁽²⁾ This process in which both of the

forms hitherto considered of the life-process are synthetically combined, may be described as process of *re-creation* or *reproduction*. Without it there is no life. ⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ The living thing *re-creates* itself in the process of assimilation. ⁽²⁾ The feeling of the necessity of this transition—which transition cannot, of course, have the meaning that by assimilation, of nourishment for example, the latter becomes a representative of the species—all hitherto have had who have identified the nutritive and the reproductive function. ⁽³⁾ In the natural sphere it occurs as process of the genus; in the spiritual, the mind reproduces itself only in community with its fellows. Language is then the fructifying germ, without which the mental life dies. If, by mechanical juxtaposition an *aggregate*, by chemical intussusception a *product*, is generated, assimilation and reproduction are equivalent to *potentiating*; this is not merely perservation, but enhancement of existence.

§ 218. But the result of this process is, since assimilation is also a *becoming* assimilated, that each of the two things undergoing a process have *as such* disappeared, only that remains which was not outwardly directed, the identical essence. The living, therefore, does not in this process so much produce *itself* as rather only its (universal) essence, and that at the cost, and with the sacrifice, of its individuality.⁽¹⁾ But if now the idea was the *immediate* in

that it existed in these (living) individuals, and it here appears, in the highest form of the life-process, that individuals *as such* must cease to be, it is manifest that the idea as *immediate* has disappeared, *i.e.*, has *for us* ceased to be. But if immediacy, which was distinctionlessness, has ceased to be, the idea which at first was to be conceived in immediacy will now have to be thought rather as having entered into difference, *i.e.*, as reference and as *essential relation*.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ In the generic process the individual does not produce itself as individual, but produces its *blood*, *i.e.*, its substance. Just so, man in society gives up his individuality. *De duobus intellectibus fit unus*, well says *Johannes Erigena* of dialogue. ⁽²⁾ Also here obtains, of course, what in the preceding §, obs. 2, and elsewhere, has often been recalled as regards transition. (*Cf.*, however, § 221, obs. 2.)

B. THE IDEA AS ESSENTIAL RELATION.

§ 219. The idea is *essential relation* where it relates itself to itself, where, therefore (*cf.* § 117), the idea forms both sides, though in each side the other shines (§ 89) as its necessary complement. In this relation the idea can enter only as it is posited in the different sides, always according to the different moments which are contained in it. Hence the *subjective* idea will stand over against the *objective*,

and each will necessarily be referred to the other. This relation, like every other, will, accordingly as the one or the other side is regarded as the starting-point, be *two-fold*. *Objective* rationality (idea) posited as *subjective* gives us the concept of *truth*.

Socrates got beyond the Sophists (see § 209, 1) in that he gave the idea validity, but only in the form of immediacy, hence in his ideal *living*: where he brings it to his consciousness it is always *beauty* which he praises. Plato made the advance that he conceived the idea as theoretical and practical, *i.e.*, as relation.

(a) *The True.*

§ 220. In *the first instance* it is clear from the above development how *truth* is distinguished from mere objectivity. It consists in, that concept and objectivity have become adequate one to the other, and is, therefore, *ideal objectivity*. Therefore, in the entire investigation of the categories each has been described as *untrue* which has not been adequate to its concept, but those in which it was adequate to its concept as its *truth*. (Cf. § 19.) Therefore the truth does not appertain *to* the idea, but the idea, and *only* the idea, is the truth. A thing contains truth *only* in so far as it contains idea.

A man exists ; man, i.e., humanity, or the world

of men, has *objectivity*; a *true* man is he who has become adequate to his concept, his destiny; in whom the subject identifies itself with humanity, and hence has won *ideal* existence.

§ 221. But in what has hitherto been said is contained only what belongs to the ideal relation *generally*, whether it be regarded from the one or the other side, and what here was given as the concept of the true obtains likewise of the good.⁽¹⁾ (§ 224, ff.) More closely, however, this relation was determined, to the effect that in it the objectivity of the idea was the starting-point, its subjectivity, its goal. The idea will, therefore, have this *theoretical* character, or will be *truth*, if its *object* is for the idea as *subject*. Since, now, the idea as subjective is manifested in rational subjects, which as such are conscious, that is true which is known as it *is*, and truth is *self-manifesting* or *conscious rationality*.⁽²⁾ A truth which were not for knowledge would be a *contradictio in adjecto*.⁽³⁾ Objective rationality of *itself* tends to be as subjective, and subjective rationality, likewise, to take into itself objectivity. And to the subject's impulse to know, corresponds the impulse of revelation in objective rationality, and only by this correspondence does the truth come to be.⁽⁴⁾

⁽¹⁾ Hence the expressions, *true man* and *good man*, are used as synonyms. ⁽²⁾ The usual explanation of

truth, which in the place of knowledge puts representation, in the place of objective rationality, mere existence, gives a definition at most of correctness, not of (rational) truth. If here the transition is made from the process of reproduction (§ 218) to truth and conscious rationality, it is also empirically shown as follows: In the first of the above-cited examples (§ 217, obs. 3) there is produced in the generic process that in which the single exemplar has its truth: in the second the giving-up of individuality leads to *knowledge of the truth*. Hence the dialectic of Socrates and Plato *consists* only in conversation. ⁽³⁾ This reference to knowledge is suggested in the word ἀλήθεια, also in the fact that in German the word *manifest* (*offenbar*) frequently stands in the place of *true* (*wahr*). The thought of some mystics that because there are *eternal truths* there must be an *eternal understanding*, contains, therefore, the truth. ⁽⁴⁾ It is usual to call *accident* that which is merely this correspondence. Whoever *seeks* will *find*.

§ 222. The truth, therefore, comes to be only in the act in which objective rationality becomes subjective, *i.e.*, the act of knowing. But if this is so, knowing must be both the *perceiving* of truth and the *producing* of it. In the former aspect the truth is *assumed* or *received*; in the latter, it is *put forth* (outward). If these moments are one-sidedly held fast, there results the opposite views of *dogmatical empiricism*, which knows only axioms and theorems, and recognises only an analytic method; and of *constructive idealism*, for which there are only postulates and problems and synthetic method.

The psychology which considers knowing not so much to show how truth comes to be as how the subject comes into possession of it, must, only with a changed point of view, treat of much that appears here. (*Cf.* § 110, obs., and my "Outlines of Psychology," § 111, and ff.)

§ 223. If we consider what lay in the fact that the truth comes to be by being *produced*, it is manifest that unity of the subjective and the objective idea is the product of an activity which has its proper *ground* in the idea as subjective, hence *proceeds from* it. Therefore the relation which was described as truth points to another (or another form of the ideal relation), in which the subjectivity of the idea is the starting-point; and the *goal*, that it be *as objective*. Rationality, as rationality which is to be carried into objectivity, is *rationality as end*, the *good*. Since the good has emerged as the necessary consequence of the true, it is to be seen in how far Kant can grant to the practical reason the primacy in relation to the theoretical.

(b) *The Good.*

§ 224. The good is, in the first instance, precisely as the true, ideal relation, and has being only where the subjectivity of the idea and its objectivity are

adequate to one another. (Cf. § 221, 1.) But if this relation gave the *true* in that the subjective idea was made adequate to the objective idea, and hence *thought* as it *is*, the *good* occurs where subjective rationality is carried over into objectivity, so that it now *is* as it was *thought* (willed). Thus there results as a determination corresponding to that discovered in § 221. The good is *rationality that is to be realised*, or *rationality as end*. So little as *mere* objectivity is truth, so little is *mere* subjectivity the good, if it have not the determination also of objectivity.⁽¹⁾ Compared with it, the finite end is merely subjective, it, on the contrary, *objective*.⁽²⁾

¹⁾ The mere conception of duty, the so-called ideal, does not of itself make man good. ⁽²⁾ Kant is, therefore, entirely right when he opposes to one another maxims and laws of reason as subjective and objective. A view which, as, say, Fichte's, knows no higher category than the good, conceives God only as the world's final purpose that *is to be*, as a world-plan to be realised, moral world-order.

§ 225. The good is the idea as end. But the end had as its truth and its termination its realisation. In *the termination*, therefore (or really), the good appears as realised, *i.e.*, as *being*.⁽¹⁾ But the idea as it is *realised* or has objectivity, is for *knowledge*, is no longer a problem for the will; the concept of the

good, therefore, points with necessity to the idea *as truth*, with same necessity as that with which transition must be made from the truth to the good. Each is in the *termination* the other, and has it, therefore, as much for its *limit* as for its *presupposition*.⁽²⁾ If one will avoid this consequence, this is possible only if one never brings the matter to a conclusion, and, therefore, on the one hand, takes *knowing*, and thereby (§ 222) the *true*, as incomplete, and, on the other, willing as a continual *problem*, and so brings them into the endless progression.⁽³⁾

(1) Therefore, Kant, in the consideration of the good, is driven to the idea of a perfect essence, *i.e.*, the theoretical *assumption* of the reality of the good. (2) Hence, on the other hand, Kant is compelled to concede to the practical reason, the primacy, because it limits knowledge. (3) Therefore, the thing-in-itself remains behind as a forever *unknown residuum*; as its correlate it has the never realised ideal of the good. Fichte, also, takes the good as endless problem, and is forever again brought back to the non-deducible *appulsion*, which is the (theoretical) *conditio sine qua non* for the practical being of the spirit.

§ 226. If we bring the endless progression to a conclusion by fulfilling what it demands (§ 49), there results that the idea, since it is already *is* as it *should* be carried out, must be conceived as neither the one nor the other, because it is both the one and the

other. Thus it is the *idea in general*, rationality taken absolutely, which is both realised good, and living, self-realising truth. The idea so taken is actual return-into-itself has as such got rid of all finitude,⁽¹⁾ and is *absolute idea*,² absolute rationality, in short, the *absolute*.⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ The true and the good, because each had it, end in the other, were still *finite* modes of the idea. Therefore, it appeared still as a plurality (these two) of ideas. Each of them still displays in itself finitude. In the absolute sphere, religion occurs as reality (law and gospels, morals and dogmatics). Hence Plato (§ 219, obs.) has been styled *Christianus ante Christum*. ⁽²⁾ This means here the idea taken *absoluté*. This neither theoretical nor practical idea has also been called speculative idea. ⁽³⁾ The idea is the absolute, since it realises its determinations, and so has *absolved* its development. All categories may, therefore, be called *definitions* (of course defective) *of the absolute*, by which is asserted merely that the (logical) *absolute* is not to be confounded with the (theological) concept of *divinity*. The *absolute* is far from being the absolute *spirit*. Historically, the transition from the theoretical and practical to the absolute idea was made by Aristotle.

C. THE IDEA AS ABSOLUTE.

§ 227. Since the idea has got rid of and taken up into itself the limitation which it had when the good

and the true were opposed to each other, it is the *truly infinite* (§ 47). It is no longer a rational end to be realised like the good, but the self-realising *final end*; it is *absolute reason*, Logos, whose manifestation all actuality is. As is the difference of the good and the true, so is also the difference of all categories, which had in a succession ascended to this difference destroyed in the idea; the idea is the *totality of the categories* (§ 6), the category taken absolutely.

The problem of philosophy is to apprehend in actuality the absolute, the absolute final end, the Logos, *i.e.*, reason absolutely, *absolute idea*. It is, therefore, neither empirical nor practical, but *absolute idealism*. The word reason is here taken as it is when one says, There is *reason* in the world. How reason, or the Logos, is related to *God*, logic, which knows nothing of God, cannot, of course, say. (*Cf.*, however, my "Nature or Creation," p. 82, ff.)

§ 228. Since difference is destroyed in the idea, the idea has returned to immediacy, and it is, therefore, *life*. This it is, in that it is not resting being but *process*. On the other hand, the difference in it is *sublated*, hence not destroyed, and the life of the idea is constant mediation with self.⁽¹⁾ The process of self-mediation is *logic*, objectively taken. To follow this is the task of the *science of logic*, or *logic* subjectively taken. Its procedure consists in *method*, *i.e.*, in

its *accompanying* the movement of the idea through the various categories onward. The method is *dialectical*, since that movement itself is *dialectic*.⁽²⁾ The science of logic, therefore, has for its subject the idea, and if in the Introduction it was called the science of the categories, here its true definition ⁽³⁾ is that it is the *science of the idea*. This it is in a double sense; on the one hand, since it has the idea as its object, and, on the other hand, because, having originated through the self-movement of the idea, it has this as its subject.⁽⁴⁾ (Cf. § 152, obs. 5.)

⁽¹⁾ In this respect one may (figuratively) speak of the *blessed, reconciled* life of the idea. ⁽²⁾ Here is made clear in how far in the Introduction the pre-supposition could be made, of the subject of logic, that it could have in itself the necessity of self-development. (Cf. § 18, ff.) ⁽³⁾ This can be intelligible only at the *end*, must, therefore, first be given at the end. ⁽⁴⁾ Here the *genitivus objecti* and *subjecti* coincide, as in *amor dei*.

§ 229. As only here at the close of the logic can be said *what* logic is, so only here can one become conscious of what has been *done* in the exposition of it. In the beginning of the exposition, namely, the resolve to engage in the activity of pure thought, appeared as a mere act of arbitrary will. (§ 25.) At most it could only be pointed out that it was not

inconsistent with reason. But now we know that this resolve has been nothing other than the impulse of reason, of the idea to be *thought*. (§ 221.) What we might regard as our doing appears now as that of the idea which impelled us. Therefore, we have not generated the logic, but it has generated itself; we have merely *followed* it. What *there* might appear strange, namely, that thought has to be considered as something living, appears *here* as necessary, since nothing else has been thought than the *idea* which has shown itself to be the *process* of self-mediation (§ 226), which, therefore, had to be followed up to the point where it has *completed* itself as process.

§ 230. As at the conclusion of *each* main part, so here, recapitulation must *first* recall the course of the chapter concluded. In this chapter we have had to do with the *idea*, which had shown itself to be the unity of subjectivity and objectivity. This unity met us *first* as *immediate* in the phenomenon of *life*; there was shown that the idea opposed itself to itself as subjective and objective, and, in the *essential relation*, presented to us the ideas of the true and the good; *finally*, when all moments had attained to their rights, the idea was considered as it had absolved and *completed* itself. The recapitulation will, *secondly*, then have to show what the peculiarity of the

categories is which were treated of in the *Third Part* of the *Logic*. They receive according to the different principles of nomenclature the superscription, *Concept*, or *From the Abstract Concept to the Absolute Idea*, or *Categories of Freedom*. First has been shown the concept as *subject* of (every) free development; further, it has been shown how this development realises and explicates itself in *objectivity*; and, finally, it has come to light that the real truth is there arrived at where both sides are adequate to one another, so that the idea which contains in itself all categories of freedom (all the earlier ones, which entered into these), as sublated moments, thus becomes full, or *all, truth*. If, finally, only at the close of every science can be said what its peculiar significance is, so only here also may be brought to consciousness what logic really *is* and *should be*. But this occurs when two things are done; first, when it has been shown how logic, when it has completed its course, forms a closed totality; second, when logic has been defined in relation to the discipline contiguous to it, in the entire system of science. To accomplish the first of the two is the *third* task which the recapitulation had. It is, to compare it with the recapitulations already given, placed only at *the close of the whole*.

§ 231. The goal of logic has been to follow the

mediation of the idea. Even though already at the beginning the subject was only the idea striving to know itself, the idea was so, however, only as it is most remote from the goal of self and mediation, it was *immediacy*, and was by us termed *being*. The most remote possible from being the totality of *all* categories, it was the poorest of all the categories indeed, poverty itself, which yearned after a fulfilment. It strove to rid itself of the contradiction that it, the totality, was *as emptiness*. This contradiction we corrected by executing the self-correction of the idea, and passing on to those categories which lie nearer to its truth. The contradiction which displayed itself in all the categories of immediacy, impelled us onward to the categories of *mediation*. As against the idea as mediation, immediacy appeared to be the untrue; as mediation the idea was called *essence*. Since the idea appeared here, ruptured within we had constantly to do with relations; the more concrete these became, the more we approached the abandoned sphere. It appeared, namely, that the idea as mediation likewise contradicted itself, and that the highest form of mediation as unresolved contradiction pointed to the sphere where all contradictions were solved. In the sphere of *freedom* we have observed the idea as *self-mediation*, where it as completed is satisfied in itself, so that the entire

logic has had to do with the gradual self-realisation of the idea as such, hence with its *becoming*, whether we regard this becoming as becoming in us or as *becoming in itself*. (Cf. § 228.)

§ 232. But if the logic has considered this gradual self-realisation of the idea, its *becoming*, what then is the real result? Manifestly the settled precipitate of that process (cf. § 34), *i.e.*, the idea as *there-being*, for therebeing was the product of becoming as *complete* since it *has* realised itself. But the idea or reason as *therebeing*, as *complete* and *perfected*, we call *Nature*, and transition must be made from logic to the philosophy of Nature as the second main part of the system of philosophy, since if one has thought the idea in its becoming to the end, one is compelled to think it as become, *i.e.*, as there-being. This transition to Nature is *not* a transition of the idea, for the idea, as in itself completed, is satisfied in itself, has not, as hitherto, to complete itself; it no longer *becomes* other, because there is in it no lack, no limitation; but the science of logic passes over into the science of Nature, or *we* from the idea to Nature. This transition is still less a speculative demonstration of creation; here is no question *either* of a *creator* or of a forth-putting of creative *activity*. Nature as it has here presented itself is only *there-being rationality*.

It is a task of the *philosophy of Nature* to justify the calling of *Nature*, only therebeing rationality; just as much is *its* task to show that the contradiction which lies in that Nature is idea (hence process, life), and yet *therebeing* (i.e., processless) drives us beyond Nature. It is the task of the *philosophy of religion* to investigate whether what we call Nature may have also still another meaning (of creation). Both lie outside *logical* investigation.

§ 233. With this we pass out of the sphere of logic. This had to do with the *inner* movement of the idea, its continual completion of itself; now, on the contrary, reason is to be conceived as *external therebeing*, as completed. Hence, the distinction between the subject of Logic and that of the philosophy of Nature is so fixed that the former has to do with the idea in its *subjectivity*, the latter with idea in its *objectivity*. In distinction from the philosophy of Nature, which will explain reason as *therebeing*, externally existing, logic may be defined as *science of the idea in the abstract element of thought*. This definition, which can here for the *first time* be intelligible, shows how far it could be said with right that logic is *fundamental philosophy*,⁽¹⁾ but also *mere* fundamental philosophy. It forms the *presupposition* and *basis* of the concreter parts of philosophy.⁽²⁾ The logical categories are the *universal* relations of reason, which are *valid alike* in all spheres;⁽³⁾ one must know these before one can

show how in each sphere reason displays itself in a *particular* manner.

(¹) Logic forms the *foundation* for the other parts of philosophy, and its study is for that of the latter indispensable, since, in order to apprehend *reason* in Nature, the life of the mind, etc. (which alone physiology, pneumatology, etc., aim at), one must know what *reason* is, which precisely logic shows. (²) It forms *only* the foundation, just because it makes known only at the end that which they presuppose, and with which they begin. With logical knowledge, therefore, one stands as yet only in their fore-court. (³) It is therefore a mistaking of the nature of the logical categories when one, for example, believes that he has conceived the essence of space, time, motion, when one says that they are being, not-being, becoming. Not these categories, but how the *totality of the categories*, i.e., reason, manifests itself in space, is what the philosophy of nature should explain. The philosophy of nature of Vanini, who saw in a straw-halm (his) God, i.e., the (entire) absolute or (entire) reason, is something far better than such a repetition of the logic. The application of the categories in the concreter parts of philosophy is, therefore, not false, but it gives, when it keeps to the universal, not that which one really wishes—the specific. Rightly would the physicist be dissatisfied if one should demand of him, in the case of any phenomenon, to be satisfied with the fact that it was a manifestation of causality. That is, of course, correct; but this *logical* category does not suffice, he wishes to know what *physical* category (electricity, heat, etc.) is here to be applied.

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